United States v. Aguilar

• Decision Date: 30 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 17-cr-00541-JCS
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOAQUIN AGUILAR, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOAQUIN AGUILAR, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cr-00541-JCS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 30, 2018

ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 12

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Joaquin Aguilar moves to dismiss the criminal information filed against him, arguing that California's one-year statute of limitations applies to the charges against him based on California law as assimilated by federal statute and regulation. The United States contends that the federal five-year, catch-all statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) should apply. The Court held a hearing on August 10, 2018. Aguilar's motion is DENIED as to Count One, but GRANTED as to Count Two.

II. BACKGROUND

The information against Aguilar, filed on October 18, 2017, reads as follows:

The United States Attorney charges:

COUNT ONE: (18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating CA Pen. Code § 466—Burglary Tools)

On or about June 7, 2016, in the Northern District of California, while on federally-owned land administered by the Presidio Trust, the defendant, JOAQUIN AGUILAR, unlawfully and knowingly possessed a master key, other instrument, and tool with felonious intent to break or enter into a vehicle, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 13, assimilating California Penal Code Section 466, a Class B Misdemeanor.

COUNT TWO: (36 CFR 1004.2(b) assimilating, CA Veh. Code §12500(a)—Unlicensed Driver) On or about June 7, 2016, in the Northern District of California, while on federally-owned land administered by the Presidio Trust, the defendant, JOAQUIN AGUILAR, unlawfully and knowingly drove a motor vehicle upon a highway without a valid driver's license in violation of Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1004.2(b), assimilating California Vehicle Code, Section 13500(a), a Class B Misdemeanor.

Information (dkt. 1) (line spacing altered).

In his present motion to dismiss, Aguilar argues that the applicable statute of limitations is one year under section 802(a) of the California Penal Code, which applies to most misdemeanors under California law. Mot. (dkt. 12) at 2. Aguilar devotes most of his argument to Count One, which assimilates California law under the Assimilated Crimes Act (the "ACA"), arguing that dismissal of Count Two is more straightforward because the regulation at issue there simply states that "traffic and the use of vehicles within the boundaries of the area administered by the Presidio Trust are governed by State law," 36 C.F.R. § 1004.2(a), which Aguilar contends "plainly includes the statute of limitations." Mot. at 2.

With respect to Count One, Aguilar argues that the ACA "instructs that defendants must receive 'a like punishment' to that they would receive in state court," and that because the state courts would not allow a prosecution commenced more than one year after Aguilar's alleged offence, his "punishment [in state court] would have been nothing." Id. at 3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13(a)). Aguilar relies on then-Judge Gorsuch's opinion for the Tenth Circuit that "'[w]hen the maximum punishment a state court can import for a conviction is "nothing," it follows that the same must hold true in a federal ACA proceeding.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1171 (10th Cir. 2013)).

Aguilar contends that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to assimilating state laws under the ACA, citing decisions holding that deferred prosecution schemes provided by the laws of Hawaii and Washington are available to defendants in federal court facing ACA charges based on the assimilated laws of those states. Id. at 3-4 (citing United States v. Sylve, 135 F.3d 680, 682-84 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bosser, 866 F.2d 315, 316 (9th Cir. 1989)). According to Aguilar, a 1988 decision by Judge Patel applying the federal statute of limitations to ACA charges did not have the benefit of the more liberal standard that the Ninth Circuitarticulated in Sylve and Bosser. Id. at 4 (citing United States v. Johnston, 699 F. Supp. 226, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1988)). Aguilar acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit recognizes limits to the scope of ACA assimilation, but argues that the logistical challenges presented by, for example, applying different parole policies or evidentiary doctrines to different groups of people subject to federal charges are not implicated by using California's statute of limitations for ACA charges based on assimilated California law. Id. (distinguishing United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1978); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965)).

