United States of America v. Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis, No. 386

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtLurton
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appt., v. TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS et al
Docket NumberNo. 386
Decision Date22 April 1912

224 U.S. 383
32 S.Ct. 507
56 L.Ed. 810
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appt.,

v.

TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS et al.

No. 386.
Argued October 20 and 23, 1911.
Decided April 22, 1912.

[Syllabus from pages 383-385 intentionally omitted]

Page 385

Mr. Edward C. Crow, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Charles A. Houts, United States Attorney, and Attorney General Wickersham, for appellant.

Page 386

Messrs. H. S. Priest and T. M. Pierce for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 386-390 intentionally omitted]

Page 390

Mr. John C. Higdon as amicus curioe.

Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court:

The United States filed this bill to enforce the provisions of the Sherman act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat. at L. 209, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200, against thirty-eight corporate and individual defendants named in the margin, as a combination in re-

The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis; the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Railway Company; the Wiggins Ferry Company; the St. Louis Bridge Company; the St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Company; the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company; the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company; the Chicago & Alton Railway Company; the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company; the Illinois Central Railroad Company; the St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern Railway Company; the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Company; the St. Louis, Vandalia, & Terre Haute Railroad Company; the Wabash Railroad Company; the Cleveland Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Railway Company; the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company; the Southern Railway Company; the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company; the Missouri Pacific Railway Company; the Central Trust Company of New York; A. A. Allen, S. M. Felton, A. J. Davidson, W. M. Green, J. T. Harahan, C. S. Clarke, H. Miller, Benjamin McKean, Joseph Ramsey, George E. Evans, C. E. Schaff, T. C. Powell, J. F. Stevens, A. G. Cochran, W. S. McChesney, Julius Walsh, V. W. Fisher and S. D. Webster.

Page 391

straint of interstate commerce and as a monopoly forbidden by that law. The cause was heard by the four circuit judges, who, being equally divided in judgment, dismissed the bill, without filing an opinion. From this decree the United States has appealed.

The principal defendant is the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, hereinafter designated as the terminal company. It is a corporation of the state of Missouri, and was organized under an agreement made in 1889 between Mr. Jay Gould and a number of the defendant railroad companies for the express purpose of acquiring the properties of several independent terminal companies at St. Louis, with a view to combining and operating them as a unitary system.

The terminal properties first acquired and combined into one system by the terminal company comprised the following: The Union Railway & Transit Company of St. Louis and East St. Louis; the Terminal Railroad of St. Louis and East St. Louis; the Union Depot Company of St. Louis; the St. Louis Bridge Company; and the Tunnel Railroad of St. Louis. These properties included the great union station, the only existing railroad bridge,—the Eads or St. Louis bridge,—and every connecting or terminal company by means of which that bridge could be used by railroads terminating on either side of the river. For a time this combination was operated in com-

Page 392

petition with the terminal system of the Wiggins Ferry Company, and upon the completion of the Merchants' bridge, in competition with it, and a system of terminals which were organized in connection with it. The Wiggins Ferry Company had for many years operated car transfer boats by means of which cars were transferred between St. Louis and East St. Louis.

Upon each side of the river it owned extensive railway terminal facilities, with which connection was maintained with the many railroads terminating on the west and east sides of the rivers, which gave such roads connection with each other, as well as access to many of the industrial and business districts on each side. In 1890 a third terminal system was opened up by the completion of a second railroad bridge over the Mississippi river at St. Louis, known as the Merchants' bridge. This was a railroad toll bridge, open to every railroad upon equal terms. That it might forever maintain the potentiality of competition as a railroad bridge, the act of Congress authorizing its construction provided that no stockholders in any other railway bridge company should become a stockholder therein. But as this was a mere bridge company, it was essential that railroad companies desiring to use it should have railway connections with it on each side of the river. For this purpose two or more railway companies were organized and lines of railway were constructed connecting each end of the Merchants' bridge with various railroad systems terminating on either side of the river. The Merchants' bridge and its allied terminals were thereby able to afford many, if not all, of the railroads coming into St. Louis, access to the business districts on both sides of the river, and connection with each other.

Thus, for a time, there existed three independent methods by which connection was maintained between railroads terminating on either side of the river at St. Louis: First, the original Wiggins Ferry Company, and

Page 393

its railway terminal connections; second, the Eads Railroad bridge and the several terminal companies by means of which railroads terminating at St. Louis were able to use that bridge and connect with one another, constituting the system controlled by the terminal company; and, third, the Merchants' bridge and terminal facilities owned and operated by companies in connection therewith.

This resulted in some cases in an unnecessary duplication of facilities, but it at least gave to carriers and shippers some choice, a condition which, if it does not lead to competition in charges, does insure competition in service. Important as were the considerations mentioned, their independence of one another served to keep open the means for the entrance of new lines to the city, and was an obstacle to united opposition from existing lines. The importance of this will be more clearly seen when we come to consider the topographical conditions of the situation.

