United States v. Abelow
Decision Date | 14 April 1936 |
Citation | 14 F. Supp. 304 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. ABELOW. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Martin Conboy, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Lumbard, of New York City, for defendant.
The defendant is charged, in an indictment containing two counts, with committing perjury, and has filed a demurrer.
The basis of the charge is that on September 28, 1934, in this district, he signed and swore to an affidavit, before a competent notary public, which affidavit he knew to be false in two particulars:
(a) That the export to Bolivia of 15 machine guns manufactured by Colts Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company of Hartford, Connecticut, had been authorized by the State Department of the United States Government.
(b) That a copy of the export bill of lading or other evidence of exportation, covering the export of 15 machine guns from the United States to Bolivia, was on file and readily accessible for inspection by an authorized official of the United States.
Of course the defendant by demurring admits that the affidavit was false, but seeks to avoid going to trial, because of asserted infirmities of the indictment.
The affidavit was signed and sworn to, in order that the manufacturer of the machine guns might avoid the payment of the tax imposed by section 610 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1420 et seq. note (of 10% of the selling price of the firearms), through the operation of section 627 of the same statute, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1420 et seq. note, whereby section 1121 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 121, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1125, is called into play; that provision is to the effect that "under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary may prescribe" such taxes "shall not apply in respect of articles sold or leased for export * * * and in due course so exported * * *."
Article 3 of Regulations 46 provides that this tax is payable by the manufacturer upon all sales "whether made directly or through an agent * * *."
Section 626 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1420 et seq. note, provides that the person liable for the tax shall make monthly returns under oath "and pay the taxes imposed by this title to the collector" where his principal place of business is located. And that without assessment or notice by the latter official the tax shall be due and payable at the time fixed for filing the return.
Article 67 of Regulations 46 calls for the making of the return on form 728.
Thus it will be seen that if during September, 1934, the Colt Company made a sale of these 15 machine guns, it would have been required to make a return and pay the tax arising upon that sale, according to its return for that month, unless the sale were for export and that fact were made to appear in accordance with the regulations.
The latter are as follows (Regulations 46):
The foregoing establish the statutory and regulatory background of this indictment, except as to the Joint Resolution of Congress bearing date of May 28, 1934, to be hereinafter noted.
It will be seen that the false affidavit of the defendant was the document falling within so much of Article 75 of Regulations 46 as applies when the manufacturer is not the exporter.
It is alleged in the second count, but not the first, that the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was the purchaser of these machine guns; the first count states that the defendant's affidavit was an affidavit of export. The language is: "the said defendant made a written declaration in behalf of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, to wit, an affidavit of export, authorized by the Revenue Laws of the United States and the regulations duly promulgated thereunder, in which it was required to be stated that articles had been in due course exported from the United States, which said affidavit was sent, * * * in behalf of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation to the Colts * * * Company * * *, the manufacturer of said articles, in which * * * the defendant did unlawfully * * * and contrary to his said oath state and subscribe that the State Department * * * had authorized the export of * * * 15 machine guns, to Bolivia, which * * * was a material matter which by a law of the United States was required to be truly stated under oath, and the defendant * * * did not believe the matter so stated by him to be true * * *" and that he knew it to be false.
As to the first count then, the charge of perjury is directed to the false statement that the State Department had authorized the export of 15 machine guns to Bolivia.
The second count deals with another false aspect of the same affidavit, and the pertinent parts of the charge are: "* * * the defendant made * * * an affidavit of export, authorized by the Revenue Law * * * and the Regulations duly promulgated thereunder, which required the purchaser of articles exported from the United States to specify the evidence of exportation * * * which said affidavit was sent * * * in behalf of Curtiss-Wright * * *, the purchaser of articles exported * * * to the Colts * * * Company * * *, the manufacturer of the articles exported, in which said written declaration the said defendant did unlawfully, wilfully * * * and contrary to his said oath state and subscribe that a copy of the export bill of lading or other evidence of exportation covering the export of 15 machine guns * * * was on file and readily accessible for inspection by an authorized official of the United States which said statement * * * was a material matter which by law * * * was required to be truly stated under oath * * * and the said defendant * * * did not believe the matter so stated by him to be true and the said matter was * * * false as the defendant well knew," etc.
The attacks upon the indictment may be briefly summarized as follows:
First: That the false statement concerning the authorization by the State Department was immaterial, because it was the fact of export, and not the fact of authorization, which was required to be shown.
Second: That Article 75 of the Regulations respecting the purchaser's oath was without legal warrant, and therefore the concededly false affidavit does not support a charge of perjury.
Third: That the indictment does not allege that the untrue affidavit was that of the purchaser.
In connection with the first contention, it must be understood that between May...
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