United States ex rel. Myers v. America's Disabled Homebound, Inc.
Decision Date | 22 March 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 14 C 8525,14 C 8525 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. DONNA MYERS, AND DONNA MYERS, individually, Plaintiff, v. AMERICA'S DISABLED HOMEBOUND, INC.; BENCHMARK HEALTH CORP.; ROBERT M. KAPLAN; RICHARD ANSFIELD; SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Donna Myers worked as a nurse for America's Disabled Homebound, Inc. ("ADH"), which is a home physician service. She alleges that ADH; its president, Richard Ansfield; its chief operating officer, Scott Schneider; its employee Dr. Robert Kaplan; and Benchmark Health Corp., another home physician service of which Ansfield is the president, falsely certified that certain patients were homebound in order to receive reimbursement from Medicare for their services in violation of the False Claims Act ("FCA"). She also alleges that Defendants violated the FCA by requiring her to use Medicare billing codes for patient visits of a greater duration than she actually provided. In addition to her FCA claims, Myers alleges that she was fired in violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act when she refused to follow Defendants' instructions for visiting patients and recording the treatment services she provided because she believed those instructions violated federal regulations. Defendants have moved to dismiss Myers's claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 38; R. 41; R. 44; R. 49. For the following reasons, those motions are denied in part and granted in part.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "'A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mann, 707 F.3d at 877.
Additionally, it is well established that the FCA "is an anti-fraud statute and claims under it are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)." Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC, 771 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2014). Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." "The reference to 'circumstances' in the rule requires the plaintiff to state the identity of the person who made the misrepresentation, the time, place and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff [.]" United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2009) (). Nevertheless, courts should not "take an overly rigid view of the formulation," and the "requisite information . . . may vary on the facts of a given case." Pirelli v. Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, although plaintiffs "'are not absolutely required to plead the specific date, place, or time of the fraudulent acts,'" they "still must 'use some alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud.'" Id. (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 9.03[1] [b], at 9-18 (3d ed. 2010)). Rule 9(b) requires a Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
The relevant Medicare regulations provide the following:
See Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, Chapter 7 - Home Health Services, Part 30.1.1 - Patient Confined to the Home, available at https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/bp102c07.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
Myers alleges that Defendants sought reimbursement for services provided to "homebound" patients, even though those patients were not in fact homebound. Myers alleges that she has personal knowledge of these patients' conditions and knows that they were not homebound when Defendants sought Medicare reimbursement on that basis. For five of the patients (identified by a number beginning with "DM"), Myers makes the following specific allegations about their conditions in an effort to show that they were not homebound:
R. 13 ¶¶ 48-49, 52, 54-55. Myers also alleges that Defendants sought Medicare reimbursement for seven additional patients who she alleges were not homebound. She does not make detailed allegations about their conditions, but merely alleges that they are "not homebound." Id. ¶¶ 57-67.
Liability under the FCA can be predicated on a number of acts, including as relevant to Myers's claims: "knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented, afalse or fraudulent claim for payment or approval," 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Count I); "knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim," § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Count II); or "knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceal[ing] or knowingly and improperly avoid[ing] or decreas[ing...
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