United States v. Adams

• Decision Date: 26 May 2022
• Docket Number: s. 19-1811 & 19-2574
• Citation: 36 F.4th 137
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Nakia ADAMS, a/k/a S, a/k/a Shawn, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

36 F.4th 137

UNITED STATES of America

v.Nakia ADAMS, a/k/a S, a/k/a Shawn, Appellant

Nos. 19-1811 & 19-2574

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued September 8, 2021

Opinion Filed: May 26, 2022

Salvatore C. Adamo [ARGUED], 1866 Leithsville Road – No. 306, Hellertown, PA 18055, Counsel for Appellant

Robert A. Zauzmer, Eric A. Boden [ARGUED], Eric B. Henson, Office of United States Attorney, 615 Chestnut Street – Suite 1250, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellee

Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

With the passage of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 – 3174, Congress codified a defendant's right either to be tried within seventy days of arraignment or indictment or to have all charges dismissed.

But it also sought to ensure that the speedy trial was a fair one, so it excluded from the running of the so-called "speedy trial clock" certain periods of delay. Three are at issue in this appeal where Nakia Adams was not tried until nearly two years after his arraignment and now contends that his conviction must be vacated on Speedy Trial Act grounds.

Adams argues that an open-ended continuance granted by the District Court did not meet the Act's criteria for tolling under § 3161(h)(7)(A), that the motions in limine filed by the Government did not qualify for the Act's exclusion of "delay resulting from any pretrial motion" under § 3161(h)(1)(D), and that his motion for discovery did not toll the clock under § 3161(h)(1)(D) from its filing through its official disposition. Because we conclude those periods of delay were excluded, we reject Adams's claim that he was tried in violation of the Speedy Trial Act. And because we also reject Adams's second claim—that the District Court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on the "knowledge-of-status" element under Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2021) —we will affirm the District Court as to all counts of conviction.

I. Background

Following a jury trial in October 2017, Nakia Adams was convicted on twenty counts of a superseding indictment, including eight for felon-in-possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and twelve for making false statements to federally licensed firearms dealers under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). These charges arose out of a straw-purchaser scheme, which Adams devised to illegally acquire firearms that he then sold or traded for drugs in Newark, New Jersey. Being himself a convicted felon, Adams was prohibited from legally possessing firearms; instead, he recruited individuals with clean criminal records to serve as his straw purchasers.

The scheme ground to a halt after Adams was arraigned on his original indictment on December 16, 2015.¹ Trial was initially scheduled for February 16, 2016, but it was rescheduled for May 16 after Adams moved for a continuance on February 4. The record from that point on is fraught with what the District Court later characterized as "numerous continuances [and] unnecessary motions," caused by Adams's "obstreperous behavior." J.A. 29. The District Court judge handled these continuances and motions with commendable professionalism, but they nonetheless resulted in more than a year of delay. We focus on three sources of that delay central to this appeal.

First is a continuance that the District Court sought to enter on May 25. Adams filed two pro se motions on April 4 and April 25, respectively. One was to replace his defense counsel, and the other was for unspecified discovery materials. Those motions prompted the District Court to strike the May 16, trial date and to schedule a hearing on them for May 25. At the hearing, however, it became apparent that the motions' resolution would not be straightforward. Adams explained that his discovery motion was motivated, in part, by his desire to personally review discovery materials, so the Court directed the parties to negotiate a stipulated protective order to accommodate Adams's request without compromising sensitive cooperator information.

The Court also addressed Adams's motion for new counsel, explaining to him that changing attorneys several months into the case would "delay [his] trial" because the Court would need to find and appoint a "new attorney" and give Adams time to "meet with that ... attorney." J.A. 133. On more than one occasion, Adams acknowledged he "underst[ood]" that a new appointment would "delay [ ] trial," but he made clear he wished nonetheless to substitute counsel. Id. The hearing concluded with the Court's statement that it would "appoint counsel, and then schedule a future status hearing ... and possibly pick a trial date at that point in time." J.A. 146. Notably, the judge did not set a particular date for that future hearing or for trial. He also did not cite 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), which allows district courts to pause the speedy trial clock by entering a continuance, or state that this continuance would serve the "ends of justice."

