United States ex rel. Rainwater v. Morris, 75 C 1646.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75 C 1646.,75 C 1646.
• Citation: 411 F. Supp. 1252
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Dana RAINWATER et al., Petitioners, v. J. D. Ernest MORRIS, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

411 F. Supp. 1252

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Dana RAINWATER et al., Petitioners, v. J. D. Ernest MORRIS, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, et al., Respondents.

No. 75 C 1646.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

March 4, 1976.

Joseph N. Lascaro, Wood Dale, Ill., for petitioners.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAROVITZ, Senior District Judge.

Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I.

On November 13, 1974, petitioners Dana Rainwater, Martin Trejo, Lawrence Tully and Enrique Flores were found guilty of the crime of rape by a jury in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Du Page County, Illinois. Rainwater is presently incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois pursuant to a four to six year sentence imposed by the trial court on January 13, 1975. Trejo, Tully and Flores were sentenced on December 30, 1974 to terms of four to five years, four to eight years and four to six years, respectively, and are incarcerated respectively at the Vandalia Correctional Center in Vandalia, Illinois, the Joliet Correction Center in Joliet, Illinois and the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois.

Following their convictions, petitioners made appropriate and timely post trial motions in the trial court which were denied by the trial judge. Subsequent to the imposition of their sentences, petitioners requested the trial court to set an appeal bond and requested that execution of their sentences be stayed pending their appeal. These motions were also denied by the trial judge, and petitioners were remanded to the custody of the Du Page County Sheriff and thereafter transferred to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal in the Illinois Appellate Court, Second Appellate District, and as of the date of this writing the briefing schedule has been completed though a date for oral argument has not yet been set.

On January 23, 1975, subsequent to the filing of notice of appeal, petitioner Rainwater moved in the Appellate Court to stay judgment and execution of his sentence, and requested that he be admitted to bail pending appeal. Rainwater's motion was contested by the State, and on March 6, 1975, the Appellate Court denied his request without indicating any reasons for its action. Petitioners Trejo, Tully and Flores filed no such motions before the Appellate Court.

On March 21, 1975, all four petitioners filed a lengthy document in the Supreme Court of Illinois wherein they made an emergency motion for a stay, appealed from the Appellate Court's denial of Rainwater's request for bail pending appeal, requested the court to set bail pending appeal for all four of them, sought leave to file an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus and filed a brief in support thereof. On April 8, 1975, the State filed its objections to petitioners' motions and requested relief, and on April 9, 1975, Justice Ryan of the Supreme Court of Illinois denied petitioners' requested relief. Once again, no reasons were articulated by the court for its refusal to grant bail pending appeal. In pertinent part the Supreme Court order stated:

The court having considered the motion and the objections finds that the motion seeks to have this court fix bail pending a determination of an appeal by the Appellate Court for the Second District. The court further finds that the Appellate Court for the Second District has heretofore denied the defendant, Dana Rainwater, bail pending appeal and that Martin Trejo, Enrique Flores and Lawrence Tully have not requested the Appellate Court for the Second District to fix bail pending appeal.

* * * * * * IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for an emergency stay order and for the setting of reasonable bail pending appeal for Dana Rainwater, Martin Trejo, Enrique Flores and Lawrence Tully is denied.

On May 22, 1975, petitioners filed this action seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that no rational basis exists for denying them bond pending appeal and that the failure of the trial court, Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois to articulate reasons for denying them bond pending appeal constituted an arbitrary denial of their statutory right to bail pending appeal and a violation of their constitutional rights.

Respondents have moved to dismiss on the grounds that (1) petitioners Trejo, Tully and Flores have failed to exhaust state remedies; (2) there is no constitutional right to bail pending appeal; (3) since a presumption of regularity attaches to all state court proceedings, the state courts need not state any reasons for the denial of bail; and (4) since the record in the state courts reflected some justification for the courts' actions, the denial of bail was not arbitrary.

II.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

Respondents contend that since petitioners Trejo, Tully and Flores restricted their state court applications to the Illinois Supreme Court and failed to file motions or seek bond pending appeal in the Appellate Court, their present application should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. We disagree.

Respondents do not deny that petitioner Rainwater has properly and fully exhausted the available state remedies, nor do they contest petitioners' assertions that following the Appellate Court's denial of Rainwater's application, repeated applications by Trejo, Tully and Flores would have been futile. Thus, even absent the joining of Trejo, Tully and Flores in the Illinois Supreme Court application for bond pending appeal, the obvious futility of their efforts would act as a bar to the dismissal of their action under the exhaustion requirement. Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); Matthews v. Wingo, 474 F.2d 1266, 1268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985, 93 S.Ct. 2283, 36 L.Ed.2d 963 (1973); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 459 F.2d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1972); Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1972); Perry v. Blackledge, 453 F.2d 856, 857 (4th Cir. 1971).

Further, it appears that the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of petitioners' collective application for bond pending appeal was not based on the failure of three of them to exhaust remedies within the state court process below, but was rather somehow based upon the merits of their application. Thus, petitioners' claims have been fully presented to the state's highest court where they have been considered and rejected. Under such circumstances, further proceedings within the state court process would not be required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), for "once the federal claim has been fairly presented to the local courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied," Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438, 443 (1971), and "petitioners are not required to file `repetitious applications' in the state courts." Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250, 92 S.Ct. 407, 409, 30 L.Ed.2d 418, 421 (1971). See also, Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63, 95 S.Ct. 257, 259, 42 L.Ed.2d 226, 229 (1974); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43, 88 S.Ct. 194, 196, 19 L.Ed.2d 41, 43-44 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-450, 73 S.Ct. 397, 402-03, 97 L.Ed. 469, 483-85 (1963).

We therefore hold that petitioners' application for a writ of habeas corpus is timely and is entitled to our consideration on the merits.

III.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." While courts have held that the "excessive bail" prohibition of the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pilkinton v. Circuit Court of Howell County, Missouri, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710-711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965, 84 S.Ct. 1128, 11 L.Ed.2d 982 (1964); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McMann, 263 F.2d 940, 943 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 937, 79 S.Ct. 1462, 3 L.Ed.2d 1549 (1959); Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 346 F.Supp. 681, 682 (N.D.Iowa 1972); United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F.Supp. 784, 786 (N.D.Ill.1971); United States ex rel. Walker v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1973); see also, Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 484, 30 L.Ed.2d 502, 511 (1972), no court has held that there is an unqualified constitutional right to bail. Rather, both prior to conviction as well as after conviction no defendant is automatically guaranteed bail by the federal Constitution. Mastrian v. Hedman, supra; Dameron v. Harson, 255 F.Supp. 533, 536-537 (W.D.La. 1966), aff'd, 364 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1966); Bloss v. Michigan, 421 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1970); Sellers v. Georgia, 374 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, supra.

Where, however, bail is authorized by the state statute, even though it is not a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution, the arbitrary denial of bail violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and allegations of such arbitrary denial are grounds for review by federal courts. United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, supra, 322 F.Supp. at 786 n.7.

Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 38, § 110-7(d) provides:

After conviction the court may order that the original bail stand as bail pending appeal or deny, increase or reduce

...