United States ex rel. Brown v. McGinnis
| Citation | 592 F. Supp. 729 |
| Decision Date | 28 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83 C 3454.,83 C 3454. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | UNITED STATES ex rel. Norman BROWN, Petitioner, v. Kenneth L. McGINNIS, et al., Respondents. |
Norman Brown, pro se.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for respondents.
Petitioner Norman Brown brings this application for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents Kenneth L. McGinnis and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board ("the Board") answer the application pursuant to Rule 5, governing § 2254 cases in the United States District Courts, by claiming that Brown has not exhausted the state remedies available to him under the statutes and procedural rules of Illinois. Specifically, respondents claim that "petitioner has an available avenue of state court relief in the state writ of mandamus." (Respondent's Answer p. 2.) Respondents further answer that petitioner's transcripts of conviction are not relevant to petitioner's application, but do not answer substantively any of the application's allegations.
In his application, Brown does not challenge the constitutional validity of his conviction. Rather, he claims that the statement of reasons provided by the Board for denying him parole in April 1983 were constitutionally deficient for several reasons. The court dismissed Brown's original application in an opinion of June 9, 1983. Brown v. McGinnis, et al., No. 83 C 3454, slip op. (N.D.Ill. June 9, 1983). There the court held that in denying Brown's parole, the Board's statement of reasons and facts supporting those reasons satisfied due process. The cover sheet to Brown's parole denial contains a list of the three reasons why parole may be denied and, under each reason a list of factors relevant to that reason. Boxes listed opposite these reasons and factors are unchecked on Brown's cover sheet. Instead, an attached "Rationale" explains that Brown is a poor risk in the free community and mentions some facts about Brown's crime. The court found that the Board's denial of parole was based upon the substantial risk that Brown would not be able to conform to the reasonable conditions of parole. In reaching that conclusion, the Board properly considered not the seriousness of Brown's offense, but the particular nature of the crime. The court concluded that because the reasons and factors for the denial of Brown's parole request were constitutionally sufficient and proper, Brown failed to state a violation of federal law. His application was dismissed.
Pursuant to a motion to reconsider its June 9, 1983 ruling, the court again found that Brown's original application did not state a constitutional claim. However, responding to new arguments presented by Brown, the court found that one aspect of Brown's parole denial may have been constitutionally deficient. While Brown was provided a permissible reason for the denial of his parole request, see Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c)(1), and was provided with the factual basis supporting that reason, see Scott v. Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, 669 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982), there is no indication that the supporting facts are among the factors listed by the Board in their own rules as relevant to the finding that Brown would not yet be able to conform to the reasonable conditions of parole. Brown v. McGinnis, et al., No. 83 C 3454, slip op. at 6 (N.D.Ill. September 8, 1983).
Rules Governing Parole were promulgated pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(d). Rule V, entitled "Basis for Denying Parole," lists the three statutorily prescribed reasons for denial with a set of factors under each reason for the Board to consider in determining whether the reason is met. Id. at 3-4. Rule VII states that an order denying parole "shall contain the reason or reasons for denial based on No. V above and a concise statement of facts supporting the reason or reasons given." The court noted that it interpreted Brown's denial as based on § 1003-3-5(c)(1). The Board's statement of rationale for denial, however, did "not indicate reliance on any of the factors listed under the `substantial risk' criterion as they appear in Rule V or on the preprinted form." Id. at 6.
The court concluded that two legal issues were presented by the Brown application. First, a question was raised as to whether the set of factors listed in Rule V under each of the three criteria is exclusive so that the Board must grant parole if "it does not rely on a statutory reason based on one or more of the underlying factors." If the set under each factor is exclusive, another question is raised as to whether the Board is constitutionally required to follow Rule V. Id. As some support existed for finding the factors exclusive and the Board bound by its own rules, the court granted Brown's motion for reconsideration and reinstated the case.