The May 25 hearing was not the last word on Adams's discovery motion, which is the next source of delay that concerns us. Following the hearing, the Government and Adams's new counsel, who entered the case on June 1, negotiated a stipulated protective order that outlined the materials Adams was entitled to review personally. That order was entered on June 21,² but over the next few weeks, Adams's counsel became concerned it was potentially ambiguous. Thus, at a subsequent hearing on July 11, he suggested that the parties "present another order for the Court, just so it's clear to everyone which documents [counsel was] permitted to give [Adams]." J.A. 152. The Court agreed and entered a clarifying order on July 20. On August 18, the Court denied Adams's discovery motion on the ground that "he was (and still is) represented by counsel, and therefore, not entitled to file motions pro se. " Supp. App. 3.

The final delay that looms large here resulted from two motions in limine filed by the Government on August 17, 2016: a Rule 404(b) motion to introduce evidence at trial concerning Adams's straw purchases and heroin trafficking; and a Rule 609(a) motion to introduce one of his prior felony convictions, should Adams choose to testify. The District Court issued an order directing Adams to respond to those motions no later than September 28 and held argument on November 7. At the end of argument, however, the Court opted against "making a ruling" at that time, stating that "motions in limine [ ] are issues that continue almost up until the point of trial." J.A. 189.

At this point, trial was scheduled for November 30. Before trial could commence, however, Adams requested to proceed pro se , prompting the District Court to reschedule trial for June 12, 2017, to allow Adams to move forward without counsel. And trial did begin on that date. But again, it did not go smoothly and was cut short due to Adams's conflict with his attorney. A new trial commenced several months later.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on all twenty counts of the superseding indictment on October 17, 2017. And the evidence supporting those convictions was substantial. Evidence of the scheme included testimony from five straw purchasers, who described how Adams inquired into their criminal records, only recruited buyers without prior convictions, and typically compensated them with drugs. They explained how, once recruited, they bought guns at Adams's direction at various federally licensed firearm dealers, and before each transaction, were required to fill out forms issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"). According to these witnesses, Adams directed them to lie on the forms by attesting that they were the guns' true purchasers and coached them on how to respond to each question, including one confirming that they had no prior felony convictions. He also advised them that they would be subject to criminal background checks for the purchases made in Pennsylvania, which comprised the majority.

Regarding proof of the § 922(g) felon-in-possession charges, Adams entered a so-called Old Chief stipulation, confirming the existence of his prior felony conviction, see Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), and the judge ultimately instructed the jurors on the elements of a § 922(g) offense as they were understood at the time, including (1) "that the defendant has been convicted of a felony," (2) "that after this conviction the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm," which merely required "the government [to] prove that the defendant possessed the firearm in question," and (3) that the firearm was "in or affected interstate or foreign commerce." J.A. 1217–20.

On two occasions in the lead up to his conviction, Adams argued that he had not been brought to trial within the time required by the Speedy Trial Act. On November 16, 2016, he moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, claiming that his rights under the Act had been violated because his former counsel had moved for the February 4, 2016, continuance without his knowledge. The District Court denied that motion because the continuance was valid, regardless of whether Adams knew that his attorney had asked for it. In his second motion to dismiss, Adams again alleged a Speedy Trial Act violation but did not offer specific arguments in support of his claim. That motion was likewise denied on October 17, 2017.

Upon conviction, Adams again raised this argument in his motion for acquittal or alternatively for a new trial. The District Court denied this motion on January 16, 2019, and said it would not "allow Mr. Adams to use the Speedy Trial Act as a shield for his obstreperous behavior," citing his "numerous continuances, unnecessary motions, and representation by three different attorneys," as well as the "numerous delays" resulting from Adams "attempt[ing] to proceed pro se" after repeatedly firing...