United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Chaddock & Co.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1909
• Docket Number: 1,736.
• Citation: 173 F. 577
• Parties: UNITED STATES CONSOL. SEEDED RAISIN CO. v. CHADDOCK & CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

173 F. 577

UNITED STATES CONSOL. SEEDED RAISIN CO. v. CHADDOCK & CO.

No. 1,736.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

November 3, 1909

John H Miller, William K. White, and Horace G. Platt, for appellant.

L. L Cory, for appellee.

Before GILBERT and MORROW, Circuit Judges, and HUNT, District Judge.

GILBERT Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellant by its written agreement had relinquished its right to appeal from the decree. It is shown that after the cause had been argued and submitted in the court below, and before the decision thereof, the appellee, together with E G. Chaddock, E. L. Chaddock, and John Chaddock, as parties of the first part, entered into an agreement with the appellant as party of the second part, in which, after referring to the patents of the respective parties, it was recited that:

'Whereas, many conflicting claims have arisen between the holders and owners of said respective patents, and which have resulted in litigation, which is expensive and otherwise injurious to the business and interests of the respective parties hereto, and it is the desire of said respective parties hereto to make and enter into an arrangement whereby and during its continuance there would be an amicable arrangement and adjustment between them of their respective controversies, and in the hope of a final, just, and amicable settlement of all disputes and differences.'

In the agreement it was covenanted that so long as the parties of the first part shall deal exclusively in, and shall purchase, sell, and handle, only seeded raisins seeded, processed, and packed by the party of the second part, and no other, the parties of the first part do lease and demise unto the party of the second part, for a term of three years, the Chaddock raisin seeding plant at an annual rental of $15,000, provided, however, that, should the said suit then pending and undecided be decided in favor of the appellee, the annual rental should be $20,000. Then follows this proviso:

'And provided, further, that the judgment which shall be rendered in said Circuit Court in said action or suit, whether the same shall be in favor of said plaintiff or of said defendant, shall be final, and shall not be appealed from or otherwise assailed, in any manner or mode whatsoever, by either or any of the parties hereto or thereto, except, only, that if by said judgment or decree it shall be held and adjudged that the patent belonging to said party of the second part, and concerning which the said action or suit is brought, is invalid, or that the same is not infringed upon by any machine, or machines, belonging to said Chaddock & Co., or by any machine described in and claimed by said letters patent granted to said E. L. Chaddock, above referred to, said party of the second part may appeal from said judgment, or take such other course with reference thereto, and for the protection of its rights in the premises, as it may be advised, and except, further, that if the decree or judgment rendered in said action or suit shall be in its terms to cover a machine built under and in accordance with said patents held by E. L. Chaddock, and to hold that such a machine infringes the patent of said party of the second part, then and in that event said Chaddock & Co. may appeal from the said judgment or decree, or take such other course to obtain a review or correction of said judgment or decree as it may be advised.' The agreement is of great length, and contains numerous other provisions, but none bearing upon the question of the right to appeal. The right of the appellant to prosecute the appeal, in view of the terms of the agreement, depends upon the construction to be given to the decree. The appellant does not contend-- and, indeed, the contention, if made, could not be sustained-- that the decree it is adjudged that the appellant's patent is not infringed upon by the machines used by the appellee. We are unable to agree with this contention. There was no finding whatever upon the question of infringement. Having determined that an equitable estoppel arose from the conduct of the appellant, the court found it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the question of infringement. The decree says in substance to the appellant:

'It is immaterial whether the machines used by the appellee infringe upon your machine, for by your conduct you are estopped to allege infringement.'

But the appellant points to the machine made under the letters patent granted to E. L....