United States ex rel. Rosen v. Williams

• Decision Date: 11 November 1912
• Docket Number: 19.
• Citation: 200 F. 538
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. ROSEN v. WILLIAMS, Immigration Com'r.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

200 F. 538

UNITED STATES ex rel. ROSEN v. WILLIAMS, Immigration Com'r.

No. 19.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 11, 1912

Henry A. Wise, of New York City (D. D. Walton, Jr., Asst. U.S Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

W. S Bennet, of New York City, for appellant.

Before COXE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.

NOYES Circuit Judge.

In the very recent habeas corpus proceedings (Lou Wah Suey v Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468, 32 Sup.Ct. 734, 735 (56 L.Ed 1165)) involving the sections of the Immigration Act of 1907 in question in the present case, the Supreme Court of the United States has said with respect to the effect of the decisions of executive officers in immigration cases:

'A series of decisions in this court has settled that such hearings before executive officers may be made conclusive when fairly conducted. In order to successfully attack by judicial proceedings the conclusions and orders made upon such hearings it must be shown that the proceedings were manifestly unfair, that the action of the executive officers was such as to prevent a fair investigation or that there was a manifest abuse of the discretion committed to them by the statute. In other cases the order of the executive officers within the authority of the statute is final.'

While the statutes under consideration by the Supreme Court in many of the cases in its long series of decisions have contained express provisions making the ruling of certain immigration officers final and conclusive unless reversed by higher officers and while the court has often referred to those provisions, we do not understand that they afford the real basis for the limitations placed upon the judicial review of such administrative decisions upon habeas corpus. The underlying principles are rather that Congress has power to commit to executive officers the enforcement of the laws and regulations relating to the admission, exclusion and deportation of aliens and that the conclusions of such officers are final unless a court or some other tribunal is expressly authorized to review them. In the absence of such authorization courts cannot review decisions of such officers further than to ascertain whether they have acted within their jurisdiction and have accorded the alien a fair hearing. These principles were stated by the Supreme Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 Sup.Ct. 336, 338 (35 L.Ed. 1146), and have been approved many times since:

'An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (5 Sup.Ct. 255, 28 L.Ed. 770); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (8 Sup.Ct. 663, 31 L.Ed. 591); Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (11 Sup.Ct. 729, 35 L.Ed. 503); Lau Ow Bew, Petitioner, 141 U.S. 583 (12 Sup.Ct. 43, 35 L.Ed. 868). And Congress may, if it sees fit, as in the statutes in question in United States v. Jung Ah Lung, just cited, authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts may be intrusted by Congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.'

So in the recent case of Prentis v. Di Giacomo, 192 F. 467, 468, 112 C.C.A. 605, 606, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a deportation case under the statutes here in question said:

'We believe the rule to be settled, however, under these congressional enactments, that their enforcement against aliens is vested exclusively in the designated executive department, for hearing, ascertainment of the facts, and rulings thereupon, 'without judicial intervention'; that Congress has so provided, within its powers, not only in respect of control over the alien at the time of landing for entry, but of like control during the probation period fixed by the act for ascertaining whether the entry was lawful, to direct and enforce deportation when the entry is found to be unlawful; and that the executive finding and order thereupon is not subject to judicial review or intervention, through the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise, except for failure or denial of the administrative hearing intended by the act.'

See, also, Prentis v. Stathakos, 192 F. 469, 112 C.C.A. 607.

This conclusion that the courts in the absence of express statutory authority have a very limited power of...