That the promoters of the terminal company designed to obtain the control of every feasible means of railroad access to St. Louis, or means of connecting the lines of railway entering on opposite sides of the river, is manifested by the declarations of the original agreement. as well as by the successive steps which followed. Thus, the proviso in the act of Congress authorizing the construction of the Merchants' bridge, which forbade the ownership of its stock by any other bridge company or stockholder in any such company, was eliminated by an act of Congress, and shortly thereafter the terminal company obtained stock control of the Merchants' Bridge Company, and of its related terminal companies, and likewise a lease.

The Wiggins Ferry Company owned the river front on the Illinois shore opposite St. Louis for a distance of several miles. It had on that side and on its own property, switching yards and other terminal facilities. From these yards extended lines of rails which connected with its car transfer boats and with the termini of railroads on the Illinois side.

Page 394

On the St. Louis side of the river it had like facilities by which it was in connection with railway lines terminating on that side. That company was consequently able to interchange traffic between the systems on opposite sides of the river, and to serve many industries. In 1892 the Rock Island Railroad Company endeavored to obtain an independent entrance to the city. For this purpose it sought to acquire the facilities owned by the Wiggins Ferry Company by securing a control of its capital stock. This was not deemed desirable by the railroad companies which jointly owned the terminal company's facilities, and to prevent this acquisition effort was made to secure control of the stock. The competition was fierce and the market price of the shares pushed to an abnormal price. The final result being in debt, an agreement was reached by which the Rock Island Company was admitted to joint ownership with the other proprietary companies in all of the terminal properties which were operated by the terminal company, or which should be acquired by it. The shares in the ferry company bought by the Rock Island were transferred to the terminal company at cost, and were paid for by that company. These shares, united with those which had been acquired by the terminal company, enabled the latter to absorb the properties of the ferry company, and thus the three independent terminal systems were combined into a single system.

We come, then, to the question upon which the case must turn: Has the unification of substantially every terminal facility by which the traffic of St. Louis is served resulted in a combination which is in restraint of trade within the meaning and purpose of the anti-trust act?

It is not contended that the unification of the terminal facilities of a great city where many railroad systems center is, under all circumstances and conditions, a combination in restraint of trade or commerce. Whether it is a facility in aid of interstate commerce or an unreason-

Page 395

able restraint, forbidden by the act of Congress, as construed and applied by this court in the cases of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632, will depend upon the intent to be inferred from the extent of the control thereby secured over instrumentalities which such commerce is under...

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213 practice notes
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
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    ...standards. As a textbook example of a monopolist in control of an essential facility, see United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383, 32 S.Ct. 507, 56 L.Ed. 810 (1912), it is difficult to conclude that these efforts could not have amounted to an abuse of the administrative......
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    ...U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 90, 57 L. Ed. 243;Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518;U. S. v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383, 32 Sup. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810;Northern Securities Co. Case, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679;Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.......
  • Coates & Hopkins Realty Co. v. Terminal Railway, No. 28132.
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    ...Mo. 165; State ex inf. v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 182 Mo. 284; Stevens v. Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 212; United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 224 U.S. 383; Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Morton, 83 Mich. 265; Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485; Beach v. Wakefield, ......
  • Francis v. Terminal Railroad Assn., No. 39573.
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    • April 8, 1946
    ...must act as the impartial agent of each company which uses its facilities. United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 56 L. Ed. 810; United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 236 U.S. 194, 59 L. Ed. 535. (6) This record discloses that appellant not only was not shi......
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197 cases
  • Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., Nos. 1323-26
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • February 3, 1983
    ...standards. As a textbook example of a monopolist in control of an essential facility, see United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383, 32 S.Ct. 507, 56 L.Ed. 810 (1912), it is difficult to conclude that these efforts could not have amounted to an abuse of the administrative......
  • Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
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    ...U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 90, 57 L. Ed. 243;Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518;U. S. v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383, 32 Sup. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810;Northern Securities Co. Case, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679;Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.......
  • Coates & Hopkins Realty Co. v. Terminal Railway, No. 28132.
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 17, 1931
    ...Mo. 165; State ex inf. v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 182 Mo. 284; Stevens v. Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 212; United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 224 U.S. 383; Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Morton, 83 Mich. 265; Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485; Beach v. Wakefield, ......
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • April 8, 1946
    ...must act as the impartial agent of each company which uses its facilities. United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 56 L. Ed. 810; United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 236 U.S. 194, 59 L. Ed. 535. (6) This record discloses that appellant not only was not shi......
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  • Curbing Aftermarket Monopolization
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    • Antitrust Bulletin Nbr. 38-2, June 1993
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    ...F.2d 174 (2dCir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).96 Otter Tail Power, 410 U.S. at 366; U.S. v, Terminal RailroadAssociation, 224 U.S. 383, 405, 409 (1912).91 Laurel Sand &Gravel, Inc. v, CSX Transportation, Inc., 924 F.2d539,544(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991); Del......
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    ...forthe unremarkable points that collusion makes adifference, thatcollusive exclusion can be remedied simply through direct prohibition,60 224 U.S. 383 (1912).61 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).62326 U.S. at Coherence or confusion :423and thus the remedy requires no cont......
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