United States v. 3935 Cases of Distilled Spirits, Civil Action No. 1065.

Citation55 F. Supp. 84
Decision Date12 April 1944
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1065.
PartiesUNITED STATES v. 3935 CASES OF DISTILLED SPIRITS.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

McMeekin & Quinn, of St. Paul, Minn., for claimant.

Wm. P. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn., for libelant.

JOYCE, District Judge.

It is alleged by the Government that the owners of the seized property, who were licensed to do business as retailers, violated the Internal Revenue laws by engaging in business as wholesalers without payment of the wholesale dealers occupational tax required by Section 3253 of Title 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code; without making the reports required to be kept by wholesale liquor dealers pursuant to the provisions of Section 2857 of Title 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, or without securing a basic permit to purchase distilled spirits for resale at wholesale as required by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of August 29, 1935, as amended, 27 U.S.C.A. § 203.

The Government bases its authority for the seizure on Section 3116 of Title 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, which provides as follows:

"It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property intended for use in violating the provisions of this part, or the internal-revenue laws, or regulations prescribed under such part or laws, or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property. A search warrant may issue as provided in title XI of the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 228 (U.S.C., Title 18, §§ 611-633), for the seizure of such liquor or property. Nothing in this section shall in any manner limit or affect any criminal or forfeiture provision of the internal-revenue laws, or of any other law. The seizure and forfeiture of any liquor or property under the provisions of this part, and the disposition of such liquor or property subsequent to seizure and forfeiture, or the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of such liquor or property, shall be in accordance with existing laws or those hereafter in existence relating to seizures, forfeitures, and disposition of property or proceeds, for violation of the internal-revenue laws."

The claimants herein seek return of the goods and equipment seized, contending that the libel of the Government cannot be sustained under Section 3116 for the reason that that act was not intended to include all violation of the internal revenue laws but is limited to violations involving industrial alcohol, none of which is involved in this libel. So that in the final analysis the problem is one of determining the meaning and intent of Section 3116.

It is of course well settled that where a question arises as to the meaning of a statute, it is resolved by determining what was the Congressional intent. At the outset, then, the question is: Did Congress intend that Section 3116 should apply only to violations of industrial alcohol statutes?

With the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment many of the provisions of Title II of the National Prohibition Act, 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 4 et seq., had fallen, but there remained a number which retained vitality as revenue laws, some of which were vital in enforcement of Title III of the National Prohibition Act, 27 U.S.C.A. § 71 et seq., relating to industrial alcohol, which title did not fall with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Its provisions constituted an essential revenue measure, having followed similar provisions antedating the prohibition laws and requiring no constitutional amendment for their vitality. Section 25 of Title II of the National Prohibition Act provided that it was unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use or which had been used in violating Title II. It also provided for seizure and forfeiture of the liquor and property. When Title II of the National Prohibition Act was repealed, this provision of course fell and the only provisions for the seizure and forfeiture were, then, the less inclusive provisions of the internal revenue laws. United States v. Zager, D.C., 14 F.Supp. 23. On August 27, 1935, the Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, 49 Stat. 872, was enacted. Section 8 of that law was modeled after Section 25 of Title II of the National Prohibition Act. When it was reported to the House by the committee on the judiciary, Mr. Duffy, speaking for the committee, explained the purpose and intent of Section 8 as follows:

"Section 8 is modeled after section 25 of title II, which made it unlawful to have or possess any liquor, or property designed for the manufacture of liquor, intended for use in violating title II, or which had been so used, and providing for the destruction thereof unless the court should otherwise order. Search warrants were to be issued as provided in title XI of the so-called `Espionage Act' (18 U.S.C.A. secs. 611-633), which prescribes the authority to issue search warrants; the grounds and conditions thereof, etc. Section 9 sic extends this provision by making it unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property used or intended for use, in violating the provisions of this title of the bill, or of title III, or of the internal-revenue laws or of regulations promulgated thereunder. This extension bridges a gap now existing in the internal-revenue laws and in title III with regard to the seizure of property intended for use in violating the designated laws."

And on August 15, 1935, Mr. V. Simonton, a Treasury Department representative who had to do with the drafting of Section 8, explained its purpose and intent to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as follows:

"The old act read, in section 25: it shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property intended for use in violating the provisions of this title.

"We have extended that to include the possession of liquor or property...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • United States v. Plymouth Coupe
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • January 25, 1950
    ...violation of the Internal Revenue laws to forfeiture, appears clear from the wording of 26 U.S.C.A. § 3116. United States v. 3935 Cases of Distilled Spirits, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 84; United States v. One Pontiac Sedan Automobile et al., D.C., 56 F.Supp. 929; United States v. Windle, 8 Cir., 158......
  • One 1941 Buick Sedan v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • November 12, 1946
    ...of the internal revenue laws relating to spirituous liquors. See Seib v. United States, 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 673; United States v. 3935 Cases of Distilled Spirits, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 84; United States v. One 1942 Pontiac Sedan Automobile, D.C., 56 F.Supp. 929. We agree with the trial court that t......
  • United States v. 2265 One-Gallon Paraffined Tin Cans, 17193.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 24, 1958
    ...not guilty. 2 Snead v. United States, 4 Cir., 217 F.2d 912; Stroud v. United States, 5 Cir., 199 F.2d 923; United States v. 3935 Cases of Distilled Spirits, D.C., 55 F. Supp. 84; De Hart v. United States, 4 Cir., 237 F.2d 227; United States v. One Lot of Intoxicating Liquor, D.C., 27 F.2d 9......
  • United States v. One Chevrolet Four-Door Sedan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • May 11, 1957
    ...United States, 5 Cir., 185 F.2d 343; United States v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 5 Cir., 239 F.2d 102; United States v. 3935 Cases of Distilled Spirits, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 84. Little need be said as to the contention that the automobile was not used in failing to pay the tax. The offens......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT