United States Farm Land Co. v. Jameson

• Decision Date: 08 October 1917
• Docket Number: 4876.
• Parties: UNITED STATES FARM LAND CO. v. JAMESON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

246 F. 592

UNITED STATES FARM LAND CO. v. JAMESON.

No. 4876.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

October 8, 1917

O'Brien Young & Stone, of St. Paul, Minn. (E. T. Young, of St. Paul Minn., on the brief), for appellant.

M. H Boutelle and A. M. Higgins, both of Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.

Before SANBORN, CARLAND, and STONE, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges a decree of dismissal of a suit to enjoin the defendant, A. Y. Jameson, from prosecuting an action he brought against the United States Farm Land Company, a corporation, in the state of Arizona on September 16, 1915 on the same cause of action which he litigated in the action he brought against that company in Minnesota on January 24, 1912. The cause of action in each case is for the recovery of $214,000 for the breach of a contract. The Minnesota case was tried to a jury in the court below. After Mr. Jameson had introduced all his evidence and had rested, the Land Company made a motion to dismiss the action on the merits, and on May 22, 1912, the court ordered 'that this action be, and the same is hereby, dismissed. ' A writ of error was sued out to reverse that judgment, it was affirmed on July 10, 1913 (Jameson v. United States Farm Land Co., 206 F. 889, 124 C.C.A. 549), and the petition for a rehearing was denied on January 28, 1914 (210 F. 885, 127 C.C.A. 495). The theory of the suit now in hand for the injunction is that the judgment of dismissal was a final determination of the merits of the first action, which rendered the issues therein res adjudicata and constituted a bar to the prosecution by Jameson of another action for the same cause, that the action he has brought in Arizona is in defiance and derogation of that judgment, and that the court below should issue its injunction against the prosecution by Jameson of his second action, in aid and enforcement of its judgment of dismissal of his first action.

According to the statutes of Minnesota and the rules of practice and proceeding in actions at law in the courts of that state, which prevail in such actions in the federal court below under the act of conformity (Revised Statutes, Sec. 914 (3 U.S.Comp.Stat. 1916, Sec. 1537)), the settled rule is that a judgment of dismissal on the motion of the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, against the latter's objection or protest, does not constitute a bar to another action by the plaintiff against the same defendant for the same cause, although a judgment of dismissal on a verdict for the defendant, directed by the court on the motion of the defendant made at the proper time, constitutes such a bar. General Statutes of Minnesota 1913, Sec. 7825; Craver v. Christian, 34 Minn. 397, 398, 26 N.W. 8; Andrews v. School District No. 4, 35 Minn. 70, 71, 27 N.W. 303; McCune v. Eaton, 77 Minn. 404, 80 N.W. 355; Woods v. Lindvall, 48 F. 62, 70, 1 C.C.A. 37, 45; Hammergen v. Schurmeier (C.C.) 3 Fed. 77, 78, 79; Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 264, 26 L.Ed. 539; Board of Com'rs v. Home Savings Bank, 200 F. 28, 35, 118 C.C.A. 256, 263.

At the close of Mr. Jameson's evidence in the first action, therefore, the Land Company had the option to move, at the proper time, for a directed verdict and the consequent bar of a second action for the same cause, or for a dismissal and the consequent judgment thereon that would not constitute such a bar. It moved for a dismissal on the merits. If that motion was not the equivalent of a motion for a directed verdict at the proper time, the Land Company then elected to take a judgment that would not be a bar to a second action for the same cause. If, as is now asserted, that motion was the equivalent of a motion for a directed verdict, it imposed upon the trial court the duty to decide whether a judgment that should constitute a bar, or a judgment which should not constitute a bar, to another action, should be rendered upon the motion, and it decided, and entered neither a judgment on a directed verdict nor a judgment of dismissal on the merits, but its order was simply 'that this action be and the same is hereby dismissed.'

Through many years of practice as a lawyer in the courts of Minnesota, and many years of honorable service on the bench of the court below, the learned judge who made that order was perfectly familiar with the difference in the effect upon the second action for the same cause of this judgment of dismissal without more and a judgment of dismissal on a directed verdict, and there can be no doubt that he intended that the dismissal he ordered should not bar a second action. It is certain that by its terms the judgment he entered did not do so, and the Land Company, if reasonably diligent, could not have failed to know that fact, for it had moved for a dismissal 'on the merits,' and the court had refused such a dismissal, and had granted a mere dismissal without more, which, in its legal effect, did not bar another action for the same cause. Nevertheless the Land Company took no exception to the order or judgment. It made no motion to modify its form or effect. It sued out no writ of error to reverse or modify it; but from the day of its entry, on May 22, 1912, it strove through this court and the Supreme Court to sustain it as it was written until it had been finally affirmed. Thereafter, on March 21, 1916, for the first time, by the commencement of this suit for an injunction against the maintenance of a second action, it sought to transform that judgment of dismissal, which does not bar a second action, into a final determination of the issues of that action, which should have that effect. If there was any mistake or error of the court in the rendition of the judgment in question, the failure to move to modify it and to except to its entry, or to challenge it by writ of error, or otherwise, for nearly four years, discloses a striking lack of reasonable diligence on the part of the Land Company. If, on the other hand, as the presumption is, and as the court is confident the fact is, the court below, without mistake or misunderstanding, thoughtfully considered the motion of the Land Company and deliberately decided that it would not render a judgment which should be a bar to another action for the same cause, and deliberately rendered a judgment of dismissal, which does not do so, there is no ground for the issuance of the injunction. In either case there is no equity in the bill of the complainant, and it was rightly dismissed.

The court has thoughtfully considered the arguments of counsel that the second action upon the same cause cannot be maintained under the statute and practice in Minnesota because the merits of the case were involved,...