Implicit in the September 8, 1983 opinion is that if the Rule V factors are not exclusive, Brown will not have stated a claim since, according to the June 9 opinion, he was properly provided with a statutorily mandated reason for the denial of parole with an indication of the factors supporting that reason. If Rule V's factors are exclusive, a question is raised as to whether the Board followed its own rules. The Rationale's factor is not one of those listed under the reason provided for Brown's denial. Hence, it would appear that the rule was violated, although the court's September 8 opinion suggests that the Rationale is confusing on this point. In any case, to be cognizable in this court, the violation of Rule V must also have violated federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Hence, even were the court to determine that Rule V's factors are exclusive and that they were violated in this case, the court would also have to reach the issue of whether the Board must, under federal law, comply with its own rules. Respondents argue vigorously that these issues should first be presented to the Illinois state courts for review in a petition for mandamus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts should require the exhaustion of state remedies that are neither futile nor deficient. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 18, 70 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Echevarria v. Bell, 579 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (7th Cir.1978). Moreover, where the state remedy is conjectural, a petitioner may not be required to exhaust it. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250, 92 S.Ct. 407, 408, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971). However, the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) and (c) does not compel the court to predict the outcome of the available state court remedy. See Moore v. Duckworth, 581 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 713, 99 S.Ct. 3088, 61 L.Ed.2d 865 (1979); U.S. ex rel. Isaac v. Franzen, 531 F.Supp. 1086, 1093 (N.D.Ill.1982). This circuit has once refused to require a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to exhaust a state mandamus remedy as the strict conditions for the issuance of the writ — a clear right to relief and a showing that defendants had a preexisting duty to grant the relief — were not present. U.S. ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir.1976). The court must therefore address petitioner's claim that a mandamus remedy in state court is not available to rectify the constitutional violations he alleges.
Other cases in which prisoners have applied to courts in this district for habeas corpus relief from allegedly constitutionally deficient denials of parole have been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. E.g., U.S. ex rel. Reese v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, No. 82 C 6353, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D.Ill. October 25, 1983) (); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, No. 83 C 3679 (N.D.Ill. October 6, 1983); U.S. ex rel. Barksdale v. Thompson, No. 83 C 1946 (N.D.Ill. April 14, 1983); U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Klincar, 572 F.Supp. 924 (N.D.Ill. 1983). Such cases concern whether the Board's rationale for denial of parole satisfied the due process mandates of Scott. Presumably in the resulting mandamus action the court would evaluate the particular Board rationale against federal due process requirements and, if the rationale were found deficient, order the Board to comply with the law and issue a proper statement of reasons or release the prisoner.
Here, were the court to require petitioner to seek mandamus, the state court would be faced with the interpretation of Rule V, whether it was followed in Brown's case, and if not, whether Brown's federal due process rights were thereby violated.
The court concludes that the state court would likely entertain Brown's action in a mandamus hearing. Although mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, People ex rel. Hoagland v. Streeper, 12 Ill.2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625, 632 (1957), that will issue only upon a clear showing of rights to an official's performance of an unquestioned duty, People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 567-68, 30 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1940), it is not necessary to demonstrate with certainty that the writ would issue before the court may require this avenue exhausted, U.S. ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, No. 83 C 3679, slip op. at 3 (N.D.Ill. October 6, 1983); U.S. ex rel. Taylor v. Welborn, et al., No. 83 C 3358, slip op. at 12 (N.D.Ill. January 10, 1984).
Here, Brown seeks to require the Board to follow its rules for parole denial. In Taylor v. Franzen, 93 Ill.App.3d 758, 417 N.E.2d 242, 48 Ill.Dec. 840 (Fifth Dist. 1981), aff'd on rehearing, 93 Ill.App.3d 1152, 420 N.E.2d 1203, 51 Ill.Dec. 645 (1981), the Illinois Appellate Court found mandamus the appropriate remedy for petitioner Taylor's allegation that his good time credit was revoked in violation of the Department of Corrections' own rules. Th...
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Brewer v. Dahlberg
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