United N.J. R. & Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes And Assessment

• Decision Date: 07 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 203,No. 251,No. 254,No. 247,No. 207,No. 242,No. 246,203,207,242,246,247,251,254
• Citation: 134 A. 669
• Parties: UNITED NEW JERSEY R. & CANAL CO. et al. v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT et al., and six other cases.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

134 A. 669

UNITED NEW JERSEY R. & CANAL CO. et al.

v. STATE BOARD OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENT et al., and six other cases.

Nos. 203, 207, 242, 246, 247, 251, 254.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Oct. 7, 1926.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Writs of certiorari by the United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company and another by the New York Bay Railroad Company and another, by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, by the Long Dock Company, by the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company of New Jersey, and by the Lehigh Valley Harbor Terminal Railway Company to review assessment of property for taxation in 1924 by the State Board of Taxes and Assessments. Assessments affirmed, except as to one tract of the New York Bay Railroad Company.

Argued May term, 1926, before PARKER, BLACK, and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Robert J. Bain, of Jersey City. M. M. Stallman, of Newark, and Albert C. Wall, of Jersey City, for prosecutors.

Edward P. Stout, of Jersey City, for defendants.

BLACK, J. The writs of certiorari in these cases bring under review the assessments of railroad property for the year 1924. The assessments or valuations were made as of January 1, 1924, under the Railroad Tax Act of 1884 (page 142), as redrafted in 1888 (page 269), and the. supplements (4 Comp. St. 1910, p. 5260 et seq.). The assessments were made in the first instance by the state board. Upon complaint being made to the board, a hearing was given to the owners of the property assessed. At the hearing, the complaints against the assessments for the year 1924 were consolidated and heard by the state board; testimony was taken, which was returned as part of the record in two printed volumes. There are 55 separate pieces of property assessed; 24 of these are the identical properties considered by the Court of Errors and Appeals in the cases of United N. J., etc., R. R. Co. v. State Board, 100 N J. Law, 131, 125 A. 335, and New York Bay R. Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment, 100 N. J. Law, 182, 125 A. 923, assessed for the year 1922, and considered again by this court in the case of United N. J., etc., R. R. Co. v. State Board, 128 A. 427, assessed for the year 1923. For a description and identification of the properties there considered and now under discussion, a reference to those cases will be sufficient. There are seven cases, and, as stated, the assessments are for the year 1924. There are 55 separate pieces of property assessed, described by lot and block numbers.

This court said, in the case of Howard Savings Institution v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 63 N. J. Law, 65, 74, 42 A. 848, that the primary rule for the construction of tax laws is that in taxation from year to year each act of taxation is a separate and distinct thing; appealing to the law in force when the tax is laid to support the imposition, assessments are made each year. United N. J., etc., R. R. Co. v State Board of Taxes and Assessment (N. J. Sup.) 128 A. 427.

|3, 4] There are 12 reasons filed for setting aside or reducing the assessments in one case; 10 and 11 reasons in the other cases. They are substantially the same. The argument, in the brief of the prosecutors varied somewhat, is practically made under one head, viz. that the valuations are in excess of true value, or the assessments were made upon erroneous principles and are therefore excessive, or the yards and rights of way of the prosecutors are permanently devoted to railroad use, and therefore have no market value susceptible of enhancement for assessment purposes. The question involved is essentially and primarily one of fact.

The last reason may be dismissed as fanciful. It seems strange that, with all the litigation over the valuations of these identical properties, this point has never before been suggested. As a basis for the argument of the point, the act creating a board of public utility commissioners is cited. P. L. 1911, p. 374, § 3, par. 18 (H). That act provides "that no public utility * * * shall * * * without the approval of the board, sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of or incumber its property," etc. This point may be dismissed as unsound, without further discussion.

This court, in the case of United N. J., etc., R. R. Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment, 128 A. 427, and in many other cases, discussed and considered at some length the legal principles which should guide the Supreme Court in reviewing valuations made against railroad property by the state board. It would serve no useful purpose to make any further or extended discussion of these settled principles. They are elementary. In the last case cited it was held that the court is required to reverse or affirm in whole or in part for "palpable error" made by the state board of taxes and assessment in making the valuations. The testimony of the prosecutors must so preponderate as to overcome the judgment of the state board of taxes and assessment and the testimony that supports it, before the Supreme Court can or should reduce, alter, or modify the assessments. This is the legal question or principle involved, as distinguished from the questions of fact. So in Long Dock Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 82 N. J. Law, 21, 81 A. 508.

This court, when reviewing the first assessments made under the act of 1884, speaking through Chief Justice Beasley, said:

"We do not consider that we have the right to alter or annul any of the proceedings of this body of officers except for palpable error, for it is not to be overlooked that the statute in question expressly declares that these assessors shall be entitled to use their personal knowledge and judgment as to the value of property, a capacity with which this court is not endowed by the Legislature." Central R. R. Co. v. State Board, 49 N. J. Law, 19, 7 A. 300.

That case was cited with approval by the Court of Errors and Appeals on this point in the case of United New Jersey R. R., etc., Canal Co. v. State Board, 100 N. J. Law, 131, 125 A. 335. So in Long Dock Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 82 N. J. Law, 21, 81 A. 568. The state board is entitled to use its personal knowledge and judgment, under the statute, as to the value of the property, when interpreting, comparing, weighing, and considering the evidence. Our reading of the voluminous testimony returned with these writs leads ...