United States v. Akeson
Decision Date | 25 September 1968 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 68-CR-115. |
Citation | 290 F. Supp. 212 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. John Virgil AKESON, John David Buttny, Mendel L. Cooper, Bruce L. Goldberg, Thomas Glenn Harris, William David Landauer, Richard Moskowitz, Thea Tenenbaum and John Weigand, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty. for the Dist. of Colo., Milton C. Branch, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.
Eugene Deikman, Denver, Colo., for defendants.
The defendants are charged by information with violating 41 C.F.R. § 101-19.304, a General Services Administration regulation proscribing "unseemly or disorderly conduct" on federal property under its jurisdiction. The defendants have moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the regulation is unconstitutionally vague. We have heard oral arguments and both parties have filed briefs. Also, we have denied the motion in an oral judgment from the bench. This memorandum will more fully expound the reasons for the denial.
The General Services Administration regulations covering conduct on federal property,1 including the regulation here in issue, are prominently displayed at the entrances to the Customs House.
The information is limited to the allegation that the defendants engaged in unseemly or disorderly conduct in violation of 41 C.F.R. § 101-19.304, and therefore the narrow question before the Court is whether the phrase "unseemly or disorderly conduct" is unconstitutionally vague within the context with which it is used in the regulation. This regulation is limited to conduct on federal property, and the concepts of "conduct" and "federal property" are of particular importance in determining the constitutionality of the regulation. The regulation here in question does not deal with conduct on public streets or parks, but rather governs conduct on government property which interferes with normal and orderly government business. The area of government property in question, the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, is not freely open to the public at the time of day involved in this case, and the public's presence there is subject to reasonable restriction. Furthermore, the right of free speech protected by the First Amendment is not involved in this case for the defendants were acting, not speaking. The defendants under the guise of the First Amendment right to peaceably assemble are apparently asserting a right to enter a government building in large groups during hours when the building is not open to the general public and to do so without being subject to limitations on their conduct once they are within the building. Although the defendants attack the regulation as unconstitutional on its face, we cannot determine its constitutionality in a vacuum, but rather we must appraise the phrase "unseemly or disorderly conduct" within the full context with which it is used in this regulation, and finally in the light of the evidence at the trial.
The "invalidity" of this regulation is asserted on two grounds: (1) that the phrase "unseemly or disorderly conduct" is too vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of due process in that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application and (2) that this phrase is so broad that it acts as an unnecessary restraint on First Amendment freedoms.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by that statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.3
Several cases have held disorderly conduct statutes unconstitutionally vague even though their breadth had been narrowed by a construction of the state court. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.Ill.1968); Baker v. Bindner, 274 F.Supp. 658, 663 (W.D.Ky. 1967); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F.Supp. 985, 997 (N.D.Ga.1967); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). On its face and without a limiting construction the phrase "unseemly or disorderly conduct" in the regulation in question raises constitutional questions. However, we are mindful of our duty to interpret federal legislation in a manner not inconsistent with the demands of the Constitution; if it can be fairly construed so as to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality, we are obligated to do so. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)4; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-502, 71 S.Ct. 857, 863, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)5; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136, 144 (7th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion); Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 938, 967 (N.D.Ill.1968); Amsterdam, The Voidfor-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 67, 86 (1960).
The fact that this regulation applies only on federal property is highly significant. This fact gives rise to a natural and normal construction of the phrase "unseemly or disorderly conduct" as prohibiting conduct on federal property which is intended to and does interfere with, delay, or impede the normal and orderly conduct of government business on such federal property. This is not a strained construction of the phrase for the regulation is clearly concerned with conduct on federal property, is entitled nuisances and is obviously meant to ensure the orderly conduct of government business on federal property.
The questions that are presented by our narrowing construction of the regulation are: (1) does the construction comply with the First Amendment guarantee of the right to peaceably assemble, and (2) if so can it be applied to the defendants in this case?
Our construction of the regulation speaks solely to conduct, not speech, and as Justice Goldberg stated for the Court in Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965):
"We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech." 379 U.S. at 555, 85 S.Ct. at 464-465.
Furthermore, we are not concerned here with conduct on public streets, highways, or parks, but rather with conduct on federal property that interferes with the normal and orderly conduct of government business. As Justice Black stated in Brown v. State of Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966):
383 U.S. at 157, 86 S.Ct. at 732 (dissenting opinion). No member of the Court has yet expressed disagreement with this proposition.
The Supreme Court has made it clear in two recent cases that those wishing to protest against governmental action or propagandize their views do not have a constitutional right to do so whenever and wherever they please. Adderley v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). In Cox, Justice Goldberg speaking for the Court wrote:
379 U.S. at 554-555, 85 S.Ct. at 464 (citations omitted).
That...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Turney v. Civil Service Com'n, No. 08CA0215.
...to administrative regulations. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); United States v. Akeson, 290 F.Supp. 212, 216 (D.Colo.1968); People v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1218-19 (Colo.1987); Barham v. Univ. of N. Colo., 964 P.2d 545, 548 (Colo.App. 1997)......
-
United States v. Cassiagnol
...regulation is applicable to acts and conduct on government property only is highly significant. As was stated in United States v. Akeson, 290 F.Supp. 212, 215 (D.Col.1968), a case in which the court upheld the constitutionality of this same challenged GSA "This fact that the regulation appl......
-
People v. Blue
...P.2d 310; Anderson v. People, 176 Colo. 224, 490 P.2d 47, Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042, 92 S.Ct. 1316, 31 L.Ed.2d 583; United States v. Akeson, 290 F.Supp. 212 (D.Colo.1968); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of University of Colorado, 258 F.Supp. 515 (D.Colo.1966). When rights come into confl......
-
State v. Comeau
...v. People, 176 Colo. 224, 490 P.2d 47 [1971], cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042, 92 S.Ct. 1316, 31 L.Ed.2d 583 [1972]; United States v. Akeson, 290 F.Supp. 212 (D.Colo.1968); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 258 F.Supp. 515 (D.Colo.1966). When rights come into confli......