United States v. 0.073 Acres of Land
| Decision Date | 09 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3776,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-4241,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3773,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3770,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3781,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3777,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3779,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3782,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3775,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3774,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3778,CIVIL ACTION NO: 09-3772,CIVIL ACTION NO: c/w: 09-3771 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. 0.073 ACRES of LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE in PARISHES of ORLEANS and JEFFERSON, STATE of LOUISIANA, and PETER B. ANDERSON, et ux. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Plaintiff the United States and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association ("MCTA"). (Rec. Doc. 51, 59). Having reviewed the record, memoranda of counsel, and the law, the United States' Motion is GRANTED and MCTA's Motion is DISMISSED AS MOOT for the following reasons.
On June 5, 2009, the United States filed this eminent domain proceeding against 0.73 acres of land comprising fourteen of the 58 townhomes in Mariner's Cove Development ("Development"), a residential community located near Lake Pontchartrain and the 17th Street Canal, to facilitate the United States Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") access to the pumping station on the canal. (Rec. Doc. 1). MCTA is a non-profit corporation that provides residentialservices to the individually-owned townhouses in the Development in exchange for periodic assessments pursuant to the "Declarations of Servitudes, Conditions and Restrictions of Mariner's Cove Townhomes Association, Inc." ("Declarations), recorded on July 28, 1977. (Rec. Doc. 20 at 2). MCTA filed an Answer and Declaration of Interest ("Answer") under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 13, seeking a ruling that "the Corps is obligated to pay the yearly assessments arising from the Declarations encumbering the properties since its occupation in 2005, and for the reasonable lifetime of a townhomes association such as Mariner's Cove." Id. at 5. Alternatively, MCTA seeks a "lump sum payment which, if invested conservatively and adjusted for inflation, is a principal amount capable of generating annual interest sufficient to make up the shortfall in the funds owed." Id.
The United States' 12(c) Motion argues that this Court should dismiss MCTA's claims on the ground that (1) MCTA has no continuing right to levy assessments on the taken property because when the United States condemns property, it takes perfect, unencumbered title; and (2) the loss of MCTA's right to assess the taken property is not compensable under federal or Louisiana state law. (Rec. Doc. 51 at 2). MCTA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment urges this Court to rule that the United States must compensate MCTA for the diminution of its assessment base resulting from condemnation because such a loss is compensable under federal and Louisiana state law. (Rec. Doc. 59 at 8-14). The parties agree that federal procedural and substantive law controls in condemnation proceedings, and that courts may look to state law to determine whether a property interest is compensable under the United States Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. (Rec. Doc. 51-1 at 7, Rec. Doc. 52 at 10, 13).
After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court must decide whether the facts alleged in the pleadings, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy. Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 2001); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). When considering a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not accepted as true. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of material fact and only questions of law remain. Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998).
MCTA asks that the United States' Rule 12(c) Motion be converted into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d), which would allow the Court to consider matter outside the four corners of the pleadings, on grounds that pleadings "rarely provide a sufficient factual basis for a determination on the merits" and "the great majority of Rule 12(c) motions are converted into summary judgments." (Rec. Doc. 52 at 9). MCTA provides no argument as to how this principle applies in this case, stating only that a judgment on the pleadings would deprive MCTA of the opportunity to explain or refute facts before the Court and "wouldabrogate the rule that all facts pleaded by the nonmover are taken as true." Id. This Court is unpersuaded. First, MCTA has preserved its opportunity to refute facts, as shown in its Opposition to the United States' Motion. Id. Second, as demonstrated below, this Court adheres to, and does not abrogate, the 12(c) principle that facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmover. Accordingly, the Court shall address the United States' Motion as filed, without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. In granting the United States' Motion, this Court disposes of the case and thus declines to address the merits of MCTA's Motion.
MCTA argues that seven issues of material fact remain, such that judgment on the pleadings under 12(c) is inappropriate. This Court disagrees. First, MCTA argues that "the government ignores the fact that the ancestors in title of the Mariner's Cove properties filed [the Declarations] which, under Louisiana law, establish real rights in immovable property that apply to all successive owners [...]." (Rec. Doc. 52 at 8). The United States expressly acknowledges that MCTA filed and recorded the Declarations, citing to MCTA's Answer and the Declarations themselves. (Rec. Doc. 51-1 at 3). The United States objects only to the second part of MCTA's argument, which addresses the issue of law whether a real covenant running with the land can burden property that the United States acquired through a condemnation proceeding.
Second, MCTA urges that the United States "ignores the similarity of the facts in [Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960)] to the facts at bar." (Rec. Doc. 52 at 8). Any objection by the United States on this point is plainly tied to legal analysis, not to a dispute about the factual events at the heart of this case. Third, MCTA states that the United States "ignores that the MCTA owns no property in common with the owners ofthe Mariner's Cove properties." Id. at 8. Yet the United States explicitly agrees, stating that "MCTA adamantly states that it has no property interest in the Mariner's Cove development." (Rec. Doc. 51-1 at 13). Fourth, MCTA argues that the United States disagrees that "MCTA has been damaged by the government's abrogation of the obligations it has as owner of encumbered properties." Id. at 9. However, the United States specifically acknowledges that MCTA "may be damaged by the instant takings [...]." (Rec. Doc. 51-1 at 11). Its objection pertains not to a factual issue but to whether those damages are compensable under the law. Id.
As required by Rule 12(c), the Court takes as true the allegations in MCTA's Answer for purposes of this Motion, including the remaining issues that MCTA characterizes as issues of fact in its Opposition which are referencing allegations in MCTA's Answer. (Rec. Docs. 52, 20). Specifically, the Court finds that "MCTA is a nonprofit corporation whose sole existence is to fulfill the obligations it has to the property owners it was created to serve [...]"; "there are no contracts between the MCTA and any specific owners"; and "the Declarations do not contain a statement that the properties are governed under a condominium regime," as required by the Louisiana Condominium Act, LSA-R.S. 9:1123.101 et seq. (Rec. Doc. 52 at 8-9). None of these allegations save MCTA's claims from judgment on the pleadings.
In its Opposition, MCTA repeatedly states or implies that it has a present interest in the land at issue. See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 52 at 8 (); Id. at 9 () (emphasis added). However, it provides no argument supporting that conclusion. In oneportion of their Opposition, MCTA dispute that the United States takes perfect title to properties acquired through condemnation:
[T]he United States proposes the novel concept that, when the government takes title to a property through condemnation, it takes the property free and clear, and therefore, any rights attached to the land that the government chose not to reserve in favor of the holder of the right would then vanish into thin air because of the "perfect title" it acquired. This confounding position misses the mark entirely, and brought to its logical conclusion, would erase the concept of just compensation.
(Rec. Doc. 52 at 3). Yet at another point, MCTA agrees with the Government that condemnation grants perfect title to the United States: "MCTA [...] agrees that the government takes 'perfect title' to any...
To continue reading
Request your trial