United States v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 01 June 1891 |
| Citation | 46 F. 728 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. ALEXANDER et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Syllabus by the Court
Title to an office cannot be determined in a collateral proceeding but sufficient inquiry may be made to determine whether a claimant is a mere intruder or not.
De facto officers are those who act under some color of right to the office, who perform its duties, who are generally recognized as the officers, whose acts as such are acquiesced in, and their acts are valid.
Fremont Wood, U.S. Atty.
James W. Reid, for defendants.
Trial of this cause having been had and judgment rendered in the first district court of Idaho territory, and a statement upon motion for a new trial having been settled, such motion was on April 15, 1889, taken under advisement by the judge of said territorial court. On November 19, 1889, another judge was appointed, who on November 25, 1889, at Boise City Idaho, duly qualified. On November 27, 1889, the former judge signed an order overruling the motion for a new trial, which was, on December 6,1889, filed by the clerk of the court.
The defendants claim such order was made without authority, and ask its annulment. It is not, and cannot be, disputed that on the day this order was signed the new appointee was the duly appointed and qualified judge of said territorial court, and was then fully authorized to assume the duties thereof. Neither will it be doubted that if he had in fact then taken possession of such office, was then in the discharge of its duties, and was then generally known and recognized as such officer, no other person could at the same time exercise any authority as judge of that court. It must also be admitted he was the de jure judge, but it remains for determination whether his predecessor was a then de facto judge, and upon this question rests that of the validity of the order. At the threshold of the argument is raised the proposition of the right, in a collateral proceeding, to determine who was the legal officer. It is claimed that in this action we cannot look beyond the act of the officer, and investigate his title to the office, but that the order must be accepted as one made by a de facto officer, and as valid. This proposition, unconditionally accepted, would make valid the unauthorized proceedings of a mere intruder into an office; of any one who might assume, without the semblance of authority, to act, and thus leave us remediless against usurpation and the grossest injustice. While the question of strict title to an office can be inquired into and determined only by direct proceeding, and while courts will not, in a collateral proceeding, make such investigation, they may and will make such inquiry as will establish the line between the mere intruder into an office and one holding it under some color of title, some semblance of right,-- between him without any authority whatever and the de facto officer.
It has long been established that as to the public and third persons the acts of a de facto officer are valid, and their virtue cannot be impeached by any inquiry, in a collateral way, into the strict title to the office. This rule is established as a matter of public policy and necessity, for the protection of the public who have dealings with officials. It would be a disastrously inconvenient requirement that all who have business with an official person must, before it can be transacted, inquire into the validity of the officer's claim to the office, and that the...
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State v. Wilson
...whether he is an intruder, since the acts of an intruder may be treated as null and void in any proceeding. (29 Cyc., 1375; United States v. Alexander, 46 F. 728.) If officer in making an arrest acts in such a wanton and menacing manner as to threaten persons being arrested with serious bod......
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Commonwealth v. Di Stasio
...usurped authority or acts done in violation of an express constitutional or statutory prohibition are not in point. United States v. Alexander (D.C.) 46 F. 728;Keeler v. Stead, 56 Conn. 501, 16 A. 552,7 Am.St.Rep. 320;Hildreth's Heirs v. McIntire's Devisee, 1 J.J.Marsh.(24 Ky.) 206, 19 Am.D......
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Waite v. City of Santa Cruz
...perform duties belonging to a public office is a mixed question of law and of fact. State v. Taylor, 108 N.C. 196, 12 S.E. 1005; U.S. v. Alexander, 46 F. 728. And passing upon the question presented by defendant's contention upon this point it is well to first consider what facts are suffic......
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Wingler, In re
...investigation of the title to the office; for the official act of a judge de facto is as binding as that of a judge de jure. U. S. v. Alexander, D.C., 46 F. 728. When these legal principles are laid alongside the record in this proceeding, it is immediately evident that Mayor McNeil did not......