United States v. [1] Reginald Johnson
Decision Date | 19 March 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 3:15-cr-00088,3:15-cr-00088 |
Citation | 299 F.Supp.3d 909 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. [1] Reginald JOHNSON, III [2] Aweis Haji-Mohamed [3] Marquis Brandon [5] Charles Braden |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Sunny A.M. Koshy, Van S. Vincent, Office of the United States Attorney, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.
William I. Shockley, Law Office of William I. Shockley, Meggan B. Sullivan, Law Office of Meggan B. Sullivan, David I. Komisar, Nashville, TN, Luke A. Evans, Bullock, Fly, Hornsby & Evans, Murfreesboro, TN, for [1] Reginald Johnson, III, [2] Aweis Haji-Mohamed, [3] Marquis Brandon, [5] Charles Braden.
In anticipation of the trial set to commence with jury selection on April 2, 2018, Defendants have filed a number of Motions. As a preliminary matter, all Motions to Join in the Motions filed by Co-Defendants (Doc. Nos. 503, 509, 512) are GRANTED. The remaining Motions are considered roughly in the order in which they were filed.
Brandon requests that the Court "not designate the alternate jurors in this case as ‘alternate jurors’ at the onset of the trial." (Doc. No. 475 at 1). Instead, "he suggests that at the end of the Court's final instructions to the jury the Court should randomly pick the alternates," under the theory that "this step will help ensure that all jurors remain attentive as they all believe they will be required to deliberate and render verdict." (Id. ). While "[t]here may well be benefits to selecting a jury in this manner," United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 2007), it violates the federal rules for jury selection in a criminal case.
In pertinent part, Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]lternate jurors replace jurors in the same sequence in which the alternates were selected." Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(2)(B). As the Sixth Circuit reads it, this rule1 "assumes that alternate jurors will be designated separately–and sequentially–before the trial begins." United States v. Delgado, 350 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2003). A "district court's selection of alternates by random draw just prior to jury deliberations [i]s inconsistent with the rule." Id.; see also, United States v. Seifer, 800 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2015) (); United States v. Brewer, 199 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) ( ).
Accordingly, Brandon's "Motion to Not Designate the Alternate Jurors as ‘Alternate Jurors’ " (Doc. No. 475) is DENIED . Nevertheless, and as is this Court's practice, the alternate jurors will not be informed of their status until the evidence has been presented, counsel have made closing arguments, and the jury has been instructed on the law by the Court.
(Doc. No. 480).
Without any further argument, the Court finds Brandon's request to be overbroad and impossible to police, particularly given the alleged relationships between Defendants. There may be times when a collective reference to Defendants or a subset of Defendants is appropriate, even before proof is presented about certain events. To the extent generalization prove problematic, Defendants can object, at which time the Court will consider giving the jury a curative instruction, if appropriate.
Brandon's "Motion to Prevent the Government From Referring to the Defendants Collectively Unless a Common Fact Applies to Every Defendant" (Doc. No. 480) is DENIED .
Brandon asks that he be allowed "access to the Presentence Investigation Reports ("PSR") of any cooperating witnesses at the trial in this case." (Doc. No. 489). No such witness is identified by Brandon because witness lists have yet to be exchanged.
"PSRs are confidential reports created by an arm of the court and designed for use by a judge in reaching a fair sentence." United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 940 (8th Cir. 2016). They "occupy a unique position," In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., 831 F.3d 765, 773 (6th Cir. 2016), and "ha[ve] always been jealously guarded by the drafters of the federal rules and by the federal courts," United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1996). "The commonly invoked reasons underlying PSRs' special status are threefold: (1) the defendant's interest in privacy and in preventing the dissemination of inaccurate information, (2) law enforcement's and cooperating informants' interest in confidentiality, and (3) the sentencing court's interest in encouraging the free flow of information during the presentencing process." In re Morning Song, 831 F.3d at 773.
"Neither Brady nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that a trial court produce a copy of a presentence report concerning a government witness, prepared for the court, to the defense upon request." United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1218 (6th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Additionally, "presentence reports are not statement of the defendant within the meaning of Jencks," but are "reports prepared by probation officers used primarily as an aid to district courts at sentencing" and contain "the government's version of the offense," to which defendants rarely object. United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 2005).
Nevertheless, the production of a PSR, being a discovery matter under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d), is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1218. In exercising that discretion, a court should first conduct an in camera examination of the PSR to see if disclosure is warranted. Pendleton, 832 F.3d at 940.
"This in camera review is not mandatory, however." United States v. Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 2013). "The district court need only perform the in camera examination once the defendant has ‘clearly specified the information contained in the report that he expects will reveal exculpatory or impeachment evidence.’ " Id. (quoting Trevino, 89 F.3d at 192 ). "Thus, ‘as a prerequisite for an in camera review, an accused must plainly articulate how the information contained in the PSR will be both material and favorable to his defense.’ " Id. He must also make "a threshold showing of a good faith belief that a co-defendant's PSR contains exculpatory evidence not available elsewhere." United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 2004) ; see United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 921 (8th Cir. 2010) ( ); United States v. Happ, No. CR2-06-129(8), 2008 WL 5101214, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2008) ().
At this point, Brandon does not know who the Government will call as a witness against him, and, as such, is not in a position to make any showing of the need for a cooperating witness's PSR. Nor does he know whether any such cooperating witness's PSR is in the possession of the Government. His "Motion for Disclosure of Presentence Reports of Cooperating Witnesses" (Doc. No. 489) is therefore DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Braden moves to dismiss the present indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness.
To place the Motion in context, a chronology of the case is necessary.
On June 18, 2015, a three count Indictment was returned against Reginald Johnson, charging him with the distribution of a controlled substance in or near a school or public housing, and possession of a firearm and ammunition after having previously been convicted of a felony. (Doc. No. 1). Ten months later, on April 21, 2016, a Superseding Indictment was returned adding Aweis Haji-Mohamed, Marquis Brandon, and Keno Lane, and seven new counts, including possession of an analogue substance, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, using a firearm to commit a crime of violence, possession of a stolen firearm, false declarations before a grand jury, and obstruction of justice. (Doc. No. 46). The charges were amended two months later on June 27, 2016, with the return of the Second Superseding Indictment, adding Charles Braden and Santez Bradford as defendants, and twenty-one new counts, that contained the charges already leveled, plus additional counts including conspiracy, the unlawful transfer of a firearm, theft of a firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (Doc. No. 67).
After the return of the Second Superseding Indictment, and given "the complexity of the case, the...
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