United States v. $102,836.00 in U.S. Currency

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 3:10–CV–00682–LRH–WGC.,3:10–CV–00682–LRH–WGC.
• Citation: 9 F.Supp.3d 1152
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. $102,836.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant. Santiago Cruz, Claimant.

9 F.Supp.3d 1152

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.$102,836.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant.

Santiago Cruz, Claimant.

No. 3:10–CV–00682–LRH–WGC.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Signed March 25, 2014.

Filed March 26, 2014.

Gregory W. Addington, U.S. Attorney's Office, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff.

Shawn R. Perez, Law Office of Shawn R. Perez, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant.

ORDER

LARRY R. HICKS, District Judge.

This is a civil forfeiture action. Before the Court is Claimant Santiago Cruz's (“Cruz”) Motion to Suppress Evidence Pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(8). Doc. # 27. The United States filed an Opposition (Doc. # 28), to which Cruz replied (Doc. # 31).

I. Facts and Procedural History

On July 12, 2010, Cruz was driving westbound on Interstate 80 near Sparks, Nevada when Nevada Highway Patrol (“NHP”) Trooper Jason Phillips (“Phillips”) pulled him over for speeding and for an obtrusively-placed Global Positioning System (“GPS”) device mounted on Cruz's windshield.¹ Doc. # 29, ¶ 4. Thereafter, Phillips approached Cruz's vehicle to request identification. Doc. # 29, ¶ 8. Cruz produced his Nevada driver's license. Id. Phillips informed Cruz that it was not his intention to issue a citation, but that he would conduct a routine check of Cruz's license. Doc. # 29, ¶ 9. Cruz then volunteered that the car was a rental, and produced the rental agreement, which stated that the rental period for the vehicle began on June 28, 2010, in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was due back to Las Vegas one week earlier, on July 5, 2012. Doc. # 29, ¶ 12. Cruz explained that he had extended the rental term over the phone. Doc. # 27, p. 3.

Upon approaching the vehicle, Phillips recognized the odor of marijuana and the strong odor of air freshener coming from the interior of the vehicle. Doc. # 29, ¶ 10. Phillips also observed Cruz to exhibit signs of nervousness and anxiety as he was looking for the rental agreement and repositioning the GPS device. Doc. # 29, ¶ 13. While the records check was being processed, Phillips contacted NHP Trooper Erik Lee (“Lee”) to inquire as to the availability of a canine unit. Doc. # 29, ¶ 15. Lee informed Phillips that his NHP vehicle was temporarily out of service and that he would arrive to the location with a canine as soon as possible. Id. Thereafter, Phillips requested that Cruz exit the vehicle. Doc. # 29, ¶ 11. When Cruz exited the vehicle, Phillips smelled marijuana on Cruz's person. Id. Phillips then conducted a search of Cruz's person for weapons, but discovered none. Id.

Also while awaiting the results of the records check, Phillips inquired as to Cruz's criminal history. Doc. # 29, ¶ 16. Cruz responded that he had one prior drug-related arrest. Id. Cruz's record check subsequently confirmed a drug-related arrest and conviction for drug trafficking. Id. Phillips also asked Cruz if he possessed any methamphetamine, and Cruz replied that he did not. Id. Finally, Phillips inquired about Cruz's travel plans, and Cruz stated that he was driving back from Battle Mountain, Nevada to Fairfield, California in order to pick his mother up for a friend's funeral back in Battle Mountain. Id. Cruz also stated that he had rented the vehicle in Las Vegas to drive to Battle Mountain to visit family.Id. Additionally, Cruz admitted that he used to sell drugs in Battle Mountain, but was no longer involved in that illegal activity. Id.

Thereafter, Phillips returned Cruz's license and rental agreement and informed Cruz that he would not issue a citation and Cruz was free to go. Doc. # 29, ¶ 17. Before Cruz had returned to the vehicle, Phillips asked to conduct a search of the vehicle. Id. Cruz declined, and Phillips informed him that he was being detained until the narcotics canine unit arrived. Id. Phillips then returned to his patrol car to inquire as to the availability of a canine unit with the Reno Police Department (“RPD”) or the Washoe County Sheriff's Office (“WCSO”). Doc. # 29, ¶ 18. No canine units were available from either RPD or WCSO. Id. Phillips was thereafter informed that Lee was en route to his location with a canine unit. Doc. # 29, ¶ 20. Lee and canine “Petey” arrived twenty to thirty minutes after the initial traffic stop had concluded. Doc. # 29, ¶¶ 18–20; Doc. # 27, p. 4. Upon arrival, Petey positively alerted to the trunk and the rear passenger door of Cruz's vehicle. Doc. # 29, ¶ 21. A subsequent search of Cruz's vehicle yielded two bags containing cash, one in the trunk and one in the back seat of the car. Doc. # 16, ¶ 16. The currency in the two bags totaled $102,836.00. Id. The search also yielded discovery of an air freshener container under the front passenger seat of the vehicle. Doc. # 29, ¶ 23; Doc. # 29, Ex. 17.

II. Legal Standard

Rule G(8)(a) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions provides that “[i]f the defendant property was seized, a party with standing to contest the lawfulness of the seizure may move to suppress use of the property as evidence.” A motion to suppress brought by a claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding is akin to one brought by a defendant in a criminal case. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 696–702, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to forfeiture proceedings); see also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) (requiring that seizures be made pursuant to a warrant or based upon probable cause and pursuant to a lawful arrest or search). As such, the exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture cases. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 702, 85 S.Ct. 1246 ; United States v. $493,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 518 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir.2008). The rule “bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution, as well as ‘fruits of the poisonous tree.’ ” $493,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 518 F.3d at 1164 (quoting United States v. Ramirez–Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir.1989) ). “[U]nder the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, evidence obtained subsequent to a violation of the Fourth Amendment is tainted by the illegality and is inadmissible....” Id. at 1164–65 (quoting United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 774 (9th Cir.2007) ).

III. Discussion

Here, Cruz does not challenge the legality of the initial traffic stop based on Phillips' observed traffic violations. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred); see also United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1219–20 (9th Cir.2000) (the constitutionality of a traffic stop turns on whether there was an objective basis for the officer to believe that a traffic violation or some other infraction has been committed). Rather, Cruz challenges only the legality of his “prolonged detention,” which followed the initial traffic stop, but preceded the positive canine alert and subsequent search of Cruz's rental car.² See Doc. # 27, p. 5. Indeed, the authority and limits of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigative stops of vehicles such as the one at issue here. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Specifically, courts are to evaluate “whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

A. Reasonable Suspicion

As to the first prong of the inquiry, an investigative stop is only permissible where “the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot[.]’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). Whereas, here, the legality of the initial traffic stop is not at issue, the Court must evaluate whether the officer developed a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity sufficient to justify continued investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834 (“seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission”); see also United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1100–04 (9th Cir.2008) (duration of traffic stop is evaluated for reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances; traffic stop is not unreasonably prolonged where officer briefly pauses to ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop); United States v. Motley, 344 Fed.Appx. 445, at 446 (9th Cir.2009) (30–minute delay between when officer completed his independent investigation and the time the drug dog arrived ran afoul of Fourth Amendment because officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify continued detention) (citing United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir.1973) ).

The officer “must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) ). Nevertheless, “the level of suspicion required for [an investigative] stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause[.]” Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, ...