United States ex rel. Payton v. Pfister
| Decision Date | 01 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 C 6610,11 C 6610 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. TOBIAS G. PAYTON, Petitioner, v. RANDY PFISTER, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Illinois prisoner Tobias Payton ("Petitioner") is serving concurrent prison terms of seven years and thirty-one years for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and home invasion, respectively. Petitioner is currently in the custody of Randy Pfister ("Respondent"), the warden of Pontiac Correctional Center.1 Presently before the Court is Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the Petition and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
On April 18, 2007, Petitioner was charged with aggravated battery with a firearm (Count I), two counts of home invasion (Counts II and III), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (Count IV), and intimidation (Count V). (R. 30-1, Ex. A, Payton I at 1; R. 30-1, Ex. B, Def.'s Br. at 14.) All the charges arose from an incident at the home of Shawn Mobley's mother on March 17, 2007. (R. 30-1, Ex. A, Payton I at 2.) According to the bill of indictment, Petitioner possessed a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony, entered the house without authority, shot Mobley multiple times, and threatened a witness, Eva Morris, with physical harm if she told the police about the shooting. (Id.)
During pretrial proceedings, Petitioner informed the trial court that on the night of the incident he was at a gas station, and that he wished to subpoena the hard drive from the gas station's computer surveillance system. (Id.) Petitioner's attorney had already informed Petitioner that he had learned that the surveillance video recording had been erased, but counsel agreed in open court to discuss the hard drive issue with his investigator. (Id.)
Upon Petitioner's motion, the trial court severed the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. (Id. at 1.) On September 5, 2007, a jury trial began on that charge in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. (Id. at 2.) The State's witnesses testified that on the dayof the shooting, Petitioner was at the house three separate times, each time arriving in a red Ford Taurus. (Id.) On the first occasion, early in the day, Petitioner and his brother, Xavier Payton, arrived at the house accompanied by two females. (Id. at 2-3.) After socializing with alcohol, Petitioner and his companions left the house. (Id. at 3.) Later that evening, Petitioner returned to the house, accompanied by a different female. (Id.) In the presence of Morris, Petitioner asked Mobley if he could use Mobley's mother's bedroom to spend time with the female. (Id.) Mobley refused, and Petitioner became upset. (Id.) Mobley and Petitioner then attempted to contact Mobley's mother by telephoning a neighbor, LaDena Hite. (Id.) The men could not successfully locate Mobley's mother, however, and Mobley continued to refuse to allow Petitioner access to his mother's bedroom. (Id.) Mobley and Petitioner proceeded to engage in a physical altercation. (Id.) Petitioner then left but said that he would return. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, Petitioner returned to the house for the third time. (Id.) This time Petitioner was accompanied by Xavier and kicked in the front door to the house. (Id.) Petitioner, Xavier, and Mobley entered the den, where Morris was located. (Id.) Mobley tried to reason with Petitioner, but Petitioner began shooting at him, striking him in the hand, leg, and knee and grazing his side. (Id.) Petitioner and Xavier left the house, but then returned to retrieve some of the shell casings. (Id.) Xavier told Morris that he would kill her if she told anyone about the shooting. (Id.) Petitioner and Xavier then left again. (Id.)
After the State's witnesses testified, the State introduced Petitioner's prior felony conviction of February 5, 2002, into evidence. (Id.) Petitioner presented no evidence. (Id.) On September 7, 2007, the jury found Petitioner guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. (Id.)
Petitioner filed a post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id.) In the motion, Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective because he: (1) failed to impeach the State's witnesses with their statements to the police; (2) failed to call Petitioner's girlfriend, Tatiana Jackson, as an alibi witness; (3) failed to call public defender investigator Owen Beasley to testify that Hite told him that she thought the car belonged to Petitioner only because it was a maroon four-door car; (4) failed to obtain computer surveillance footage; (5) advised Petitioner to falsely testify that Xavier committed the crime; (6) advised Petitioner that he would lose and that the State's Attorney would make him look foolish if he testified that he was not at the scene of the crime or that he had nothing to do with the crime; (7) failed to object to hearsay testimony during Detective Joseph Fazio's testimony; and (8) failed to object to hearsay during the State's closing argument. (Id. at 3-4.)
On December 14, 2007, the trial judge conducted an inquiry into some of Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims. (Id. at 4.) First, the judge asked Petitioner about counsel advising him to testify. (Id.) Petitioner explained, "He actually advised me not to testify and that if I did, he would advise me to testify that the co-defendant had actually committed the crime." (Id.) Next, the judge questioned counsel about his reason for not calling Jackson to testify. (Id.) Counsel explained that Jackson had been interviewed and that her testimony would not have helped Petitioner's case. (Id.) Finally, the judge inquired as to the significance of Beasley's potential testimony. (Id.) Petitioner explained that Beasley would testify that Hite told Beasley different information than to what she had testified. (Id.) The trial judge stated that she remembered the facts of the case and that several witnesses had testified, and then she denied the motion on its face. (Id.) Petitioner responded that the State's witnesses had all testified differently from their statements to police in that "[t]he only thing that was the same was the factthat [he] allegedly shot [Mobley]." (Id.) Petitioner argued that the other facts, such as who was present and where things happened, changed from the statements given to the police. (Id.) The judge reiterated that she was denying the motion. (Id.)
Before Petitioner's second jury trial on the remaining counts, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to dismiss the charges, alleging a violation of his right to a speedy trial under Illinois law. (R. 30-3, Ex. E, 01/15/08 Hr'g Tr. at 17.) On January 15, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied the motion, finding that Petitioner's speedy trial rights had not been violated. (Id. at 20.)
On February 20, 2008, Petitioner's jury trial on Counts I, II, and III began. (R. 30-1, Ex. A, Payton I at 4.) The State dismissed Count V before the beginning of the trial. (R. 30-1, Ex. B, Def.'s Br. at 20.) Most of the State's witnesses testified to the same facts to which they testified during the first trial, with some differences. (Id.) On February 25, 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm and two counts of home invasion. (R. 30-1, Ex. A, Payton I at 4-5.) The convictions merged into a single conviction for home invasion pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule. (Id. at 5.) On April 7, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner concurrently to thirty-one years of imprisonment on the home invasion conviction and seven years of imprisonment on the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon conviction. (Id.) Petitioner appealed his convictions. (Id.)
On November 26, 2008, while his direct appeal was still pending, Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. (Id.) On February 5, 2009, the trial court summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. (Id.) Petitioner appealed the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition.(Id.) The Illinois Appellate Court consolidated Petitioner's direct and post-conviction appeals. (Id.)
On appeal, with the assistance of counsel, Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by only inquiring into some of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Id.) Specifically, Petitioner asserted that the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry into Petitioner's claims as required by People v. Moore, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637-38 (Ill. 2003) (citing People v. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. 1984)), and thus his case should be remanded for a new inquiry. (R. 30-1, Ex. B, Def.'s Br. at 22-26.) Petitioner did not present any argument regarding the trial court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On September 22, 2010, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial judge properly considered and ruled on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on her discussions with both Petitioner and his attorney and her independent recollection of the jury trials. (R. 30-1, Ex. A, Payton I at 8.)
While his direct appeal was pending, on September 24, 2009, Petitioner requested leave to file a pro se supplemental brief in the Illinois Appellate Court. (R. 28, Resp't's Answer at 2 n.1.) In his pro se supplemental brief, Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) whether he was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts; (2) whether his statutory speedy trial rights were violated; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing "other crimes" evidence in his first jury trial; (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing...
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