United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 72-1122-72-1129.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1122-72-1129.,72-1122-72-1129.
• Citation: 472 F.2d 100
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Terry L. WILSON et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Joseph COUGHLIN, Assistant Director, Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

472 F.2d 100 (1973)

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Terry L. WILSON et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Joseph COUGHLIN, Assistant Director, Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, Respondent-Appellant.

Nos. 72-1122-72-1129.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 19, 1972.

Decided January 19, 1973.

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Patrick T. Murphy, Lewis Wenzell, John D. Shullenberger and James M. DeZelar, Chicago, Ill., for the United States and Wilson.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for Coughlin.

Before STEVENS and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, District Judge.¹

STEVENS, Circuit Judge.

Four juveniles confined in the Illinois Industrial School for Boys at Sheridan, Illinois, filed petitions for habeas corpus alleging that they were entitled to be released because they have already received punishment greater than that authorized by law for adults guilty of offenses comparable to those which led to their respective delinquency findings. The district court denied the relief requested but ordered the respondent to transfer the four petitioners either to a home or to a different institution and to discontinue the use of the drug thorazine, or any other tranquilizer, for purposes of mere control or punishment. Both sides have appealed. Petitioners seek complete release from custody; respondent, without challenging the propriety of the relief which was granted, seeks a new trial on the ground that the district judge was biased.

I.

In the district court, petitioners contended that they were denied equal protection of the laws by incarceration in an institution no different from an adult penitentiary for a longer period of time than they could have been incarcerated had they been convicted by the Illinois criminal courts. The district court found the facts in petitioners' favor and ordered respondent to provide them with the rehabilitative treatment authorized by the Illinois Juvenile Code;² he refused to order their release.

A juvenile delinquent may be incarcerated until his twenty-first birthday, no matter how insignificant the misconduct that resulted in the jurisdictional finding of delinquency, provided that the requisite findings are made at his dispositional hearing,³ and provided further that he does not demonstrate that his best interests would be served by an earlier release.⁴ Thus, a juvenile's indeterminate sentence may be longer than the maximum period of imprisonment for an adult guilty of a like offense. This potential difference in treatment does not invalidate the statutory distinction between adults and juveniles because offsetting benefits generally result in favored treatment for the youthful offender.⁵

Since the character of petitioners' detention was tantamount to imprisonment in an adult penitentiary, they contend that they received no offsetting benefits which could arguably justify detention beyond that authorized for adults. Though not conclusive,⁶ this argument is appealing; nevertheless, even if the argument is accepted for purposes of decision, it does not follow that the only permissible remedy is to treat petitioners as if they were adults. On the contrary, it was well within the district court's discretion merely to order respondent to provide them with the statutory benefits authorized for other members of the juvenile class. On the remedy issue the district court properly focused on the ultimate question of what relief would best serve the interests of these young men. Since we are satisfied that he did not abuse his discretion, we affirm the denial of petitioners' prayer for complete release without analyzing the validity of their equal protection claim.⁷

II.

Although respondent prevailed on the principal issue litigated in the district court, and does not object to the relief granted against him, he urges us to order a new trial because the district judge was guilty of flagrant misconduct. The argument is in two parts: First, that a statement at a preliminary hearing evidenced prejudgment and required the judge to recuse himself; and second, that several incidents during the course of the trial revealed such bias and hostility on the part of the judge as to deprive respondent of a fair and impartial trial.

Since the propriety of the relief which was granted is not questioned no useful purpose would be served by another trial. We have concluded, however, that the record discloses such friction between the trial judge and counsel for respondent that if questions relating to compliance with the court's order should arise in the future, the interests of justice would be served by having such matters heard by another judge.

A.

Respondent's motion to recuse was predicated on a statement made by the trial judge on Friday, October 15, 1971, in an informal opinion explaining his reasons for denying a motion to dismiss predicated on the assertion that state remedies had not been exhausted. Petitioners had invoked the state procedures, obtaining partial relief from the Juvenile Court in May, 1971, and had unsuccessfully sought expedited review in the Illinois appellate courts. When the trial judge learned that, notwithstanding petitioners' bona fide efforts to obtain it, the transcript of the May hearing was not yet available, and was informally apprised of the risk that routine handling of the appeals in the overloaded Illinois courts might moot the issues before any relief could be granted, he understandably reacted unfavorably to the State's exhaustion argument. In the context of his impromptu remarks, he made the following statement:

"Illinois is notorious in its Juvenile Court in its history of mistreatment, legal mistreatment, under a guise of legal parentage, parenthood attitude, but the rights under the Constitution inure to the benefit of the newborn infant as much as they do to the most venerable citizen among us."

On the following Monday, before any evidence was heard, respondent filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 requesting the district judge to recuse himself.⁸ The motion was supported by an affidavit of one of the attorneys for respondent rather than the affidavit of a "party" as required by the statute. The motion was, therefore, insufficient. Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1970).

B.

If there is a substantial likelihood that a judge's conduct would prejudice the jury, a new trial must be directed.⁹ In a case tried without a jury, that danger of prejudice is absent; accordingly, the judge may properly play a more active and critical part in such a trial without impairing his ability to give the parties a fair hearing and to rule impartially after the record is complete. Nevertheless, the presiding judge must require the barristers and the litigants to observe and to respect the standards of decorum that are traditional attributes of a fair trial. By his own example, as well as by his rulings, the judge must confirm the objectivity and majesty of the judicial process. The integrity of the proceeding, not merely its ultimate outcome, must command the confidence of the community. The conduct of this trial fell short of the high standards that are required.

Respondent's attack on the judge's conduct of the trial is threepronged. He contends that the judge (1) prejudged the merits; (2) assumed the role of advocate; and (3) exhibited unprovoked hostility toward counsel.

Before commenting on each of these points, it is only fair to observe that certain conduct on the part of counsel for respondent could only be offensive to the sensibilities of the judge. We mention this fact to indicate that although some of the court's comments did not appear to have any immediate provocation, respondent's counsel are not completely innocent victims of judicial intemperance.

After denying the State's motion to dismiss on Friday, October 15, the court ordered respondent's counsel to produce the four petitioners at the evidentiary hearing commencing at 10:00 o'clock A. M. on the following Monday. Counsel did not comply with that order, but instead presented the motion to recuse which we have held insufficient. They sought to justify what the district court correctly described as contemptuous conduct on the ground that they had been confident that their motion to recuse would be granted. We share the trial judge's unfavorable reaction to a lawyer's prejudgment of the merits of his own motion. Although some of the court's remarks were inappropriate, they were less severe than the punishment he had the power to impose.

As the case progressed, counsel for respondent properly objected to inadmissible evidence and urged the court to adhere to normal adversary procedures in the quest for the truth. But on occasion, as sometimes happens in the heat of advocacy, counsel's conduct impliedly demeaned the seriousness of petitioners' claims. The judge, sensitive to the plight of the young men who had repeatedly been injected with thorazine and incarcerated in solitary confinement for long periods of time, reacted unfavorably to the implications that this was just another ordinary lawsuit.¹⁰ Nevertheless, there is merit in portions of respondent's criticism of the conduct of the trial.

Respondent's claim that the trial judge prejudged the merits is belied by a reading of the record as a whole including the court's final ruling. There is no indication that respondent was unable to present his case. Moreover, the record does not support the conclusion that the trial judge had closed his mind to the presentation of evidence or argument. It is true that some of his comments were unfortunate. He had obviously read widely in the professional literature relating to the use of thorazine, to the problem of the youthful offender, and to correctional philosophy. But a judge should not be criticized for making an impartial study of relevant scholarship or for candidly advising counsel of the results of...