United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold
Decision Date | 14 February 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 176,Docket 31673.,176 |
Citation | 408 F.2d 125 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Anthony BRUNO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ross E. HEROLD, M.D., Director of Dannemora State Hospital, Dannemora, New York, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Joel Lewittes, New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., of the State of New York, New York City, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
F. Redmond Griffin, Troy, N. Y. (Smith, Pattison, Sampson & Jones, Troy, N. Y.), for petitioner-appellee.
Before WATERMAN, MOORE and FRIENDLY, Circuit Judges.
In September, 1947, petitioner was tried before a jury in the Kings County Court, New York; he was found guilty of robbery, grand larceny, and assault. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. People v. Bruno, 273 A.D. 977, 79 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1948). In 1963, petitioner applied to the New York Courts for a writ of coram nobis. He alleged, for the first time, that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to a public trial in 1947. Judge Leibowitz denied his motion without a hearing and the Appellate Division affirmed the denial. People v. Bruno, 20 A.D.2d 852, 249 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1964). The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.
In 1964, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. Chief Judge Foley of the Northern District of New York issued the writ for the production of petitioner for a hearing. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 233 F.Supp. 546 (N.D.N.Y.1964). After the hearing, he sustained the writ and set aside the judgment as void. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 246 F.Supp. 363 (N.D.N.Y.1965). The respondent, Herold, appealed. In March, 1966, upon motion based on additional affidavits, Chief Judge Foley reaffirmed the previous decision. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 39 F.R.D. 570 (N.D. N.Y.1966). In September, 1966, we remanded the case for a rehearing. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 368 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1966). After the rehearing, Judge Foley again reaffirmed his previous decision, although "completely cognizant from the writing that the Circuit Court is of a mind to disagree with my ruling, and leans toward flat reversal." United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 271 F.Supp. 491, 492-493 (N.D.N.Y.1967). This is an appeal from that decision.
The facts basic to a determination of this proceeding center around an incident in the courtroom during petitioner's 1947 state court trial in which the trial judge, to meet a special situation which unexpectedly arose, said:
Petitioner, together with two others, was on trial for the crimes of robbery, grand larceny, and assault. A witness, DiBari, was important for the People as the sole identification witness. A few days earlier a jury had been selected and sworn (before Judge Goldstein) but a mistrial had been declared, DiBari having taken the position that he would not testify for the People. Four days later the trial commenced (before Judge Leibowitz). At some time before DiBari testified, the trial judge was made aware of the fact that DiBari was in "mortal fear of the `gang in the courtroom.'" When DiBari was sworn as a witness, the judge observed (Testimony of Judge Leibowitz, 271 F. Supp. at 495.) It was against this background that the trial judge gave his directions to clear the courtroom, except the people in the jury box. Obviously, this meant the people in the other jury box1 because the trial judge could not have excluded the jury in a jury trial. The Judge had to meet an unusual and unexpected courtroom situation in which the interest of the prosecution, the defendant and the witness equally had to be protected. Discretion, not lightly to be disturbed after twenty years by others not then present or faced with the emergency, had to be exercised by the judge responsible for the conduct of the trial. Thus, petitioner was not in fact denied a public trial. The proof supports a conclusion that there was only a partial exclusion on the first day of trial and none on the second.
A Sixth Amendment situation is not reached. There was no in camera or secret trial. It was held in a public courtroom with attorneys, court reporters, court attendants and at least some outsiders present. Surely there is no constitutional right to the presence of all public spectators who might desire to be present — or to the presence of such element as might be detrimental to an orderly trial uninfluenced by deterrents to truthful testimony.
Most pertinent is the situation and decision in United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir., 1965), cert. denied, Orlando v. Follette, 384 U.S. 1008, 86 S.Ct. 1961, 16 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1965), where the trial judge excluded all the spectators because he believed that certain spectators were intimidating a witness. In Orlando, Chief Judge Lumbard, writing for the court, said (350 F.2d p. 970):
On a previous appeal in this case, we said:
And somewhat analogous is the recent situation in a New York federal court where to maintain courtroom decorum, the trial judge ordered certain defendants in a multi-defendant criminal case to be shackled and even gagged as they sat before the jury for days. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 930 (2d Cir.), cert denied, sub. nom. Mirra v. United States, 375 U.S. 740, 84 S.Ct. 360, 11 L.Ed.2d 272 (1963).
Of primary importance to decision is the fact that petitioner in his trial was represented by Abraham Brodsky, "an able and experienced criminal lawyer." 271 F.Supp. at 495. He did not object to the exclusion order. He, apparently, did not think that his client's rights were prejudiced by the order. He, in fact, stated upon the hearing that under the circumstances he "offered no objection when the courtroom was cleared of spectators in the belief that an objection under the circumstances, which were known to deponent Brodsky, would be neither warranted nor sustainable." Affidavit of A. Brodsky, dated Dec. 20, 1965. Brodsky also stated in the same affidavit that "When DiBari was called to the stand to testify, Judge Leibowitz cleared the courtroom with the exception of a number of civilians who occupied a second jury box usually reserved for attorneys and reporters." Thus, petitioner, in fact, had a public trial.
This Court would be closing its eyes to reality if it did not give proper recognition to the quality and experience of petitioner's trial counsel. His knowledge of trial procedures and stratagems may be assumed. This assumption bears both upon the actual situation in the courtroom and upon intelligent waiver were the situation otherwise.
Counsel obviously knew of the Sixth Amendment and his client's rights thereunder. Had he been satisfied that his client was being denied a public trial, he would have been the first to object. Lack of objection then gives support to the other testimony that the courtroom was not completely cleared and that only the element which might have been prejudicial to a fair trial was requested to withdraw. Counsel's recollection that an objection would not have been "warranted" in the light of the situation then presented to him is entitled to considerable weight in determining that petitioner was not deprived of Sixth Amendment rights as a matter of fact.
Even were the facts otherwise, did petitioner have a right to a trial at which were present persons who might seriously have affected the testimony of the witness on the stand? It would be difficult to find any space between the lines of the Sixth Amendment into which to write any such declaration. But again, assuming such a far-fetched right, could it be waived as a matter of lack of importance...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
UNITED STATES EX REL. HEADLEY v. Mancusi
...atmosphere during conferences between defendant and counsel and related to more fundamental questions." United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957, 90 S.Ct. 947, 25 L.Ed.2d 141 Headley's failure to raise the Mapp issue on appeal bears......
-
State v. Beskurt
...277, 184 L.Ed.2d 163 (2012); Downs v. Lape, 657 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.2011) (recognizing state procedural rule); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 128–29 (2d Cir.1969); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 661 (3d Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2700, 183 L.E......
-
Wash v. Sublett
...(recognizing state procedural rule), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2439, 182 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2012); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 128–29 (2d Cir.1969); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 661 (3d Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2700, 183 L.Ed......
-
Aaron v. Capps
...in a public courtroom with attorneys, court reporters, court attendants and at least some outsiders present.' United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 2 Cir., 1969, 408 F.2d 125, 127, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957, 90 S.Ct. 947, 25 L.Ed.2d 141 (1970). 'Certainly under modern conditions, when fri......