United States v. 106.64 Acres of Land, Etc., State of Nebraska, Civ. No. 01652.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1967 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 01652. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. 106.64 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, Situated IN the COUNTY OF CHERRY, STATE OF NEBRASKA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Richard L. Edgerton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Omaha, Neb., for plaintiff.
Murl M. Maupin, North Platte, Neb., William B. Quigley, and William S. Dill, Valentine, Neb., for defendants.
This case is a condemnation action brought by the government in connection with the construction of the Ainsworth Canal by the Bureau of Reclamation. The case initially involved only those parcels of land not subject to the Canal Act of 1890, 43 U.S.C.A. § 945. That act reserved a right of way to the United States for ditches or canals constructed by the authority of the United States. The owners of such Canal Act land were entitled to just compensation from the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the Act of September 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 808, but had no right to have the courts make a determination of the amount of just compensation.
Subsequent to the filing of this action, and after the court stopped the first trial and suggested to counsel the advisability of congressional action, Congress enacted a law which amended the provision above referred to authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to pay just compensation. This amendment conferred jurisdiction on the United States district courts for the determination of just compensation for Canal Act land:
Jurisdiction having thus been conferred on this court, the complaint in this action was amended to include determination of the amount of just compensation to be paid the defendants under the provisions of 43 U.S.C.A. § 945a for takings on land which in the first trial was described as Canal Act land. The amendment to the complaint also provided that the easement exercised in the Canal Act land by the United States may be considered in conjunction with the fee estate acquired in the non-Canal Act tracts taken, as if the parcels constituted but one tract of real estate and that a total ownership may be treated as comprising both Canal Act and non-Canal Act real estate.
The case then came on for trial to a jury and substantial verdicts were returned for the landowners. For purposes of the jury's determination of just compensation, no distinction was made between Canal Act and non-Canal Act land. In fact no mention was made to the jury of these terms. The verdict of the jury did not include interest. This matter, by stipulation of the parties, was to be determined by the court. The parties agree that interest is allowable on that part of the judgment applicable to the non-Canal Act land. The question before the court is whether to allow interest on that portion of the verdict and judgment for the Canal Act lands.
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It has long been the rule in this court that "interest from the date of taking upon the fair market value of lands taken by the United States in the exercise of its right of eminent domain is to be allowed as an element of that just compensation to which the owner is entitled under the Fifth Amendment * * *." United States v. 17,280 Acres of Land, 57 F.Supp. 745 (D.C.Neb.1949) (emphasis added). If a constitutional right to just compensation exists, the right to interest, of course, exists apart from any statute. Thus, the lack of an express provision for interest in a statute authorizing compensation will not justify the disallowance of interest where a Fifth Amendment right is involved. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923). This rule of law is applicable, however, only where a right of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment is involved.
No constitutional right to just compensation arises when an easement is exercised pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. § 945. The sole right to compensation in this instance arises from the statutory authorization of 43 U.S.C.A. § 945a. This statute did not repeal the Canal Act of 1890, and did not in any way affect the Government's reservation of a right-of-way as set forth in Section 945. There being no constitutional right to just compensation for Canal Act lands, the right to interest, if any, on such awards must exist by reason of statute.
In determining whether a right to just compensation includes a right to interest the United States Supreme Court has...
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...provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." United States v. 106.64 Acres of Land, Etc., State of Nebraska, 264 F.Supp. 199, 201 (D.Neb.1967). In 106.64 Acres of Land, the district court of Nebraska held that "[n]o constitutional right to jus......
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