United States of America v. New York Porto Rico Steamship Company

• Decision Date: 15 November 1915
• Docket Number: No. 44,44
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plff. in Err., v. NEW YORK & PORTO RICO STEAMSHIP COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

239 U.S. 88

36 S.Ct. 41

60 L.Ed. 161

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plff. in Err.,

v NEW YORK & PORTO RICO STEAMSHIP COMPANY.

No. 44.

Argued November 3, 1915.

Decided November 15, 1915.

Solicitor General Davis and Mr. Robert Szold for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. James H. Hayden, Norman B. Beecher, and Ray Rood Allen for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 89 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit by the United States to recover the increased cost of transportation for coal, above a price that the defendant had agreed to accept for the service; the latter having notified the government that it would not furnish the steamers agreed. There is no dispute as to the facts. On November 9, 1909, the plaintiff requested in writing that the defendant make a tender for the transportation of not less than 8,000 tons of coal from certain Atlantic ports at the option of the plaintiff to Mare island or San Francisco, with stipulations as to time. On November 13 the defendant submitted an offer which the plaintiff accepted by telegraph on the same day. On November 15 the defendant wrote, acknowledging the telegram, and saying that it could advise in due course what steamers it would tender. There was further correspondence on the footing of a mutual contract, but on December 14, the defendant's attorney wrote, stating that it believed that a combination had been made with intent 'to cause it to make default under its engagement to your Department or else to suffer heavy loss,' and requesting the plaintiff to procure the transportation if it could be done at reasonable cost, letting the writer know the terms of any contract before it was closed. The plaintiff thereupon got the transportation elsewhere. The declaration is in three counts; two upon the contract and a third for money paid at the defendant's request. At the first trial the plaintiff had judgment. 197 Fed. 995. This judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals. 124 C. C. A. 325, 206 Fed. 443. At a second trial on this same record both parties moved that a verdict be directed, and a verdict was directed for the defendant. The judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 126 C. C. A. 668, 209 Fed. 1007.

The only matter for our consideration is whether the court below was right in ruling as matter of law that there was no binding contract, and therefore we may lay on one side some details that were dwelt upon by the defendant, but that do not affect this question. The ground of the defense is Rev. Stat. § 3744, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 6895. By this section it is made the duty of the Secretaries of War, the Navy, and the Interior to cause every contract made by their authority on behalf of the government 'to be reduced to writing, and signed by the contracting parties with their names at the end thereof;' all the copies and papers in relation to the same to be attached together by a ribbon and seal, etc. A formal proposal, varying, the defendant says, from that which was accepted in the letters, was sent to the defendant, and received by it on December 11, but never was signed, and the defendant contends that, however it might be otherwise, the statute makes the informal agreement by correspondence void.

The statute does not address itself in terms to the effect of the form upon the liability of the parties, like the statute of frauds. Whatever effect it has in that way is not a matter of interpretation in a strict sense, but is implied. The extent of the...