United States v. 1957 OLDSMOBOILE 4-DOOR SEDAN, 11486.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 11486.,11486.
• Citation: 173 F. Supp. 956
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. 1957 OLDSMOBILE 4-DOOR SEDAN, Motor No. A078437, Serial No. 579T02143, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

173 F. Supp. 956

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. 1957 OLDSMOBILE 4-DOOR SEDAN, Motor No. A078437, Serial No. 579T02143, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Intervenor.

No. 11486.

United States District Court S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

June 4, 1959.

William B. Butler, U. S. Atty., and Norman W. Black, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

Liddell, Austin, Dawson & Huggins and W. Robert Brown, Houston, Tex., for intervenor.

INGRAHAM, District Judge.

The United States is seeking to forfeit a 1957 Oldsmobile Sedan under the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 781-788, concerning forfeiture of vehicles transporting narcotics. Intervenor, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, is the owner by assignment of all rights of the original owner of the automobile, Sam White Oldsmobile Company. The automobile was seized because it was used in the transportation of narcotics. This case is presented to the court on joint motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. As such, it is a proper case for the exercise of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

It is provided by 49 U.S.C.A. § 782 that a vehicle is not subject to forfeiture for acts committed while unlawfully in the possession of a person who acquired possession in violation of the criminal laws of any state. If one criminal law is violated when possession of an automobile is acquired initially, the automobile is not subject to forfeiture.

Intervenor has alleged that Dessara Christopher, the person from whom the automobile was seized, purchased said vehicle through the use of another person's name and thereby violated several criminal laws of the State of Texas, including Article 1436-1, Sections 59, 61, 62, and 53, Vernon's Ann.Texas Penal Code (Texas Certificate of Title Act); Article 1546a, Vernon's Ann. Texas Penal Code (making false written statement of financial condition to obtain personal property or credit); and Article 979, Vernon's Ann.Texas Penal Code (forgery). In the opinion of the court intervenor has made a sufficient showing, based on the stipulated facts, that the actions through which Dessara Christopher acquired possession of the automobile were in violation of all the criminal laws cited by intervenor; that the automobile is not subject to forfeiture under 49 U.S.C.A. § 782; and that it should be returned to intervenor.

The court believes there has been a clear showing of violation of the criminal provisions of Article 1436-1, the Texas Certificate of Title Act. Sections 59 and 61 provide in substance that it is unlawful to use a false or fictitious name or make any false statement in applying for a certificate of title to a motor vehicle. Section 62 provides that violation of any provision of the act is a misdemeanor. Section 53 provides that no title shall pass until the Act is complied with.

Dessara Christopher obtained initial possession of the automobile in violation of these provisions and violated the criminal laws of the State of Texas. Dessara Christopher violated the law by giving and writing the name of her mother, Nancy Christopher, on the conditional sale contract and having the application for the Texas certificate of title to the automobile issued in the name of Nancy Christopher. These actions constitute an intentional use of a false or fictitious name, i. e., a name other than one's own.

The court also believes that a violation of Article 1546a, making a false written statement of financial condition to obtain personal property or credit, has been shown. In substance this article provides that it is a misdemeanor knowingly to make a false written statement of financial condition with intent that such be relied upon for the purpose of procuring the delivery of personal property or extension of credit, amounting to more than $50. Dessara Christopher knowingly represented that her name was Nancy Christopher; that she was 43 years old, colored, divorced and employed in Nacogdoches, Texas, having a bank account there; and that she had $175 per month separate income from oil properties. Each of these statements is false concerning Dessara, but true concerning her mother, Nancy. These statements were reduced to writing and were made with the intent that they be relied upon. Sam White Oldsmobile Company, intervenor's assignor, relied upon them, having no actual knowledge that they were not true. As a result Dessara Christopher obtained possession of the automobile, which had a value of more than $50.

The court further believes that there has been a showing of forgery under Texas criminal law. By signing the name, Nancy Christopher, to the conditional...