United States v. Adams

• Decision Date: 20 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-2932,18-2932
• Citation: 934 F.3d 720
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

934 F.3d 720

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-2932

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 16, 2019

Decided August 20, 2019

Greggory R. Walters, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Peoria, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brian P. Mullins, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Rock Island, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Bauer, Hamilton, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Steven Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search warrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could rely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court properly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into account his prior drug conspiracy conviction.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third person were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to Adams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement officers were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of anonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in Keithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anonymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding arrest warrants.

During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled marijuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found a meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and marijuana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the station, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—told the arresting deputy that additional items of drug paraphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine pipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she also stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier that same day. She described the layout of the house and provided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and paraphernalia.

In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:

Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at [street address], there is often meth and cannabis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is familiar with the goings on there. She said that there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of cannabis and methamphetamine in the house.

Brandon went into great detail of Adams bedroom where she sleeps when she stays. She said she was last there at around 0430 hours this morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’ room as being in the northwest corner of the house and drew a floor plan of the house. She drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She described a dresser with a mirror on the west wall of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser, there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it. She also said that there is a colorful swirled designed "bowl" that looks like an elephant; this is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes, and maybe some meth and cannabis.

Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams have keys. She said that only Adams and she have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and she provided me one from her purse.

She said that there may be other paraphernalia in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male] stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that [Female] frequently "huffs" hair spray and has expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in the house to [Female]. This agency has also received recent information about [Male] being at the residence. [Male] had a history for possession of narcotics through Iowa.

Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior conviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from Brandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’ house from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the same day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a locked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines were inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Brandon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.

A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affidavit in support of the application did not establish probable cause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not have relied on the warrant.

The district court ruled from the bench and denied Adams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing judge had a "substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause" because Brandon had "provided firsthand detail," the information was "fresh" as it "was within a day" since she had been at the house, and the information was "in some form corroborated by the number of tips." The court noted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone they would not establish probable cause. But the court explained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunction with the other information. The court also highlighted the traffic stop of the "vehicle that involved drugs" and noted that, "to some degree," Brandon’s statements to the deputy were "against her penal interest." The court concluded: "So, I believe that all of this provides plenty of information for the establishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there is no question that there is good faith here."

Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sentencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine conspiracy conviction should not count as a "controlled substance offense" because it was conviction for only conspiracy, not actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section 2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) "subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of ... a controlled substance offense." "Controlled substance offense" is not defined in the Guideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states that the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy offenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the commentary and application note impermissibly added to the definition of "controlled substance offense" and that the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not entitled to deference.

The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court determined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to 87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

II. Analysis

Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether the state search warrant was supported by probable cause, and, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they executed the warrant. The second is whether the district court properly calculated the advisory guideline range.

A. Probable Cause and Good Faith

When reviewing a search warrant, we give " ‘great deference’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding." United States v. Miller , 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Here, that deference is given to the state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give no deference to (i.e., review de novo ) the district court’s finding that there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant. United States v. Searcy , 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We also review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies to a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v. Mitten , 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).

Probable cause exists when the circumstances "indicate a reasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in a particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a preponderance of the evidence is necessary." United States v. Aljabari , 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010) ; see generally Gates , 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only evidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant, "the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the affidavit." United States v. Bell , 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 2009). When an informant is the source of the information in an affidavit, "the probable-cause determination turns on the informant’s credibility." United States v. Hansmeier , 867 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell , 585 F.3d at 1049. We consider all relevant circumstances, including:

first, the degree to which the informant acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand observation; second, the detail and specificity of the information provided by the informant; third, the interval between the date of the events and a police officer’s application for the search warrant; and fourth, the

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