United States v. 232.68 ACRES OF LAND, IN SHELBY COUNTY, Civil Action No. 499.
| Decision Date | 24 November 1944 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 499. |
| Citation | 57 F. Supp. 891 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. 232.68 ACRES OF LAND IN SHELBY COUNTY et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
C. C. Gillespie, of Memphis, Tenn., for Villa Land Co.
Sylvanus W. Polk, of Memphis, Tenn., for City of Memphis.
Charles C. Crabtree, of Memphis, Tenn., for Shelby County.
The United States filed its petition in condemnation on December 7, 1942, in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Congress approved August 18, 1890, 26 Stat. 316, as amended by the Acts of Congress approved July 2, 1917, 40 Stat. 241, April 11, 1918, 40 Stat. 518, 50 U.S.C.A. § 171, and March 27, 1942, Public Law 507, 77th Congress, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 631 et seq., which Act authorizes the acquisition of land for military or other war purposes, and the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1942, Public Law 649, 77th Congress, 56 Stat. 611, which Act appropriated funds for such purposes.
On the same date a court order was entered requiring the property owners to surrender possession on or before December 18, 1942.
The question presented in this proceeding is whether tax liens against the properties of the petitioner Villa Land Company for the year 1943 are valid and enforceable.
All necessary facts to a decision on this question have been stipulated by the parties.
Declarations of taking were not filed at the institution of the suit because of the emergency which required immediate possession by the Government, and the lack of necessary information upon which to base them, nor was an amount, estimated as reasonable compensation, deposited with the Clerk of the Court. The original petition in condemnation sought a full fee simple title to 232.68 acres of land to be used as an air supply depot, giving only a perimeter description of the entire area, which included numerous tracts belonging to the petitioner in this proceeding.
On August 23, 1943, and December 15, 1943, orders were entered by the Court dismissing from the original petition in condemnation all of these tracts except tract 60-C, which was included in a declaration of taking filed June 19, 1943, and on which the Court the same day signed a judgment vesting title in the Government. A sum estimated as reasonable compensation for tract 60-C was deposited with the Clerk of the Court and has since been disbursed, after proper deductions. At this time the Clerk is holding an amount sufficient to pay the taxes on this particular tract for the year 1943, pending a decision in this proceeding. At various dates during the year 1943, and subsequent to January 10th, all of the remaining tracts belonging to the petitioner, Villa Land Company, were conveyed to the Government by warranty deeds.
As to these remaining tracts, sufficient amounts of the agreed purchase price were withheld by the Government to cover taxes for the year 1943 pending a ruling by this Court on the question presented here. The monies so withheld were never paid into this Court, but on many of the tracts were paid by the Government to the various taxing authorities. In this situation, it is probably true with reference to all tracts except Tract 60-C the question here presented is moot, since this Court can make no valid order unless the money actually has been paid into court.
It is contended by the City of Memphis, County of Shelby and State of Tennessee that although the Government took possession of the property in December, 1942, the legal title did not pass until the Government acquired same by warranty deeds or by a declaration of taking, all of which were at a date subsequent to January 10, 1943.
Section 1351 Williams Tennessee Code Annotated, 1934, provides that all property shall be assessed to the person or persons owning or claiming to own the same on the 10th day of January of the year for which the assessment is made, if known.
Section 1329 of the Code provides that the assessed taxes on all real estate shall be and remain a first lien upon such property from the 10th day of January of each and every year, for the taxes of that year.
The status of taxes as liens on real property is to be determined by the laws of the particular state. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadephia, Pa., et al., 3 Cir., 130 F.2d 782; Board of Commissioners of Creek County, Oklahoma, et al. v. Seber et al., 10 Cir., 130 F.2d 663; Muskogee County, Okla. et al. v. United States, 10 Cir., 133 F.2d 61; United States v. Alberts et al. and United States v. Hall et al., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 217; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of San Diego et al., D.C., 44 F. Supp. 936; United States v. Certain Land in City of St. Louis, Mo., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 92.
The taxing authorities here are clearly entitled to insist on their liens on the properties involved in this proceeding. These liens, under the Tennessee law, attached on January 10, 1943, to secure payment of taxes for the entire year 1943, and it is clear that the obligation to pay same rests upon the holder of the legal title. The Supreme Court in United States v. State of Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327,...
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