United States Building & Loan Association v. Soule
Decision Date | 05 May 1937 |
Docket Number | 6412 |
Citation | 68 P.2d 40,57 Idaho 691 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | UNITED STATES BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Corporation, Appellant, v. H. W. SOULE, Alias HENRY SOULE and Wife, ALICE C. SOULE, F. L. SOULE and Wife, MRS. F. L. SOULE, ARTEL ORME and Wife, MRS. ARTEL ORME, Respondents |
Appeal from District Court, Fremont County; C. J. Taylor, Judge.
Suit by the United States Building & Loan Association against H. W Soule, alias Henry W. Soule, and others, wherein a foreclosure decree was rendered while demurrer was pending. From an order denying the plaintiff's petition for a writ of assistance, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and set aside.
A. A Merrill, for Appellant.
The decree, at most, was only voidable, and could not be attacked collaterally in a proceeding of this kind. It could only be done by a timely motion to set aside the judgment, or by appeal, or by motion for a new trial. (Bunnell & Eno Inv Co. v. Curtis, 5 Idaho 652, 51 P. 767; Taylor v Hulett, 15 Idaho 265, 97 P. 37, 19 L. R. A., N. S., 535; Wyllie v. Kent, 28 Idaho 16, 152 P. 194; United States Nat. Bank v. Eldridge, 49 Idaho 363, 288 P. 416; Baldwin v. Anderson, 50 Idaho 606, 299 P. 341, 343; Batchoff v. Butte Pacific Copper Co., 60 Mont. 179, 189 P. 132, 136.)
Wilkie & Wilkie and H. W. Soule, for Respondents.
A default judgment entered while a demurrer is on file undisposed of is void and subject to collateral attack. (Vincent v. Black, 30 Idaho 636, 166 P. 923; Bertagnolli Bros. v. Bertagnolli, 23 Wyo. 228, 148 P. 374; Crawford v. Pierse, 56 Mont. 371, 185 P. 315; In re Smith et al., 38 Idaho 746, 225 P. 495; Kerney v. Hatfield, 30 Idaho 90, 162 P. 1077; Cuddahy v. Gragg, 46 Cal.App. 578, 189 P. 721; Berry v. Crowell, 55 Cal.App. 534, 203 P. 835.)
The law is well established that whenever a demurrer, answer, or any pleading whatsoever, is on file and not disposed of before default judgment is entered, that both the default and the judgment following are absolutely void. (Freeman on Judgments, vol. 1, sec. 333, pp. 666, 668, 669; Berry v. Crowell, supra; Freeman on Judgments, vol. 1, sec. 322, p. 642, sec. 371, p. 774.)
--February 17, 1928, respondents H. W. Soule and Alice C. Soule, husband and wife, executed a $ 1,000 real estate mortgage to appellant. August 15, 1934, appellant filed foreclosure proceedings, summons was served August 21, 1934, on all respondents except Mrs. H. W. Soule, i. e., Alice C. Soule, whom the decree recites was served by publication. September 12, 1934, H. W. Soule filed a demurrer to the complaint, and states with regard to service thereof:
A. A. Merrill, one of the attorneys for appellant makes affidavit to the effect that he never received the demurrer. The above showing on the part of respondent H. W. Soule is thus indefinite and only inferentially states or indicates when the demurrer was served inasmuch as there is no date of mailing "aforesaid" set forth in the affidavit. The trial court however evidently proceeded upon the theory that the demurrer was served and we may so assume herein without thus deciding.
December 18, 1934, default of all defendants was entered and a decree of foreclosure rendered as to all defendants:
with a deficiency against respondent H. W. Soule which appellant acknowledged as satisfied on May 5, 1936. Execution was issued December 18, 1934. January 22, 1935, on execution sale, Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was issued to appellant, and on January 25, 1936, a Sheriff's Deed on Foreclosure was issued to appellant. February 26, 1935, demand was made of H. W. Soule and Alice C. Soule, his wife, for possession of the premises, and upon refusal appellant filed its amended petition for a writ of assistance on April 18, 1936. An answer thereto was filed May 8, 1936, together with supporting affidavits alleging that since a demurrer was on file, undisposed of, at the time the default judgment was entered it was void. The appeal herein is from an order, August 13, 1936, denying the writ.
Respondents take the position that the judgment was void and may be attacked by what they concede to be the collateral proceedings herein. Appellant urges that the judgment was only voidable and not subject to collateral attack, and the showing for relief therefore insufficient.
The authorities cited by counsel for appellant and respondents do not exactly cover the instant situation, holding generally that judgment by default should not be rendered against a defendant who has filed a demurrer to the complaint where it remains undisposed of; that a premature entry of judgment before time to answer has expired is void; and others that it is voidable.
The better reasoned rule is well stated in McIntosh v. Munson Road Machinery Co., 167 Miss. 546, 145 So. 731, at 733, under a situation almost identical to the one herein:
Likewise the Alabama court said in Endowment Department, etc., G. U. O. O. F., v. Harvey, 6 Ala. App. 239, 60 So. 602 at 604:
To the same effect, where pleadings were on file, see Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 P. 246, distinguished and sustained on this point in Baird v. Smith, 216 Cal. 408, 14 P.2d 749 at 751, which also distinguishes by its reasoning the cases cited by respondents on this point; Chehalis Coal Co. v. Laisure, 97 Wash. 422, 166 P. 1158 at 1160, and cases there cited.
Although this court in Smith v. Clyne, 16 Idaho 466, 101 P 819, did not pass upon whether a default judgment entered while a demurrer was on file was void or...
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