United States v. Albinson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-929 (E.D. Pa. 1/16/2001), CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-929.
| Decision Date | 16 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-929.,CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 95-19-01. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STANLEY ALBINSON. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Petitioner Stanley Albinson was convicted of the unauthorized sale of property of the United States government. He now seeks the return of other property seized during government searches of his 69 Mine Run Road address. He has filed a motion (Document No. 41) pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides recourse for an individual whose property was unlawfully seized or whose property was lawfully seized but is unlawfully retained by the government.1 Because I conclude that there are no remedies available to plaintiff under Rule 41(e), the motion will be denied.
Petitioner's Rule 41(e) motion has a storied procedural history. The original motion was filed on April 21, 1998. Soon after, he filed a motion for summary judgment on the Rule 41(e) motion, contending there was no genuine issue of material fact as to his entitlement to the property. After the government failed to respond to the Rule 41(e) motion for over a year, despite having been ordered to do so by this Court, default judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner, and the government was ordered to return the property to the petitioner forthwith by an order dated May 14, 1999. The government then filed a motion for reconsideration, and the Court agreed to entertain it. The default judgment order was vacated, and the government was ordered to respond to the Rule 41(e) motion. In the meantime, while his direct appeal from his conviction and sentence was pending, petitioner filed a request for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, seeking an order to compel this Court to act on his Rule 41(e) motion. The court of appeals denied the request for mandamus, noting the pendency of the motion for reconsideration before this Court. Despite this rather complex procedural history, the simple fact is that the Rule 41(e) motion and its attendant motion for summary judgment are now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.2
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant. . . .
A district court has jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 41(e) motion even after the conclusion of criminal proceedings, and the motion is treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 2000). Even if it is alleged that the property at issue is no longer in the government's possession, the district court has jurisdiction to determine whether such property was in the government's possession, and whether the government wrongfully disposed of such property. See United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 308, 411 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 378 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Although Rule 41(e) does not set forth the applicable burden of proof, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that once criminal proceedings have terminated,
the person from whom the property was seized is presumed to have a right to return, and the government must demonstrate that it has a legitimate reason to retain the property. The government may meet this burden by demonstrating `a cognizable claim of ownership or right to possession' adverse to that of the movant. The government must do more than state, without documentary support, that it no longer possesses the property at issue.
Chambers, 192 F.3d at 377-78 (); see also Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1990); Green v. United States, 90 F. Supp.2d 229, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing cases). A district court may rely on evidence developed in prior criminal proceedings in determining whether the government has met its burden of proof. See Green, 90 F. Supp.2d at 230 (citing cases).
The government argues that petitioner is not entitled to the property under Rule 41(e). First, the government argues that petitioner's guilty plea precludes him from claiming that the property was unlawfully seized, and that, in any event, the property was not unlawfully seized. Assuming the government is correct in so arguing, the argument is not dispositive because Rule 41(e) requires the return of property "unlawfully seized" or property of which the government deprived defendant. This means that even lawfully seized property must be returned to a criminal defendant when the government's need for that property has expired. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e), adv. comm. notes. to 1990 amm.; United States v. Moore, Nos. 98-30346, 98-35449, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20350 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (unreported opinion) ().
The government also argues that plaintiff cannot demand the return of the property, because the property in fact belonged to the United States government. The government contends that because plaintiff pled guilty to the unauthorized sale of property of the United States government, and because the record of his criminal case establishes that it was U.S. government property, plaintiff cannot now assert ownership of or entitlement to the property.3
While the government's argument is persuasive, it is directed at the wrong property. The government argues that the property petitioner sold to them was in fact U.S. government property, but the property of which petitioner seeks return is not the property he sold to the government, but the property the government seized during warrant searches of his 69 Mine Run Road address. According to the "Inventory of Items Seized" provided by the government, more than 200 items were seized from plaintiff's 69 Mine Run Road address which plaintiff claims were his personal property and were lawfully acquired during the course of his business of buying and selling military supplies. Plaintiff's guilty plea focused on the items he sold to undercover government agents, and he did not, in the plea agreement or during the colloquy, acknowledge that any other items he possessed were government property. Thus, petitioner's guilty plea is not enough to carry the government's burden of proof as to the ownership of the property in question here.
The government has offered the Court no other persuasive evidence of the United States' "cognizable claim of ownership or right of possession" in the items on the inventory lists adverse to that of the petitioner. At best, the government has suggested that because plaintiff sold some property of the United States to undercover agents, and because the government thought the property it seized was property of the United States, this Court may infer that the seized property was in fact the property of the United States. The paucity of the government's evidence makes it impossible for the Court to draw such an inference. The property may in fact have been government property, but the government has provided the Court with nothing on which to base such a conclusion. Moreover, in light of the government's declarations concerning the property, see infra at "Available Remedies," and for the reasons discussed below, it is highly doubtful that, at this point, the government could produce sufficient evidence to carry its burden of showing a cognizable interest adverse to the petitioner's.4
The government has not met its burden of proof on the petitioner's Rule 41(e) motion, and I conclude that on this record, but for the futility of such an order (as discussed below), petitioner's motion probably would be granted as to the items on the inventory lists.
Obviously, the proper remedy on a Rule 41(e) motion is the return of the property to the petitioner. However, the government has, through its own intentional conduct, foreclosed that remedy in this case. The government has informed the Court by declaration that, while "certain personal property was returned to defendant," the government would be unable to return to plaintiff the property listed in the inventory of items seized. (Government's Declaration Respecting Property, attached to Document No. 53, filed 6/15/99, at ¶ 2). According to the government, the "items have been either acquired by third parties or have been disposed of through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Organization which destroyed most of these items while distributing a few to military agencies." (Id.) The items distributed to military agencies cannot be traced. (Id.)
The record evidence presented by the government in this case is unacceptable. When the government seizes property pursuant to a search warrant, it does not automatically assume ownership of that property. Rather, it is required by federal law to preserve the property, keep an inventory of the items seized, and return the items unless they are contraband, forfeited, or necessary for investigative or prosecutory purposes. See United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1999). The government surely was aware of those responsibilities in this case, and it kept a detailed inventory of the items seized. Yet somehow, the more than 200 items listed on the inventory of seized property were handled as if owned by the government. Whether this destruction and...
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