United States v. $242,484.00
| Decision Date | 30 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-16485.,01-16485. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. $242,484.00, Defendant, DEBORAH STANFORD, individually and as President, Director, and Stockholder of Mike's Import & Exports, U.S.A., a Florida corporation, Claimant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, D. C. Docket No. 99-01259 CV-DMM.
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and POGUE*, Judge.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellee, the United States of America, filed a petition for rehearing. We deny the petition, but we withdraw our opinion of 22 January 2003 at 318 F.3d 1240 and substitute this opinion.
This appeal arises out of a civil forfeiture action applying 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) — the version in effect before the 2000 amendments — which provides for the forfeiture of money linked to drug crimes.1 The district court ordered the forfeiture of $242,484.00 seized from the claimant, Deborah Stanford. Stanford argues that the government lacked probable cause to support forfeiture of the defendant currency.2 The district court saw probable cause as "admittedly a close question." Because we conclude the circumstances are insufficient to establish the needed probable cause, we reverse the forfeiture order.3
Deborah Stanford is an American Citizen who was born in Surinam, South America, and lives in Miami. She is the owner and president of Mike's Import & Export U.S.A., Inc. (Mike's). Stanford's brother also played some role in Mike's operations during December 1999, when this seizure occurred. Mike's buys electronics, household and automotive goods and exports the items to South America. It is not unusual for Mike's to deal in cash. Mike's transactions are conducted in United States dollars due to the instability of the Surinamese guilder.
In December 1998, Stanford was in New York City. She says that she was there to meet with her lawyer about a lawsuit involving a 1988 car accident. While in New York, she says that she was contacted by her brother and told to pick up some money for Mike's. The cash money was delivered to her by Surinamese people whom she says she did not know. Upon receipt of the money, Stanford counted it, separated it by denomination, and wrapped it in two packages. One package was wrapped in a black plastic and the other was wrapped in a Christmas bag. The district court described the wrappings as a "cellophane-type material."
On 14 December, Stanford flew from New York to Miami. Security workers at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) questioned her about the packages. She initially refused to tell security what was in the packages but then told them that the packages contained money. Security allowed her to board her flight but notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that a woman carrying a large amount of cash was traveling to Miami.4
Believing that Stanford might be a currency courier for a drug organization, six Miami DEA agents, in three teams of two, went to the gate where Stanford's flight was scheduled to arrive. Agent Kenneth Miles saw Stanford as she walked out of the jet-way. He and Agent John Johnson approached her and identified themselves as DEA agents. Agent Miles testified that he explained to Stanford that part of his job was to ask people for their help in fighting the drug flow at the Airport.
At the agent's request, Stanford gave them her ticket and identification. They verified her name and returned the items. The agents asked her if she was carrying drugs or money; and she said she was carrying about $200,000 cash in her backpack.
Agent Miles, with Stanford's permission, looked into the backpack and saw a "Christmas bag type package." He poked a hole in the bag and could see bundles of cash inside. The cash was bundled by denomination. The bundles were not of uniform size and did not bear the binding of a bank or financial institution. The Agents asked Stanford to accompany them to the DEA office, and she agreed.
At the office, Agent Miles asked Stanford why she was in New York. She said she was there because of her court case; but later, at one point during an interrogation lasting between two and three hours, she, according to the agents, once said she was in New York to pick up money. Stanford could not, or would not, identify where she stayed in New York or who gave her the cash other then to say (according to Agent Miles) that, while in New York, she was called by her brother who told her to meet some Surinamese people and pick up money for Mike's. She did not produce documentation connecting the currency to Mike's. When asked for the total amount of the cash, Stanford said that one bundle contained $79,900 and the other $162,750, a total of $242,650.
During the airport interrogation, "Rambo," a narcotics-detecting dog, was brought into the room. Stanford's backpack was placed in a hallway with other packages of similar size and shape. Rambo alerted to Stanford's backpack.5 After the dog alert, Agent Miles prepared a receipt for the currency and gave the receipt to Stanford as confirmation of the seizure.
Stanford took the receipt and left the office. The agents packed the money inside an evidence box. On 15 December, the agents took the cash to SunTrust Bank and exchanged it for a cashier's check. The bank counted the cash, determined that there was a total of $242,484 and issued a check for that amount.
After the seizure on 14 December 1998 and before the hearing on 25-27 September 2001, the DEA performed an investigation into the surrounding circumstances, including a check into Stanford's trip to New York and the business history of Mike's Import and Export USA, Inc. The follow-up investigation revealed that Stanford, in Miami, had purchased her 93-dollar round-trip airline ticket with cash and that she "no showed" for her first return flight to Miami and then twice changed her return date. No evidence in the record indicates that Stanford had a history of involvement in drug crimes, and she was charged with no crimes in connection with these events.
Stanford argues that the government has made no showing of a connection between the money and controlled substances that rises above suspicion. We will consider all the evidence to determine whether the government has met its burden of establishing "probable cause for belief that a substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by the statute." United States v. $4,255,625.39, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. $364,960.00, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981))(emphasis omitted). The probable cause standard demands less evidence than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. But the probable cause standard demands more powerful evidence than would allow some one to suspect — even reasonably to suspect — that a substantial connection exists between the pertinent property and a drug crime. "`Probable cause' refers to `reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.'" Id. (quoting United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1980)). Probable cause exists when "the facts warrant a reasonably cautious person" to believe that the item to be forfeited is substantially related to drug crime. See e.g. United States v. Armstrong, 722 F.2d 681, 686 (11th Cir. 1984)(discussing probable cause in the context of a seizure). In this case, we stress that, because the forfeiture is pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), not just any criminal activity will support the forfeiture: the form of criminal wrongdoing must involve "the exchange of a controlled substance." Id.
"[T]he probable cause inquiry is a flexible one in which the court must consider the `totality of the circumstances.'" United States v. $121,100.00, 999 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993). "In evaluating the evidence of proceeds traceable to drug transactions, we have eschewed clinical detachment and endorsed a common sense view to the realities of normal life . . . ." United States v. Carrell, 252 F.3d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When reviewing a forfeiture order, we accept the district court's fact findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. $149,442.43, 965 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir. 1992). But in this Circuit one thing is clear: Whether the facts as found by the district court are sufficient to establish probable cause is a question of law which we review de novo. See $121,100.00, 999 F.2d at 1507.6
The district court relied on these circumstances to support its finding of probable cause: (1) "the quantity of cash and its physical condition"; (2) "the route and circumstances surrounding Ms. Stanford's travel"; (3) "Ms. Stanford's lack of knowledge concerning the circumstances surrounding her trip to New York and the receipt of this money, including her inability to identify from whom she received it"; (4) "that Ms. Stanford twice was a `no show' for her scheduled departure from New York to Miami"; and (5) a narcotics-dog alert on the cash.7 None of these things standing alone is sufficient to establish the needed probable cause. Always keeping in mind that probable cause is a totality-of-thecircumstances test, we will consider each element in turn to determine how much weight, if any, should be assessed to it as part of the whole. See United States v. $36,634.00, 103 F.3d 1048, 1054 (1st Cir. 1997).8 In conducting this analysis, we recognize that probable cause is a fact-driven, case-by-case inquiry. Kinds of facts that may be suspicious in a particular case may not be suspicious in a different case involving different circumstances.
Carrying a large amount of cash can indicate criminal activity. But it is not illegal to transport money this way.9 A large amount...
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