United States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth
| Citation | 652 F. Supp. 82 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 82 C 5666.,82 C 5666. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES ex rel. Robert HOLLEMAN, Petitioner, v. Jack DUCKWORTH, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Ronald Wilder, Brian A. Hamer, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Mark Rotert, James Fitzgerald, Michael Weinstein, Neil F. Hartigan, Office of Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., Linley Pearson, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondents.
Petitioner Robert L. Holleman has applied for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On July 31, 1984, this court ruled that the State of Illinois violated Article IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 1003-8-9(a) (the "IAD"), a law of the United States for habeas corpus purposes, and therefore ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue. United States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 592 F.Supp. 1423 (N.D. Ill.1984).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed this court, finding that Holleman had waived his IAD claim by failing to raise it before the Illinois Appellate Court. United States ex rel. Holleman v. Duckworth, 770 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 828, 88 L.Ed.2d 800 (1986). The Court of Appeals then remanded this case and directed this court to consider whether Holleman can "show cause for and prejudice from the procedural default." Id. at 692. Before the court currently is Holleman's motion for summary judgment. Because the record before the court reveals that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that there was cause for and prejudice from the defaulted or "waived" IAD claim, the court grants Holleman's motion and issues the writ.
Holleman was indicted by an Illinois grand jury for murder on July 26, 1977. Because he was incarcerated in Indiana at the time (pursuant to previous Indiana and federal convictions), Illinois authorities lodged a detainer against him pursuant to the IAD. In response, the State of Indiana offered Illinois custody of Holleman on November 25, 1977.
Despite this offer, however, the Illinois authorities did not actually transfer Holleman to Illinois until March 28, 1978. Thus, he remained in the Indiana prison for a total of 123 days after Indiana offered Illinois custody and 245 days after he was indicted. After Holleman was transferred to Illinois, his trial was postponed for yet another seven months. Holleman's trial on the Illinois charges did not begin until November 6, 1978, and both parties agree that, after excluding excusable delays under the IAD, Holleman was brought to trial on the 128th day after Illinois authorities took custody. The IAD states that the trial of a transferred prisoner "shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state" after deducting time exclusions for excusable delays. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-8-9(a), Art. IV(c). Violations of Article IV(c)'s 120-day provision require dismissal with prejudice of the indictment. Id. at Article V(c).
In the state trial court, Holleman argued that the charges should be dismissed because he "was not brought to trial within the 120 days as required by Article IV of the Uniform Agreement on Detainers." He also argued that Illinois had violated the Speedy Trial Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 103-5(a), because more than 120 days elapsed between his arrival in Illinois and his trial. Finally, he argued that Illinois circumvented (and thus violated) the 120-day limit of Article IV(c) by its 123-day delay in accepting custody of Holleman. The state trial court rejected all these arguments, found him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years in prison.
On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, petitioner raised only two issues: whether Illinois violated the Speedy Trial Act and whether the state circumvented (and thus violated) the IAD by not accepting custody of Holleman as soon as Indiana offered it. Holleman did not argue that because he was not brought to trial within 120 days of his transfer from Indiana to Illinois, his conviction violated Article IV(c) of the IDA. (It is this claim which, when previously raised in this court, was the basis for this court's original decision to grant Holleman's petition for the writ of habeas corpus.) The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court conviction, People v. Holleman, 82 Ill.App.3d 409, 37 Ill.Dec. 782, 402 N.E.2d 784 (1st Dist. 1980), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Holleman's petition for leave to appeal.
If a state prisoner fails to raise a claim in his state court appeal, he may base a habeas corpus action on that claim only by showing "cause" for the failure and "prejudice" resulting from it. United States ex rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir.1983). When this case was originally before this court on Holleman's petition for habeas relief, one of the questions then presented was whether the Illinois Appellate Court was effectively presented with the Article IV(c) speedy trial claim, even though Holleman did not argue it in precise and explicit terms. There was no question that Holleman had in fact raised the claim of the Illinois Speedy Trial Act violation (which was rejected). There was also no question that Holleman had raised a claim of an Article IV(c) violation, but only insofar as he claimed Article IV(c) was violated by Illinois' failure to accept custody of Holleman as soon as Indiana offered it. Thus, the question this court faced was whether those claims were "close enough" to the additional claim that Article IV(c) was violated for failure to try Holleman within 120 days of his arrival in Illinois so that a federal court should deem that claim to have been effectively "raised" in the state court. This court answered that question in the affirmative, analogizing the facts of this case to United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 364-65, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1849-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, and therefore reversed this court.
The Court of Appeals felt that the question of whether a particular federal claim has been presented to a state appellate court is a matter of state law. See Holleman, 770 F.2d at 692 n. 2. Specifically, the Court observed that Illinois law requires "an appellant to list in his brief the issues and arguments raised on appeal, and Holleman neither listed the post-transfer IAD issue nor specifically argued it." Id. at 692 (citing to Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110A, § 341(e)(7)). With due respect, this court believes that under prior Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit law, the question of whether a state court has been notified of a particular federal claim is a matter of federal, not state, law. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 n. 18, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1056 n. 18, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972); United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Fairman, 731 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir.1984). Since it is federal law which holds that a federal claim not presented to the state courts is barred from consideration on federal habeas review (absent cause and prejudice), federal law should also determine when in fact a federal claim has or has not been so presented. Under the federal rule, a particular federal claim is deemed to have been presented to the state court if the petitioner has provided the state with a "fair opportunity" to apply the controlling federal legal principles to the facts bearing on his claim. See Anderson, supra; Picard, supra. Under this rule, which appears to be more lenient than Illinois law, Holleman might be deemed to have presented his post-transfer IAD claim to the state court. In any event, this court questions the utilization of state law for determining whether Holleman had effectively presented his post-transfer IAD claim to the state appellate court. Nevertheless, such is the Seventh Circuit's ruling in this particular case and this court is of course bound to follow the Court's mandate.
Accordingly, this court must consider Holleman to have waived his Article IV(c) speedy trial claim unless he can demonstrate sufficient "cause" for and "prejudice" from the waiver, as required by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Because of the nature of this case, the court addresses the "cause" and "prejudice" questions in reverse order.
The prejudice Holleman has experienced as a result of his state appellate counsel's failure to raise the Article IV claim can hardly be questioned, and indeed the state does not question it. In its original opinion in this case, this court concluded that the state violated the speedy trial provision of Article IV(c) and that this violation required automatic dismissal with prejudice of Holleman's indictment. Thus, but for counsel's failure to call to the appellate court's attention the substantial error of trying Holleman on an indictment which, under the conceded facts and Article IV(c), must be dismissed, Holleman's indictment would have been dismissed — at least the state recognizes this is what the court would have legally been required to do. See Holleman, 592 F.Supp. at 1426. The subsequent affirmance of Holleman's conviction, then, easily constitutes "prejudice" as expressed by the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2908, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (); Phillips v. Lane, 787 F.2d 208, 215 (7th Cir. 1986) (). Here, not only did ...
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