United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 71-1924.
Citation | 471 F.2d 657 |
Decision Date | 09 January 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1924.,71-1924. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, ex rel., Frank Earl SENK, S-0026, Appellant, v. J. R. BRIERLEY, Superintendent, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Frank Earl Senk, pro. se.
James F. McCort, Asst. Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before ALDISERT, GIBBONS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court certified probable cause for appeal. Petitioner Senk is confined in a Pennsylvania prison on a judgment of sentence following his conviction, in 1962, for first degree murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 194 A.2d 221 (1963). That judgment was vacated by the United States Supreme Court and the case was remanded for a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), on the admissibility of Senk's extrajudicial statements. Senk v. Pennsylvania, 378 U.S. 562, 84 S.Ct. 1928, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1964) (per curiam). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a hearing to determine whether Senk's extrajudicial statements, admitted at his trial, were voluntary. The trial court found that the statements were voluntary and so reported to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed. Commonwealth v. Senk, 423 Pa. 129, 223 A.2d 97 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 914, 87 S.Ct. 1694, 18 L.Ed.2d 638 (1967).
In 1967 Senk filed a petition in the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended:
In the district court, Judge Follmer, on the basis of the state court record, without any federal evidentiary hearing, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Senk v. Russell, 274 F.Supp. 783 (M.D.Pa.1967). Senk appealed. This court on appeal noted (1) that in making its findings on the admissibility of Senk's extrajudicial statements in the Jackson v. Denno hearing the Pennsylvania trial court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) and Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966), and (2) that the district court in rejecting the petition did not have the benefit of this court's subsequent decision in United States ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 392 U.S. 647, 88 S.Ct. 2307, 20 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1968). The latter case held that a Pennsylvania prisoner, before seeking federal habeas corpus relief, ordinarily must exhaust remedies still available under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to 1180-14 (Supp. 1972). We said:
"In view of the prolonged period of custody and questioning of the appellant and the failure to advise him fully as to the extent of his privilege against self-incrimination as discussed in the foregoing cases, we will affirm the order of the District Court solely for the reason that the appellant has not exhausted his available remedies, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and without prejudice to his right to apply for relief under 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 to 1180-14, as stated above." United States ex rel. Senk v. Russell, 396 F. 2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
The opinion of this court makes it quite clear that all matters which the appellant wished to raise in the petition for habeas corpus in the federal courts must be raised in a Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act proceeding, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 396 F.2d at 447 n. 2.
Senk returned to the Pennsylvania courts. On July 15, 1968 he filed a petition alleging essentially the same five contentions listed above. The Columbia County Court conducted a hearing and denied relief. An appeal was taken to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and a hearing was held in that court during the week of May 26, 1969. As of the date on which this appeal was submitted to us no decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Senk returned to the district court. He filed a new habeas corpus petition alleging the same five contentions set forth above, and in addition a sixth contention, that there had been an inordinate delay by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in deciding the appeal on his Post Conviction Hearing Act petition. Judge Nealon in the district court held, with respect to grounds one through five, that these had been determined adversely to Senk by Judge Follmer in the first federal habeas corpus proceeding, and that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) Senk should not be permitted to relitigate these issues. He reasoned that Judge Follmer's opinion, though based solely on the state court records, "was on the merits," and that the same factual and legal contentions should not be reconsidered. With respect to the sixth ground, Judge Nealon concluded that the desire of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to await the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the death sentence was an adequate justification for delaying the decision of Senk's appeal in his Post Conviction Hearing Act proceeding from May of 1969 to March of 1972. He ruled:
"Accordingly, the petition of Frank Earl Senk for a writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed because (1) allegations 1-5 have been raised and disposed of on the merits in a prior habeas corpus petition before this court and (2) Senk has failed to exhaust his available state remedies as to allegation (6)." (footnote omitted).
We reverse as to all six allegations.
There is a "Catch 22" flavor to the disposition by the district court of allegations one through five now before us. When Judge Follmer decided these contentions adversely to Senk based on the state court record he appealed to us. We held that the district court should not have passed upon those contentions. Technically, we affirmed the denial of the writ on a ground at least analogous to a lack of jurisdiction. Technically, perhaps, we should in such circumstances have remanded to the district court with an order to vacate its improper judgment, and to dismiss on exhaustion grounds. Because we did not, the district court on the second petition treated the first district court decision as an adjudication on the merits, even though we held it should not have been made, though our decision that exhaustion of state remedies was required deprived Senk of the opportunity for appellate review of the merits, and though the state proceedings, exhaustion of which we contemplated, have never been completed.
If strict principles of res adjudicata were applicable to habeas corpus proceedings our failure to remand the first case to the district court for vacation of the judgment when we affirmed on a ground analogous to lack of jurisdiction arguably would leave the district court opinion standing as a final decision "on the merits." See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Hykel, 468 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1972). Compare the above with Restatement of Judgments § 69(2), comment d at 317 (1942). But res adjudicata is inapplicable to habeas corpus cases. E. g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230, 44 S.Ct. 519, 68 L.Ed. 989 (1924). Technical rules which serve as traps for the typically unrepresented pro se litigant have no place in habeas corpus jurisprudence.
In Neil v. Biggers, supra, the Supreme Court considered the effect, in a habeas corpus case, of the affirmance of a conviction on certiorari by an equally divided Supreme Court. The problem arose because of the provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) that a prior judgment of the Supreme Court "shall be...
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