United States v. Adams
| Decision Date | 25 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 4:08-cr-00033-3 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ALPHEUS SPENCER ADAMS, Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
§ 2255 MEMORANDUM OPINION
Alpheus Spencer Adams, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner argues that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States filed a motion to dismiss, and petitioner responded, making the matter ripe for disposition. After reviewing the record, I grant the United States' motion and strike the case from the active docket.
On September 4, 2008, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Virginia returned a multi-count indictment against petitioner and co-conspirators involved in a drug-distribution conspiracy. The grand jury charged petitioner with conspiring to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 ("Count One"), and distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 ("Count Four"). The indictment included a forfeiture notice about specific real and personal property.1
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and a petit jury found him guilty of Counts One and Four on March 17, 2009. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that police used an informant tomake a controlled buy of crack cocaine in August 2008. The informant, while wearing a recorder, went to a house to buy crack and met petitioner.2 Petitioner discussed the drug trade with co-conspirators and gave the informant crack cocaine. A police officer testified that petitioner admitted that he dealt drugs to make money because he had not had a job since early 2008. Police confiscated $1,300 in a pair of pants in petitioner's house and firearms in petitioner's car and house. A chemist's certificate of analysis revealed that petitioner sold the informant 27.4 grams of crack cocaine.
I held petitioner's sentencing hearing on September 8, 2009. Counsel filed objections to the presentence report ("PSR") to argue four claims. First, the evidence was insufficient to attribute 2.4 kilograms to petitioner, which caused petitioner's base offense level to rise from 30 to 36. Second, a firearm should not be associated with petitioner's drug crimes, which caused a two-point increase to petitioner's total offense level. Third, petitioner had a minimal role in the drug conspiracy and should receive a four-point decrease to the offense level. Fourth, petitioner qualified for a safety valve provision permitted by United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 5C1.2. I denied counsel's objections and sentenced petitioner to, inter alia, 235 months' incarceration for both Count One and Count Four, to be served concurrently.3 This term of incarceration was the minimum sentence within the sentencing range recommended by the U.S.S.G.
Petitioner appealed, and counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that no meritorious issues for appeal existed but suggesting that theCourt of Appeals determine whether I erred by denying petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. Petitioner also filed a pro se appellate brief to reargue counsel's objections to the PSR. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions after specifically finding that I properly overruled counsel's objections to the PSR and adequately explained my reasoning for the 235-month sentences. The Court of Appeals further "reviewed the record in this case and . . . found no meritorious issues for appeal." United States v. Adams, No. 09-4840, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir. July 19, 2010).
Petitioner timely filed the instant § 2255 motion, arguing that counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel:
The United States filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner's claims do not entitle him to relief. The United States relies on the affidavit of petitioner's counsel's.
The United States filed a motion to dismiss that presents information outside the pleadings, which I will not exclude. Consequently, I treat the motion to dismiss as a motion forsummary judgment.4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56. A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those necessary to establish the elements of a party's cause of action. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if, in viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. The moving party has the burden of showing - "that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant satisfies this burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific, admissible facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. A party is entitled to summary judgment if the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the non-movant. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). Conversely, summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Even if there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, summary judgment is not appropriate where the ultimate factual conclusions to be drawn are in dispute. Overstreet v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1991). A court may not resolve disputed facts, weigh the evidence, or make determinations of credibility. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995); Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). The court accepts as true the evidence of the non-moving party and resolves all internal conflicts and inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Furthermore, a party "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Therefore, "[m]ere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff cannot use a response to a motion for summary judgment to correct deficiencies in a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 336 (4th Cir. 2009) (); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (same).
Courts and the public can presume that a defendant stands fairly and finally convicted after conviction and exhaustion, or waiver, of any right to appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). Nonetheless, federal convicts in custody may attack the validity of their federal sentences via 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 cures jurisdictional errors, constitutional violations, proceedings that resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice, or events that were inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. United States v.Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). A petitioner seeking relief under § 2255 must prove that: (1) a sentence violated the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence; (3) a sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) a sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Petitioner argues that his convictions were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The first prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment[,]" meaning that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The second prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to show that counse...
To continue reading
Request your trial