United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Wkrs. of Amer.

Citation456 F.2d 483
Decision Date03 February 1972
Docket NumberNo. 19454-19481.,19454-19481.
PartiesUNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant in No. 19454, et al. Appeal of DISTRICT 4, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, in Nos. 19455, 19460, 19478. Appeal of DISTRICT 5, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, in Nos. 19456, 19461, 19479. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 6321, in No. 19457. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 1248, in No. 19458. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant in No. 19459, et al. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 2399 in No. 19462. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 762 in No. 19463. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 6159 in No. 19464. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 6330 in No. 19465. BETHLEHEM MINES CORPORATION v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant in No. 19466, et al. Appeal of DISTRICT 2, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Owen F. Slagel, President, in No. 19467. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 1386, Charles Krawetz, President, in No. 19468. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 850, Edward F. Monborne, President, in No. 19469. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 1368, Thomas Watson, President, in No. 19470. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 6394, Joseph T. Mucko, Jr., President in No. 19471. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 6411, Robert C. Brown, President, in No. 19472. Appeal of DISTRICT 5, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Michael Budzanoski, President, in No. 19473. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 1190, Charles Washlack, President, in No. 19474. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 2874, Stanley C. Werstler, President, in No. 19475. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 1197, John A. Dziak, President, in No. 19476. REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Appellant in No. 19477, et al. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 9873 in No. 19480. Appeal of UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL NO. 688 in No. 19481.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lloyd F. Engle, Jr., Wilner, Wilner & Kuhn, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellants.

Leonard L. Scheinholtz, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Clyde W. Armstrong, Ralph T. De Stefano, Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, Pa., Nicholas Unkovic, Harley N. Trice, II, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and KALODNER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, labor unions and individual union members, appeal from the order of the district court denying their motion for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 317 F.Supp. 1070 (W.D.Pa.1970). The dispute had its genesis in actions filed by the appellees, United States Steel Corporation, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Mines Corporation and Republic Steel Corporation seeking injunctions against work stoppages which they alleged were in violation of union contracts containing "Settlement of Local and District Disputes" grievance-arbitration procedures. The steel companies contended that by virtue of § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1971), the work stoppages should be enjoined pending resolution of the underlying disputes through the contract grievance-arbitration procedures. After a two-day hearing the district court entered an order in each case granting a preliminary injunction. Each order contained the language:

"Bond in the amount of $1,000.00 has been approved and filed with the Court by plaintiff."

A separate bond, identical in form, was filed by each plaintiff. The condition of the bond was in each case as follows:

"WHEREAS, plaintiff has applied for a Preliminary Injunction against defendants, enjoining and restraining them from the commission of certain acts, as more particularly described in the Complaint; NOW, the condition of this obligation is such, that the plaintiff shall be liable to the defendants for such costs and damages, not exceeding the sum of $1,000.00, as defendants or any other person may sustain by reason of the Preliminary Injunction, if the Court finally decides that plaintiff is not entitled thereto."

Neither the orders granting preliminary injunction nor the bond in any case made reference to the authority under which the court required that the bond be posted. The record discloses no opportunity for the defendants to examine the bond prior to its approval and filing.

The applications for preliminary injunctions were strenuously opposed by the defendants who contended that the work stoppage did not fall within the coverage of the contract grievance-arbitration provisions. When the orders were entered defendants promptly appealed. On their motion we summarily reversed. Bethlehem Mines Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America, No. 19,040 (3rd Cir., filed July 2, 1970). That reversal was on the ground that the district court because of an erroneous view of the applicable law had effectively denied the parties the opportunity to develop their respective positions in the abbreviated hearing which it conducted. The preliminary injunction was, therefore, improvidently granted. We remanded "without prejudice to a request for a hearing de novo on the application for a preliminary injunction." The order on remand specified, "Each side to bear its own costs."

After remand the plaintiffs renewed their request for a preliminary injunction and the district court set the matter down for a de novo hearing commencing July 9, 1970. Instead of proceeding with the hearing, however, the parties with the approval of the district court entered into a stipulation providing:

"At the hearing, counsel for the respective defendants have represented to the Court that, to their knowledge, no picketing, work stoppage or strike exists at present and none is known to be anticipated in the immediate future. Also, counsel for the respective parties have agreed to an indefinite continuance of the hearing upon the oral stipulation that plaintiff, in good faith, will utilize its best efforts to comply with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and that counsel for the respective defendants, based upon the conditions in the mines as they are known to exist at present, will counsel the officers and membership of defendant-unions to refrain from any work stoppage or picketing at plaintiffs\' mines.
NOW, THEREFORE, this 10th day of July, 1970, in accordance with the representations and stipulations of counsel, it is hereby Ordered that the hearing upon plaintiffs\' application for preliminary injunction be continued until further notice by the Court."

The effect of this stipulation, although it purported to continue the hearing on plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction, was to end the lawsuit for all practical purposes. By then the work stoppages complained of had ceased.

On August 14, 1970 the defendants moved for the award of reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys' fees. This claim was based upon § 7 of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1971) which in revelant part provides:

"No temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the court sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense, or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs (together with a reasonable attorney\'s fee) and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the court.
The undertaking mentioned in this section shall be understood to signify an agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which a decree may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages of which hearing complainant and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court for that purpose. But nothing in this section contained shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity."

At the hearing on this motion the parties stipulated the amount of expenses incurred and the reasonable value of legal services rendered in opposing the preliminary injunctions and in procuring their reversal by this court.1 The stipulated fees and expenses exceed $11,350.00. The four bonds total $4,000.00. The district court denied the motion in its entirety "without prejudice to defendants' right to re-submit similar motions should the outcome of the proceedings warrant the same." This appeal followed.

The appellees moved before this court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was interlocutory. Another panel denied that motion without opinion, apparently on the ground that the order appealed from, although in form interlocutory, was in practical effect final on the issue here presented since no further proceedings would take place in the district court and was therefore appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Greene v. Singer Co., No. 71-1835 (3rd Cir., filed Nov. 2, 1971). Thus we must treat the appeal as a final decision denying defendants' motion for costs, expenses and attorneys' fees.

Since the reasonableness of the requested amounts has been...

To continue reading

Request your trial
51 cases
  • Local Lodge No. 1266, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Panoramic Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 30 Diciembre 1981
    ...Union, 516 F.2d 242, 246-48 (3d Cir. 1975); Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 560-61 (2d Cir. 1974); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 487-88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 We agree that the requirement of a full evidentiary hearing is c......
  • U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 24 Septiembre 1975
    ...But see Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Union Local 14, 3 Cir. 1972, 459 F.2d 369, 374; United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 3 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 483, 487. We reject the reasoning of these cases because it would make any strike enjoinable during the life of a collective bar......
  • Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 15 Abril 1977
    ...Co., 147 F.2d 246 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 852, 65 S.Ct. 1088, 89 L.Ed. 1972 (1945); but see United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 Accordingly, we affirm the court's dismissal of appellan......
  • Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 18 Septiembre 1978
    ...while § 4 might not bar all prospective relief, an accommodation is still required between § 301 and § 9. Just as in United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 (1972), we held that § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act appli......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT