United States ex rel. Allen v. Hardy
Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 82 C 2898.,82 C 2898. |
Citation | 586 F. Supp. 103 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Earl ALLEN, Petitioner, v. Dr. Stephen L. HARDY, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Kenneth N. Flaxman, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Earl Allen ("Allen") originally advanced four grounds for relief in his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In a series of three opinions1 this Court disposed of all four claims and dismissed Allen's petition. Opinion II, 577 F.Supp. at 985 n. 1 decided Allen had waived or abandoned his Sixth Amendment2 claim (asserting a theory found persuasive in McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y.1983)). That determination was reaffirmed in Opinion III, 583 F.Supp at 564.
Allen now moves for reconsideration of the "waived or abandoned" conclusion, urging this Court to consider his Sixth Amendment claim on the merits. Although still of the view the claim was waived or abandoned, this Court has opted to consider the merits anyway. Allen's Sixth Amendment claim is rejected.
Allen contends a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is violated if the prosecution uses its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who belong to a cognizable class.3 Opinion III, 583 F.Supp. at 563-64, had held Allen's failure at trial even to attempt an offer of proof showing the systematic exclusion of jurors over time failed the "cause-and-prejudice" test of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) as to Allen's Equal Protection Clause claim. Because of its waiver conclusion, this Court did not reach that issue (or any other merits issue) as to Allen's Sixth Amendment claim.
Now Allen asserts such a showing of systematic exclusion is unnecessary to preserve a Sixth Amendment claim. Rather he argues this Court should find a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment in the use of peremptory challenges at his own single trial. That prima facie case could then be rebutted by the prosecution's statement of non-discriminatory reasons for its action. See McCray v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 2441-43, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 ( ); McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.Supp. at 1249.
Allen's position is a difficult one, given the test prescribed by the Supreme Court for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 1634, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) taught the Sixth Amendment has not been breached merely because no members of a defendant's race are present on his or her petit jury. Instead the defendant must prove his or her race has been "systematically excluded." That principle was reaffirmed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 702, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) ( ). Then Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) further defined the principle, setting out the elements a defendant must show to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
To establish such "systematic exclusion" Duren presented evidence (id. at 366, 99 S.Ct. at 669):
His undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic — that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized.
And just last month the Court refused to reexamine the "systematic exclusion" principle as it impacts on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2364, 80 L.Ed.2d 836 (1984) ( ).
Allen thus confronts at least three major obstacles:
Those obstacles are insurmountable — at least in the present state of the law.
Perhaps the law should have developed otherwise. Perhaps "systematic exclusion" should mean "systematic" in just one case — that is, the single prosecutor's systematic efforts in a single jury selection ("systematic" as distinguished from "systemic"). Perhaps the Supreme Court, the ultimate lawmaker in constitutional areas, will come to change its view. But given the Court's consistent refusal to reconsider the "systematic exclusion" test as defined in Duren, this Court (as the Childress court said) is bound to adhere to that criterion. That makes relevant to Allen's Sixth Amendment claim (as it was to his equal protection claim) the entire discussion in Opinions II and III.
Allen's Sixth Amendment claim stands on the same footing, and is thus barred for the same reason, as his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (Opinions II and III). Allen's motion to reconsider is denied.
Just over two weeks ago this Court issued its June 5, 1984 memorandum opinion and order in this case, dealing with the need for a showing of "systematic exclusion" of prospective jurors of a cognizable class (say blacks or other minorities) to support a Sixth Amendment claim. Now our Court of Appeals has (in the context of a federal criminal appeal, United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir.1984) (citations omitted)) described the continuing force of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965):
The Supreme Court held some years ago that it is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws for a prosecutor to base peremptory challenges on racial grounds, provided that he is not doing so in pursuance of a systematic policy of racial exclusion from juries — provided in other words that there is no pattern larger than the single case. Swain.... Although Swain arose under the Fourteenth rather than the Sixth Amendment, and although subsequent decisions, such as Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), have held that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Sixth Amendment, most courts have concluded that Swain is still good law fully applicable to federal as well as state trials.... Although there is some contrary authority ... several practical considerations support the majority approach.
And in a just-published (though previously issued) opinion in a habeas case challenging a state court conviction, United States ex rel. Palmer v. DeRobertis, 738 F.2d 168, ___ - ___ (7th Cir.1984), our Court of Appeals specifically followed "Swain and its progeny," rejecting the invitation for reexamination of Swain...
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