United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 98–2088 GK |
| Citation | 50 F.Supp.3d 33 |
| Parties | United States of America, ex rel. Robert R. Purcell, Plaintiffs, v. MWI Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Joseph J. Aronica, Duane Morris, Beverly Maria Russell, Keith V. Morgan, U.S. Attorney's Office, David B. Wiseman, Elizabeth Wallace Young, Michael D. Granston, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Alexina Guiomar Jackson, Brian T. McLaughlin, Charlotte E. Gillingham, Robert T. Rhoad, Jason C. Lynch, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
On November 25, 2013, after a nine-day trial, a jury found Defendant MWI Corporation (“Defendant” or “MWI”) liable for violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (2). The matter is now before the Court on MWI's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [Dkt. No. 443] and MWI's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [Dkt. No. 478]. Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law shall be denied and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law shall be denied.
In 1992, MWI, a Florida corporation, arranged to sell irrigation pumps and other equipment to seven Nigerian states. The total sale price was $82.2 million.
To finance these sales, MWI and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”) sought and received eight loans from the Export–Import Bank of the United States (“Ex–Im”), an agency of the United States that finances and facilitates transactions between U.S. exporters and international buyers. Ex–Im agreed to finance the deal and loan Nigeria $74.3 million. Nigeria agreed to pay back the $74.3 million, as well as interest and fees, and the individual Nigerian states agreed to pay the remainder of the $82.2 million price.
Before Ex–Im would approve the loans to Nigeria, it required MWI to submit a “Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificate” for each of the eight loans. On each of those eight Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates, MWI attested that it had paid only “regular commissions” in connection with the pump sales. See Pls.' Ex. 283.
After Ex–Im approved the loans, but before it disbursed any funds, it required MWI to submit a “Disbursement Supplier's Certificate.” MWI attested on 50 Disbursement Supplier's Certificates that it had paid only “regular commissions” in connection with the pump sales.See Pls.' Ex. 284. Thus, MWI submitted eight Letter of Credit Supplier's Certificates and 50 Disbursement Supplier's Certificates to Ex–Im.2
In 1998, Relator Robert Purcell, a former employee of MWI, filed this action under the FCA. Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]. He alleged that MWI paid commissions in excess of 30 percent to its long-time Nigerian sales agent, Alhaji Mohammed Indimi (“Indimi”). Id. ¶¶ 35–37. Purcell alleged that those commission payments were not “regular” and should have been disclosed on all of the Supplier's Certificates that MWI submitted to Ex–Im. Id.
In April of 2002, the United States decided to intervene, and filed a complaint which then governed the proceedings (“Complaint”) [Dkt. No. 18]. Based in part on the amount of commissions paid to Indimi, which at the time was estimated to be approximately $28 million dollars,3 the Complaint alleged two violations of the FCA (Counts I and II) and two common law claims for unjust enrichment and payment by mistake (Counts III and IV).
The case was litigated for several years before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. Judge Urbina made several findings and conclusions that bind this Court, including two opinions granting in part and denying in part various Motions for Summary Judgment. See United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., et al., 520 F.Supp.2d 158 (D.D.C.2007) (“First MSJ Opinion”) ; United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 824 F.Supp.2d 12 (D.D.C.2011) (“Second MSJ Opinion”).
After Judge Urbina's retirement, the case was reassigned to Judge Colleen Kollar–Kotelly, and then to this Court. After resolving many pre-trial motions, the case went to trial on November 6, 2013.
At the close of the Government's case, MWI moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). Trial Tr. Nov. 19, 2013, P.M. Session at 79:8–80:7. “Consistent with the best practices governing pre-verdict motions, the Court reserved ruling” on MWI's motion. See Hancock v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 13 F.Supp.2d1, 3, 2014 WL 60288, at *1 (D.D.C.2014) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice Civil § 50.33). The Court ordered Defendant to file a written brief in support of its motion. Trial Tr. Nov. 19, 2013, P.M. Session at 80:7–8.
On November 22, 2013, the case went to the jury on Counts I and II of the Complaint. On November 25, 2013, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on both Counts I and II [Dkt. No. 453]. The Government then dismissed Counts III and IV of the Complaint, its common law claims, with prejudice. Trial Tr. Nov. 25, 2013, A.M. Session at 22:18–20.
On December 9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [Dkt. No. 460], and on December 19, 2013, Defendant filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 466].
On February 12, 2014, Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs [Dkt. No. 473]. On March 12, 2014, MWI filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“Renewed Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 478]. On April 9, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition [Dkt. No. 483], and on April 25, 2014, Defendant filed a Reply (“Renewed Reply”) [Dkt. No. 484].
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,” then a court may “grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)(B).
“If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). If the moving party renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law following the discharge of the jury, the Court may consider the motion and, if appropriate, direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3).
“The legal standard for granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law is the same whether it is rendered during the trial under Rule 50(a), or after the jury has been discharged under Rule 50(b).” Beyene v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 958 F.Supp.2d 247, 249 (D.D.C.2013). A court should grant judgment as a matter of law only “when a party has been fully heard on an issue, and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
Although the court should examine all evidence in the record, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Moreover, courts Nelson v. Dist. of Columbia, 953 F.Supp.2d 128, 130 (D.D.C.2013).
As a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion is limited to a renewal of a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law, the post-trial motion must be limited to those grounds that were specifically raised in the prior Rule 50(a) motion. Beyene, 958 F.Supp.2d at 249 (citation omitted).
The Government alleged two violations of the FCA. First, the Government alleged that MWI knowingly presented false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States Government. Complaint ¶¶ 46–48 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) ). Second, the Government alleged that MWI knowingly made false records or false statements to get the Government to pay or approve false or fraudulent claims for payment. Complaint ¶¶ 49–51 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) ).4 The jury found for the Government on both Counts. Verdict at 1–2 [Dkt. No. 453].
MWI raises several arguments that the Court will address in turn. However, many of MWI's arguments ask the Court to “make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,” which it is not permitted to do. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097 ; Estate of Mark Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 124 (D.C.Cir.2011) (). Likewise, the Court will not revisit its prior legal conclusions, which were unaffected by the evidence introduced at trial. Cf. Feld v. Feld, 688 F.3d 779, 782–83 (D.C.Cir.2012) ().
MWI argues that Plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence that the Supplier's Certificates were “claims for payment” as defined by the FCA. Renewed Mot. at 45. The FCA defines “claim” to include “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any of the money or property which is...
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