United States ex rel. Bradshaw v. Parker

Decision Date31 December 1969
Docket NumberNo. 1146.,1146.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America ex rel. Hubert Allan BRADSHAW, A-35254, Petitioner, v. J. J. PARKER, Warden, Northeastern Federal Penitentiary, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Hubert Allan Bradshaw, pro se.

No appearance for respondent.

OPINION

FOLLMER, District Judge.

Hubert Allan Bradshaw, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, has submitted to this court, in forma pauperis, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Relator avers that on November 6, 1968, he was taken into custody on a parole violator's warrant. A revocation hearing was held in January of 1969 at which time petitioner's parole status was revoked. As grounds for his allegation that he is being held in custody unlawfully, relator states that (1) he was deprived of the right to be represented by counsel at his parole revocation hearing; (2) the failure to be granted a speedy trial, and (3) the failure of the revocation hearing "to measure up to the constitutional requirements of due process." As authority for his contention that the denial of counsel at the revocation hearing constitutes a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, petitioner cites the United States Supreme Court decision of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967).

This case is not controlling here since it involved a Washington State statute which in effect provided for deferred sentencing. In that case, the petitioner was convicted in 1964 for the offense of "joyriding." The conviction was based on a plea of guilty. Petitioner was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of sentence was deferred pursuant to the applicable Washington statute. Several months later Mempa was involved in a burglary. A hearing was held at which time his probation was revoked and Mempa was sentenced to ten years with the recommendation that he be required to serve only a year. At this hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that "a lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing." Id., at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 258.

The obvious difference between the facts in Mempa and those of the instant petition is that here petitioner has been validly sentenced. By revoking his parole, the United States Parole Board did not sentence petitioner, but reincarcerated him to serve a sentence that had previously been imposed.

Petitioner would have us hold that the recommitment hearing before the Parole Board is a "critical stage" within the meaning of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). There is authority for this position. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969), that "So long as the Board allows retained counsel at revocation hearings it must provide such for those financially unable to hire one." Id., at 684. That decision however was later limited by the same court in Cotner v. United States, 409 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1969). The court there said:

* * * In this case the appellant at all times has admitted that he violated parole when he left the district without permission. He sought a hearing in order to present evidence that would persuade the Board to overlook the violation. In these circumstances, the failure to provide appointed counsel does not constitute invidious discrimination and therefore is not violative of due process. Id., at 856.

Presumably, the Tenth Circuit has decided to determine the question of whether a parolee is entitled to appointed counsel at a revocation hearing on a case by case basis.

The status of the issue in this circuit is open to question. Recently the Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Halprin v. Parker, 418 F.2d 313 (3d...

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1 cases
  • United States v. Alldredge, 18867.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • October 21, 1970
    ...1969, that the petition was filed, and without any answering pleading, it was denied by the District Court. United States ex rel. Bradshaw v. Parker, 307 F.Supp. 451 (M.D.Pa.). The District Judge also denied Bradshaw leave to appeal in forma pauperis, holding that his appeal was frivolous. ......

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