United States v. $134,750 U.S. Currency
| Decision Date | 24 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-1633,12-1633 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. $134,750 U.S. Currency, Defendant - Appellant, AMANUEL ASEFAW, Claimant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:09-cv-01513-RWT)
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
S. Ricardo Narvaiz, LAW OFFICES OF S. RICARDO NARVAIZ, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Christen A. Sproule, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
In this civil in rem action, claimant Amanuel Asefaw appeals the district court's order of forfeiture, entered after a jury trial, of the defendant funds, $134,750 in United States currency. The jury found that the funds were involved in or traceable to financial transactions structured for the purpose of evading a financial institution's reporting requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2006). Asefaw argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict; that the district court committed error in various evidentiary rulings; and that the forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 ("Bank Secrecy Act"), and regulations promulgated by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of the Treasury, financial institutions are required to file reports whenever they are involved in cash transactions of more than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2012).1 A report also must be filed for multiple transactions in a singlebusiness day that total more than $10,000, as long as the bank has knowledge that the transactions are by or on behalf of the same person. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.313(b).2 It is a violation of federal law for any person "to structure . . . any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions" for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). Any property involved in or traceable to illegal structuring is subject to criminal and civil forfeiture to the United States. Id. § 5317(c).
On March 28, 2008, the United States seized, pursuant to a seizure warrant, $114,750 from an account Asefaw held with Citibank and $20,000 from an account he held with Chevy Chase Bank. The government later filed a verified complaint alleging that the defendant funds were traceable to structuring to avoid currency reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), and seeking civil forfeiture under § 5317(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 981. Asefaw filed a claim to the defendant funds.
At trial, the government's evidence showed that between March 28 and April 4, 2007, in six business days, Asefaw made eighteen separate cash deposits totaling $142,950, visiting at least six different bank branches at three different banks anddepositing large sums of cash, none exceeding $10,000, into at least seven different bank accounts. He made ten deposits of exactly $10,000. On multiple occasions, he made consecutive deposits within a short window of time. For example, on April 3, he visited three different banks and made three separate cash deposits ($10,000, $6,000, and $10,000) in less than thirty minutes. Asefaw later used a series of checks and wire transfers to move the deposited funds into two accounts with Citibank and Chevy Chase Bank. The government's expert witness, IRS Special Agent Mary Ann Veloso, testified that, in her opinion, this pattern of splitting large amounts of cash into multiple deposits of $10,000 or less on the same day or consecutive days is consistent with a pattern of structuring to avoid reporting requirements.
In addition, the government called Jessica Cuevas, a Citibank employee, who testified that in August 2007 she called Asefaw and spoke to him about his currency transactions with Citibank. Cuevas wrote an email after the conversation, stating that Asefaw had admitted to depositing only $10,000 to avoid the need for a currency transaction report (CTR). The email read:
I spoke with Mr. Asefaw today. The funds he deposited were from himself since he's self-employed. He did mention he knew about the CTR and that's why he only deposited $10,000. I explained the importance of structuring deposits and filling out a CTR. He was very wary of the phone call and questioned the reasoning. He was also adamant about the fact that heis a "self-employed hard worker" and is not "doing anything illegal". [sic] He even made a reference to closing his accounts with us and moving his money somewhere else because of the phone call.
The government also offered evidence that, in 2005, Asefaw owned a grocery store that he registered with the IRS as a money services business, a specialized type of business that conducts regulated financial transactions and is subject to the Bank Secrecy Act. During the same time period, he held an account at Manufacturers and Trade Trust Company ("M&T Bank"). The government offered evidence that between August and September 2005, at least four CTR's were filed by M&T Bank for currency withdrawals made by Asefaw. The government argued that Asefaw was present when the reports were completed because he had to provide his driver's license.
At the close of the government's case, Asefaw, who was representing himself, moved the court for judgment as a matter of law. The court denied the motion. Asefaw then took the stand and testified that he "had no idea about this law" and that he never intended to make the banks fail in their reporting duties. He testified that he had opened multiple accounts to take advantage of favorable interest rates and promotions. During the time when he was making deposits and moving money around, he testified that he "thought it was a legitimatepersonal interest because nobody said anything to [him]" or told him he was breaking a law.
Following three days of trial, the jury returned a verdict for the government, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the funds seized from Asefaw's accounts were involved in or traceable to transactions structured for the purpose of evading a financial institution's reporting requirements. Asefaw made no post-trial motions. The district court then entered a final order of forfeiture against the seized funds.
Asefaw timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Asefaw first argues that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was aware of the reporting requirements and intentionally structured his deposits to evade them. However, Asefaw never filed a post-verdict motion renewing his motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). As a result, we are foreclosed from considering his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400-01 (2006); Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., MD, 515 F.3d 356, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2008).
We next address Asefaw's contention that the district court erred in allowing the government to present certain evidence. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 310 (4th Cir. 2006), keeping in mind that evidentiary errors which are harmless cannot be grounds for granting a new trial or setting aside a verdict, 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003)). An error is harmless if we can say "with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also Taylor, 193 F.3d at 235 ().
Asefaw first argues that the evidence of prior CTR's from M&T Bank and his registration of a money services business should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Because Asefaw did not raise this objection at trial, plain error review applies. See In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 631 (4th Cir. 1997) (). Under that standard, we may exercise our discretion to correct an error not raised below only if: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) we determine, after examining the particulars of the case, that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 630-31 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).
Rule 403 provides that the district court "may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, . . . [or] misleading the jury." Asefaw argues that the evidence of prior CTR's was unfairly prejudicial and misleading because all the evidence showed was that at some point he presented a driver's license during the cash transactions, not that he was actually present when the CTR's were completed. Similarly, he argues that the evidence of his money services business was prejudicial and misleading because the government failed to prove that every person who registers a money services business knows about the reporting requirements.
At most, however, these arguments suggest that the probative value...
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