UNITED STATES EX REL. GALVAN v. DeRobertis, 80 C 2233.
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | Carolyn B. Notkoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for respondent |
| Citation | UNITED STATES EX REL. GALVAN v. DeRobertis, 530 F.Supp. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1981) |
| Decision Date | 31 December 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80 C 2233.,80 C 2233. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. David GALVAN, Petitioner, v. Richard DeROBERTIS, Respondent. |
Robert M. Stephenson, Cotsirilos & Crowley, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Carolyn B. Notkoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
David Galvan ("Galvan"), an inmate at Stateville Penitentiary serving an eight to twenty year sentence for rape, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming his conviction was constitutionally deficient in six separate respects. Stateville Warden Richard DeRobertis ("DeRobertis") has moved for summary judgment on alternative grounds that (1) Galvan has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to some of his claims and waived his right to relief on others or (2) Galvan's claims are substantively insufficient to entitle him to relief. Galvan has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order Galvan's motion for summary judgment is denied and DeRobertis' motion is granted.
In November 1969 Galvan was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County of rape and conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping. On appeal his sole claim was that the trial judge had failed specifically to instruct the jury that the State's rebuttal testimony was to be considered only against Galvan's co-defendant Augustine Soto ("Soto") and not against Galvan. On its own motion the Court reversed Galvan's conviction on the conspiracy charge but affirmed the rape conviction. People v. Galvan, 42 Ill.App.3d 390, 1 Ill.Dec. 139, 356 N.E.2d 139 (1st Dist. 1976). Galvan took no further appeal.
On May 6, 1980 Galvan filed his habeas corpus petition with this Court. As amended the Petition1 alleges six grounds for relief:
On July 21, 1969, 17 year old Wisner was raped by a group of "Latin, Puerto Rican or Mexican" men in the basement of a building at 27th and Normal Avenues in Chicago. Wisner had been accosted by two of the men in a blue Pontiac Firebird while she was waiting for a bus near Archer and Western Avenues. They forced Wisner into the car with a knife, told her they were members of the Latin Kings and took her to the Normal Avenue basement. When she entered six other men were waiting in a room illuminated only briefly by a single light bulb. Each man raped Wisner, including the "shortest man present" who had originally held her shoulders down during the ordeal. She was then released and escorted to Archer and Halsted Streets by the two men who had driven the Pontiac. Wisner immediately reported the rape to the police.
On the following day Wisner observed, in the area from which she had been taken, what she believed to be the Pontiac her assailants had driven. She identified the driver as the same driver and reported the license plate number to the police. Later the same day police saw the automobile, stopped it and placed its four occupants — Soto, Galvan (then 16 years old), Anthony Barrera ("Barrera") and David Lara ("Lara") — under arrest. After being booked on charges of rape at the police station the four men were transported to Little Company of Mary Hospital, where Wisner had been admitted. Police officers brought Wisner into a room in which the four men had been placed. Wisner identified Soto and Barrera as the driver and passenger in the Pontiac and Galvan as the "shortest man" who had held her shoulders. She was uncertain whether Lara had been among the men.
On October 2, 1969 Galvan (then 17 years old), Soto and Barrera were indicted on a number of charges: rape (all defendants), aggravated kidnapping (Soto and Barrera), aggravated assault (Barrera) and conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping (all defendants). Before trial Galvan moved to suppress the hospital identification on the grounds that (1) he was arrested without probable cause, (2) he was denied representation by counsel at the identification and (3) the identification was impermissibly suggestive. Galvan's motion was denied and the trial proceeded. Wisner identified Galvan as the man who had held her shoulders in the basement, though she admitted the single light bulb had only twice illuminated—dimly and briefly—the basement room during the ordeal.
Galvan and Barrera presented alibis in defense. Soto testified he had in fact given Wisner a ride on the night of July 21 but had dropped her off in the vicinity of her home. In support of that contention Soto called Victor Rodriquez ("Rodriquez"), who testified that Soto's story was accurate. In rebuttal the State introduced evidence discrediting Rodriquez, who then admitted he had perjured himself. Rodriquez claimed he had done so because Soto's father had requested it and Rodriquez was fearful of possible harm to himself or his family. Soto's lawyer countered with testimony suggesting Rodriquez had been coerced into changing his own testimony. Cross-examination revealed that Soto, Barrera and Galvan had been under investigation by a special unit of the State's Attorney's Office monitoring street gang activity and that all were suspected of being members of the Latin Kings gang.
During rebuttal and surrebuttal, devoted almost exclusively to discrediting Soto, Galvan's attorney objected on several occasions to the introduction of hearsay. Each objection was denied. Counsel also requested that contemporaneously with the testimony the jury be instructed that the discrediting evidence pertained only to Soto. That request was also denied, with the judge instead giving a general instruction at the conclusion of the evidence:
You should give separate consideration to each defendant. Each is entitled to have his case decided on the evidence and the law which is applicable to him. Any evidence which was limited to one defendant should not be considered by you as to any other defendant.
Finally Galvan's attorney moved for a mistrial or alternatively a severance on the ground that the impeachment of Soto impermissibly permeated the entire trial. That motion was also denied. All defendants were convicted.
En route to a consideration of Galvan's substantive contentions DeRobertis makes two procedural claims that, if upheld, would bar further inquiry into Galvan's case:
Because those state court remedies are still available to Galvan, DeRobertis contends, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) requires Galvan to pursue those options before coming into federal court.
As to the state Habeas Corpus Act DeRobertis points to the provision (Ill.Rev. Stat. ch. 65, § 22(1)) that makes the remedy available when the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See also People ex rel. Sheffield v. Twomey, 14 Ill.App.3d 264, 266, 302 N.E.2d 439, 440 (1st Dist. 1973). But the short answer is that Galvan's claim is not so stated. Galvan rather asserts (Br. 24) a denial of due process because the 1969 Illinois statute that subjected him to prosecution as an adult, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 37, § 702-7 (1969), was based solely upon a State's Attorney's "unbridled discretion." Acceptance of that proposition would not oust the trial court of jurisdiction over Galvan's person or over the subject matter of the action. Thus the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act cannot provide relief to Galvan, either on his "juvenile status" claim or any other.
Nor would a proceeding under the Illinois Post-Conviction Act be of any avail to Galvan. Illinois law (People v. James, 46 Ill.2d 71, 263 N.E.2d 5 (1970)) holds a judgment on direct appeal to be (1) res judicata as to all issues presented to the reviewing court and (b) a waiver as to all issues that could have been but were not raised on appeal. That rule effectively eviscerates the statutory post-conviction remedy for prisoners who like Galvan have appealed their convictions.
In light of the Illinois case law, our Court of Appeals held in United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 502 F.2d 1383, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1974) that an Illinois prisoner who had appealed his conviction in state court need not pursue his remedies under the state statute, absent authority suggesting that the stringent Illinois rule might be waived in particular kinds of cases under the "fundamental fairness" exception. DeRobertis' counsel has not suggested any hint in the cases that Illinois courts would apply the "fundamental fairness" exception to allow consideration of any of Galvan's substantive contentions.2
Galvan's second major procedural argument invokes the Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). But Wainwright...
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Peo v Wall
...only two conscious people in the trailer, the possibility of misidentification is low. See United States ex rel. Galvan v. DeRobertis, 530 F. Supp. 487, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“Given an opportunity for observation, a rape victim’s attention to her attacker can surely be assumed to be extraor......