United Master Plumbers Ass'n of R. I. v. Bookbinder Plumbing & Heating Co.

• Citation: 99 R.I. 683,210 A.2d 573
• Decision Date: 24 May 1965
• Docket Number: No. 10672,10672
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Parties: UNITED MASTER PLUMBERS ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND, Inc. v. BOOKBINDER PLUMBING & HEATING CO., Inc. Ex

Page 573

210 A.2d 573

99 R.I. 683

UNITED MASTER PLUMBERS ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND, Inc. v. BOOKBINDER PLUMBING & HEATING CO., Inc.

Ex No. 10672.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 24, 1965.

Anthony A. Giannini, Providence, for plaintiff.

Ronald H. Glantz, Providence, for defendant.

CONDON, Chief Justice.

This is an action of assumpsit for breach of contract brought by United Master Plumbers Association of Rhode Island, Inc. for the use and benefit of Bassett & Company, Inc. against Bookbinder Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. The association will sometimes hereafter be referred to as the use plaintiff and Bassett as tthe legal plaintiff. The defendant demurred to the declaration on the ground among others that the use plaintiff had no legal standing to sue in its own name.

The demurrer was overruled and defendant duly excepted thereto. Thereafter the case proceeded to trial on the merits before a justice of the superior court without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence defendant moved to dismiss on the same ground alleged in its demurrer. The trial justice refused to entertain the motion but said he would decided the question in defendant's favor if at the argument on the merits it could convince him that the use plaintiff was not in law a proper party plaintiff.

After the argument he decided to the contrary and entered a decision on the merits in favor of the use plaintiff and noted defendant's exception thereto. The defendant filed a bill of exceptions including that exception, its exception to the overruling of its demurrer, and two exceptions to evidentiary rulings. However, it appears that only the exception to the overruling of the demurrer was allowed by the trial justice and no steps were taken by defendant in this court to establish the truth of the other exceptions. Consequently the only exception properly here for our consideration is to the overruling of the demurrer.

The controversy between the parties arose out of the following facts. The defendant and the legal plaintiff Bassett were members of the use plaintiff association. As such members each had agreed to be subject to the following bylaw of the association:

'The member whose bid is tabulated by the bid depository as the lowest bid shall be declared to be the lowest bidder and no other member of this Association shall accept an award of a contract from any general contractor or awarding authority for a job on which he is not declared to be the lowest bidder. Where a member who is not declared to be the lowest bidder accepts an award of such a contract, said member shall pay to the lowest bidder a sum of money equal to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of the low bid, which sum shall be collectible by an action at law brought in the name of this Association for the benefit of the lowest bidder.'

During the summer of 1962 Bassett and defendant each submitted a bid on a plumbing job with a general contractor on a building contract with Hoechst Chemical Co. In accordance with the above-quoted bylaw of the association defendant deposited its bid by mail to the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, the acting bid depository for the association. It also telephoned the bid to the general contractor who confirmed it on September 15, 1962. After it had received all bids submitted, including one from Bassett, the general contractor informed defendant on September 15 that it was the low bidder. However, when the bids were opened at the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company on September 27, 1962 it was learned that defendant's bid had not been recorded at the bid depository as required by the bylaw and therefore it was not 'declared to be the lowest bidder.' Bassett was so declared but nevertheless defendant entered into a contract for the job with the general contractor. As a result the association called upon defendant to pay 10 per cent of the low bid for the benefit of Bassett as per the implied agreement under the bylaw, and upon defendant's refusal it brought the instant action.

In the posture of the case on defendant's sole exception to the overruling of its demurrer to the declaration we are not concerned with the merits of the case on the facts alleged and admitted by the demurrer but only with the narrow question whether the association was in law authorized to bring an action in its own name against defendant. The defendant contends that it was not, and relies upon the well-established rule at common law that generally an action must be brought in the name of the party in whom the legal interest in the contract was vested. 1 Chitty, Pleading (7th Eng. ed.), chap. 1, p. 2. It concedes that there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule but argues that the use plaintiff association does not qualify under any of them.

In reply the association contends that defendant has misconceived the relation created by the bylaw. It argues that by virtue of the express authorization of it to bring suit in its own name it is the legal plaintiff. For this reason it claims that it is a proper party plaintiff and as authority for its contention it cites Milk Producers Marketing Co. v. Bell, 234 Ill.App. 222. Moreover, it also claims support for its position in Blue Star Navigation Co. v. Emmons Coal Mining...