United States v. Alabama Highway Express
| Decision Date | 28 August 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 11010.,11010. |
| Citation | 46 F. Supp. 450 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. ALABAMA HIGHWAY EXPRESS, Inc. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
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Jim C. Smith, U. S. Atty., of Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.
Leo H. Pou, of Atlanta, Ga., for Interstate Commerce Commission.
Leo P. Kitchen, of Jacksonville, Fla., and D. H. Markstein, Jr., and Logan & James, all of Birmingham, Ala., for defendant.
This is a criminal case brought by an information, consisting of forty-three counts, for several violations of the Motor Carrier Act. 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.
Demurrer.
A demurrer to each count has been filed, the objections being, in the main, that insufficient allegations are made to accuse the defendant of every element of the several crimes. On these questions of pleading, which are not matters of general interest, suffice it to say that, with one exception, the allegations are sufficient, especially when considered in conjunction with the published regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The demurrer will be overruled as to each count except count 25. As to count 25, it will be sustained because this last mentioned count charges the defendant with failure to show the weight of a shipment of chicken coops on the freight bill issued therefor, and the law and regulations do not appear to require the recording of the weight of such cargo, if the units, volume or measurement is shown, and there is no allegation made that the units, volume or measurement was not shown on the freight bill issued for the shipment of chicken coops in question.
Motion for Bill of Particulars.
This case does not appear to be one in which any unreasonable hardship is worked upon defendant because of its lack of knowledge of greater details of the charges against it than are contained in the information. All of the charges concern matters which are or should be matters of record in defendant's own documents or matters peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. The motion for a bill of particulars will, therefore, be overruled.
Motion for Suppression of Evidence.
Probably the issue of widest interest presented in this case is the motion of the defendant to suppress certain evidence obtained by the United States.
The evidence in question is alleged, in the motion, to be that "obtained by virtue of the unlawful and unreasonable search of all accounts, records, books, memoranda, correspondence and other documents by Hugh R. Williams and Wm. H. Young, Special Agents of the Interstate Commerce Commission, between the 1st and 20th days of June, 1941".
The motion, in brief, charges that the alleged search was without order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (hereafter called simply Commission), without informing defendant of such order if there was such an order, that it was made over defendant's objection, that if made under the Commission's general order of October 5, 1939, said general order was so broad as to violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, that the search was itself so broad in scope as to be violative of the same constitutional amendments, and that certain records, etc., searched concerned only the activities of defendant conducted exclusively by virtue of its character as an intrastate carrier.
At the outset the government contends that the motion to suppress evidence is premature; that objection to the evidence should be made if and when it is offered on trial. This contention must be rejected. Not only is a motion to suppress timely if made prior to trial, but an objection to illegally obtained evidence may be waived if not so made prior to trial. Segurola v. United States, 1927, 275 U.S. 106, 111, 112, 48 S.Ct. 77, 72 L.Ed. 186; Taylor v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 1940, 113 F.2d 825; Harkline v. United States, 8 Cir., 1925, 4 F.2d 526; Souza v. United States, 9 Cir., 1925, 5 F.2d 9; Rossini v. United States, 8 Cir., 1925, 6 F.2d 350. See Weeks v. United States, 1914, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B, 834, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1177. See Gouled v. United States, 1921, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647.
It is clear that the evidence here complained of may have been, consistently with the allegations of the motion to suppress, obtained in accordance with the applicable statute. Title 49 U.S.C.A. § 320(d), provides as follows:
Under this statute the special agents of the Commission referred to in the motion to suppress had full authority to make the inspection and...
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Cooper's Express, Inc. v. ICC, 6246.
...search and seizure within the 4th Amendment." Section 320(d) was examined by the district court in United States v. Alabama Highway Express, 46 F.Supp. 450 (N.D.Ala.1942) and was found to be constitutional within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A similar section, 49 U.S.C. § 20(5), was......
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Burnham v. United States, 5873.
...entitled to the information furnished. This belief was, of course entirely correct. 49 U.S.C.A. § 320(d); United States v. Alabama Highway Express, D.C.N.D. Ala.1942, 46 F.Supp. 450.1 There was no violation of defendant's constitutional It is true that under a doctrine sometimes miscalled "......