Citing United States v. Kearny, 750 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that "[t]he ACA 'incorporates state substantive criminal law as federal substantive law'" but "'does not generally adopt state procedures,'" Mot. at 4 (quoting Kearny, 750 F.2d at 789), Aguilar argues that statutes of limitations are "substantive" rather than "procedural" based on their importance in protecting individuals from arbitrary enforcement by the state, and that they have been recognized as such by the California courts. Id. at 4-5 (citing, e.g., People v. Williams, 21 Cal. 4th 335, 339 (1999)). Finally, Aguilar argues that the federal limitations statute is inapplicable by its own terms because it only applies "'[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,'" and the California statute provides otherwise here. Id. at 5-6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)). Aguilar notes that the statute does not specify that it applies except as otherwise provided by federal law, and contends that it therefore should be displaced by applicable state law. Id. at 6.

The United States opposes Aguilar's motion, arguing that the charges are governed by the five-year federal limitations period. Opp'n (dkt. 14) at 1-2. The United States contends that a charge under the ACA is not enforcement of a state's laws, but rather a distinct federal charge based on the state's definition of the offense and the available punishment. Id. at 2. The United States notes that the ACA does not assimilate state statutes that would conflict with federal policy or "effectively rewrite an offense definition that Congress carefully considered." Id. (citing United States v. Reed, 734F.3d881, 888 (9th Cir. 2013)). The United States also notes that Judge Patel's Johnston decision and three other decisions by district courts have rejected arguments that state statutes of limitations should apply to ACA charges, and argues that those cases reached the correct result because the statute of limitations is not a form of punishment. Id. at 3-4. TheUnited States contends that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Christie, where the state law at issue only allowed for a conviction on the single most serious charge stemming from a single death, is a sentencing decision not analogous to the statute of limitations at issue here. Id. at 4-5. Instead, the United States argues that this case is more like United States v. White, a decision from this district where a magistrate judge dismissed charges sua sponte based on California Penal Code section 1385 but a district judge reversed, holding that section 1385's provision allowing for dismissal "in furtherance of justice" is not assimilated by the ACA because it neither defines an offense nor constitutes a punishment, but instead "'operates to free the criminal defendant from further prosecution and punishment for that crime.'" Id. at 5 (quoting White, No. 5:11-cr-00501 PSG, 2012 WL 1497518, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012)). Finally, the United States asserts that there is a "direct conflict" between the state and federal statutes of limitations, that the ACA does not assimilate statutes that conflict with federal law, and that the United States has a greater interest than California in applying its law to prosecutions for crimes allegedly committed in geographic areas within the United States' exclusive jurisdiction, because the United States is prosecuting this action and California is not a party. Id. at 5-6.

In his reply, Aguilar argues that there is no conflict between the state and federal statutes of limitations because the federal statute explicitly does not apply to cases where some other law is applicable, as Aguilar contends the state statute is here. Reply (dkt. 16) at 2-3. Aguilar also contends that because statutes of limitations restrict when a person can be punished for a crime, they can be assimilated by the ACA as related to the punishment provided by state law. Id. at 3-7. He notes that the federal statute of limitations at issue here (which, to be clear, Aguilar contends is inapplicable) prohibits any person from being "'punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed,'" and that California's statute of limitations scheme "tethers the limitations period to offense severity, revealing the interconnectedness of the limitations period and the interest in punishment." Id. at 3-5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), and citing, e.g., People v. Sedillo, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1037, 1048 (2015)). Aguilar argues that statutes of limitations are therefore analogous to the deferred prosecution systems that the Ninth Circuit held to beassimilated in Sylve and Bosser. Id. at 4-5. According to Aguilar, applying California's statute of limitations is necessary to effectuate the ACA's purpose of conforming the law governing federal enclaves to that governing the state in which the enclave is located. Id. at 7-8.

The Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs after the hearing. Aguilar's supplemental brief argues for the first time that the statute of limitations falls within the "like offense" (rather than "like punishment") prong of the ACA, noting again that the California courts have interpreted statutes of limitations as conferring substantive rights on criminal defendants. Def's...