United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Wkrs. of Amer.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1970
• Docket Number: 70-725 and 70-727.,Civ. A. No. 70-724
• Parties: UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants. BETHLEHEM MINES CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

320 F. Supp. 743

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.

JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.

BETHLEHEM MINES CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 70-724, 70-725 and 70-727.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

December 16, 1970.

Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, S. G. Clark, United States Steel Corp., Thomas E. Ricca, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Lloyd Engle, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., Willard E. Owens, Joseph Yablonski, Washington, D. C., Kenneth J. Yablonski, Washington, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION

GOURLEY, District Judge:

In these civil actions, the matters currently before the Court are Motions to Dismiss or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of defendant-Local Unions 762, 1197 and 1148 and individual defendants Edward Monborne and Charles Krawitz, who are Presidents of Local Unions 850 and 1386, respectively.¹ As have been other matters before these, the Motions were consolidated for hearing upon a finding that common issues of fact and law were involved.

In substantially similar Complaints filed in each of the above-captioned Civil Actions, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief restraining work stoppages and picketing alleged to be in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement² and damages for the alleged breach of said Agreement, pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

In their Complaints plaintiffs alleged an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement binding upon the defendants and containing, inter alia, a broad grievance-arbitration provision obligating the parties to submit to specified grievance procedures and ultimately to arbitration, if necessary, any "differences" between the mine workers and mine operators and "any local trouble of any kind." Plaintiffs also alleged that the aforesaid grievance-arbitration provision obligated defendants to refrain from striking over any matter properly subject to the grievance-arbitration provision. It was alleged that strikes or work stoppages had occurred and were occurring, that said strikes or work stoppages arose out of "differences" or "local trouble" properly subject to the arbitration-grievance procedure, and that, consequently, the strikes or work stoppages violated defendants alleged contractual obligation to refrain from such conduct and to submit the matter to the grievance-arbitration procedures. Plaintiffs alleged that they were willing to submit to the aforementioned procedures. Further, plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered and would continue to suffer irreparable harm, that they would suffer more from the denial of an injunction than would defendants from its issuance, and that plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law.

Requests in each of the Complaints for preliminary injunctive relief were consolidated for hearing and, after the same, the Court entered an order preliminarily enjoining defendants from engaging in the alleged work stoppages. In an order of June 30, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this Court's order on procedural grounds and remanded the cases for a hearing de novo upon plaintiffs' applications for preliminary injunctions. The de novo hearing commenced on July 9, 1970 but was continued indefinitely upon certain representations and stipulations of counsel for the respective parties.

Certain of the defendants now move to dismiss the Complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, summary judgments are sought. In determining whether the Complaints can withstand the Motions to Dismiss, the applicable test is whether the well pleaded facts, accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are sufficient to constitute a valid claim. Sherwin v. Oil City National Bank, 18 F.R.D. 188 (W.D.Pa.1955), aff'd 229 F. 2d 835 (3d Cir. 1956); Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 97 F.Supp. 961 (W.D.Pa.1951); Bowles v. Sachnoff, 65 F.Supp. 538 (W.D.Pa.1946). It is "the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Movants assert that the claims for injunctive relief admittedly arise out of a "labor dispute" and that plaintiffs therefore must establish the prerequisite for an injunction under Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107. Were this the case, the Complaints would fail for want of allegations of such acts of violence on the part of defendants as would constitute "unlawful acts" within the intendment of Section 107(a). Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948, 952 (3d Cir. 1939). However, in a recent decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated the narrow circumstances in which a claim for injunctive relief, although arising out of a "labor dispute", need not meet the prerequisites of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

In the Boys Markets case, supra, the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective bargaining agreement. In so deciding, the Supreme Court states, at 253, 90 S.Ct. at 1594:

"Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the situation in which a collective bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. The dissenting opinion in Sinclair suggested the following principles for the guidance of the district courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief—principles which we now adopt:

`A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity —whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance.' Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, at 228, 82 S.Ct., 1328 at 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 440. (Emphasis in original)"

Plaintiffs must allege facts which will entitle them to injunctive relief under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Under Boys Markets, the requisite allegations would appear to be (1) that a collective bargaining agreement contains a mandatory grievance or arbitration procedure; (2) that the agreement gives rise to an obligation on the part of the union to refrain from a strike or other concerted activity over a grievance subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure; (3) that the strike or concerted activity sought to be enjoined arises out of a grievance subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure; (4) that breaches of the agreement are occurring and will continue to occur, or have been threatened and will be committed; (5) that the breaches have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and (6) that the employer will suffer more from the...