United States of America v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Railway Company United States of America v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Railway Company 23, 26 27, 1912
Citation | 34 S.Ct. 986,234 U.S. 476,58 L.Ed. 1408 |
Decision Date | 08 April 1912 |
Docket Number | Nos. 136 and 162,No. 136,No. 162,136,162,s. 136 and 162 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Interstate Commerce Commission, et al., Appts., v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA, & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY et al. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Interstate Commerce Commission, et al., Appts., v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA, & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY et al. Argued February 23, 26, and 27, 1912. Ordered on |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Mr. Patrick J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Messrs. Stephen A. Foster, William E. Lamb, Rush C. Butler, and Cornelius Lynde for appellant, the Chicago Association of Commerce.
Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr., for intervener, the Giroux Consolidated Mines Company.
Messrs. F. C. Dillard, Robert Dunlap, E. C. Lindley, Maxwell Evarts, Gardiner Lathrop, Charles W. Bunn, and Charles Donnelly for appellees.
Messrs. F. W. M. Cutcheon, James C. Jeffery, and Kerner Easton for appellees, the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company et al.
Former Attorney General Wickersham, Assistant to the Attorney General Fowler, and Mr. Blackburn Esterline for the United States on reargument.
Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Messrs. Rush C. Butler, William E. Lamb, Stephen A. Foster, and Cornelius Lynde for appellant the Chicago Association of Commerce.
Messrs. F. C. Dillard, F. W. M. Cutcheon, and Charles Donnelly for appellees.
Mr. Alfred P. Thom as amicus curioe.
We shall seek to confine our statement to matters which are essential to the decision of the case. The provisions of § 4 of the act to regulate commerce [24 Stat. at L. 380, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3155], dealing with what is known as the long and short haul clause, the power of carriers because of dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions to deviate from the exactions of such clause, and the authority of the Interstate Comerce Commission in relation to such subjects, were materially amended by the act of June 18, 1910, chap. 309, 36 Stat. at L. 547, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288. Following the form prescribed by the Commission after the amendment in question, the seventeen carriers who are appellees on this record made to the Interstate Commerce Commission their 'application for relief from provisions of 4th section of amended commerce act in connection with the following tariffs.' The tariffs annexed to the applications covered the whole territory from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast and the Gulf of Mexico, including all interior points, and embracing practically the entire country, and the petition asked the Interstate Commerce Commission for authority to continue all rates shown on the tariffs from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast, and from the Pacific coast to the Atlantic seaboard, and to and from interior points lower than rates concurrently in effect from and to intermediate points. It was stated in the petition: 'This application is based upon the desire of the interested carriers to continue the present method of making rates lower at the more distant points than at the intermediate points; such lower rates being necessary by reason of competition of various water carriers and of carriers partly by water and partly by rail operating from Pacific coast ports to Atlantic seaboard ports; competition of various water carriers operating to foreign countries from Pacific coast ports; and competition of the products of foreign countries with the products of the Pacific coast; competition of the products of Pacific coast territory with the products of other sections of the country; competition of Canadian rail carriers not subject to the interstate commerce act; competition of the products of Canada moving by Canadian carriers with the products of the United States; rates established via the shorter or more direct routes, but applied also via the longer or more circuitous routes.' After full hearing the Commission refused to grant unqualifiedly the prayer of the petition, but entered an order permitting in some respects a charge of a lower rate for the longer haul to the Pacific coast than was asked for intermediate points provided a proportionate relation was maintained between the lower rate for the longer haul to the Pacific coast and the higher rate to the intermediate points, the proportion to be upon the basis of percentages which were fixed. For the purposes of the order in question the Commission in substance adopted a division of the entire territory into separate zones, which division had been resorted to by the carriers for the purposes of the establishment of the rates in relation to which the petition was filed. Refusing to comply with this order the carriers commenced proceedings in the commerce court praying a decree enjoining the enforcement of the 4th section as amended on the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, and of the order as being in any event violative of the amended section as properly construed. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The defendants moved to dismiss, and, on the overruling of the motions, appealed from the interlocutory order, the case being No. 136. Subsequently, upon the election of the defendants to plead no further, a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal being No. 162.
It suffices at this moment to say that all the contentions which the assignments of error involve and every argument advanced to refute such contentions, including every argument urged to uphold, on the one hand, or to overthrow, on the other, the action of the Commission, as well as every reason relied upon to challenge the action of the court or to sustain its judgment, are all reducible to the following propositions:
(a) The absolute want of power of the court below to deal with the subject involved in the complaint because controversies concerning the 4th section of the act to regulate commerce of the nature here presented were, by an express statutory provision, excluded from the cognizance of the court below. (b) That even if this be not the case, the action of the Commission which was complained of was purely negative, and therefore not within the cognizance of the court, because not inherently justiciable. (c) That, correctly interpreting the 4th section, the order made by the Commission was absolutely void because wholly beyond the scope of any power conferred by the 4th section as amended. (d) That even if, in some respects, the order of the Commission was within the reach of its statutory power, there was intermingled in the order such an exertion of authority not delegated as to cause the whole order to be void. (e) That the order of the Commission was void even if the 4th section be interpreted as conferring the authority which the Commission exerted, since, under that assumption, the 4th section as amended was repugnant to the Constitution.
All the propositions, even including the jurisdictional ones, are concerned with and depend upon the construction of the 4th section as amended, and we proceed to consider and pass upon that subject and every other question in the case under four separate headings: 1, the meaning of the statute; 2, its constitutionality; 3, the jurisdiction of the court; 4, the validity of the order in the light of the statute as interpreted.
We reproduce the section as originally adopted and as amended, passing a line through the words omitted by the amendment, and printing in italics those which were added by the amendment, thus at a glance enabling the section to be read as it was before and as it now stands after amendment.
'Whenever a carrier by railroad shall in competition with a water route or routes reduce the rates on the carriage of any species of freight to or from competitive points, it shall not be permitted to increase such rates unless after hearing by the In-Interstate Commerce Commission it shall be found that such proposed increase rests upon changed conditions other than the elimination of water competition.'
Before considering the amended text we state briefly some of the more...
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