United States v. Alexis
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12cv129/RV/CJK,Case No. 3:02cr94/RV/CJK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GUERLY ALEXIS |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docs. 229, 230). The Government has filed a response (doc. 246) and Defendant has filed a reply (doc. 250). Defendant also filed a motion to amend (doc. 257) which the court denied (doc. 258). His motion for reconsideration of that order is now pending (doc. 259). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 8(a) and (b).
Defendant Guerly Alexis and his two brothers were charged in a five count indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of crack cocaine (Count One), and four substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute various controlled substances on August 19, 2002 and August 22, 2002 (doc. 2). Defendant's brothers were tried in May of 2003 and are currently serving terms of imprisonment (docs. 58, 59, 63). The marshal did not arrest Defendant until 2010 (see doc. 171).2 Defendant waived a detention hearing on May 17, 2010 (doc. 180) and on June 15, 2010 he entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment (docs. 190, 191).
In the original Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), Defendant was held accountable for the equivalent of 1,757,285 kilograms of marijuana which corresponded to a base offense level of 38 (doc. 194, PSR ¶¶ 34, 44). After a two level adjustment for obstruction of justice due to Defendant's flight to his native country of Haiti to avoid prosecution, and a three level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant's total offense level was 37 (PSR ¶¶ 48-53). Defendant had a criminal history category of VI (PSR ¶ 68). The applicable guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment.
At sentencing, Defendant objected to the amount of drugs attributed to him, noting that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy, although his brothers continued with drug trafficking activity (doc. 217 at 4). In response, the court stated that if itconsidered only the weight that Defendant acknowledged and admitted, this quantity was sufficient to sustain the offense level attributed to him. The court reasoned that sustaining Defendant's objection would not impact the sentence (id. at 8). Counsel then presented an objection to the obstruction of justice enhancement, which the court sustained (id. at 9-13). Defendant's revised offense level was 35, thus reducing the applicable guidelines range to 292 to 365 months (id. at 13; see also doc. 200, Revised Final PSR ¶¶ 48-53, 98). The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 330 months imprisonment, at the mid-point of the guidelines range.
Defendant appealed, and appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Eleventh Circuit found, after an independent review of the entire record, that there were no issues of arguable merit, and it affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on November 30, 2011. Defendant timely filed his original motion to vacate on March 12, 20123 (doc. 226 at 13). His amended motion, in which he raises four grounds for relief, is currently pending before this court. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded itsjurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Broad discretion is afforded to a court's determination of whether a particular claim has been previously raised. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) ().
Furthermore, a motion to vacate under section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal, and issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are generally not actionable in a section 2255 motion and will be considered procedurally barred.Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). An issue is "'available' on direct appeal when its merits can be reviewed without further factual development." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 n.14 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055). Absent a showing that the ground of error was unavailable on direct appeal, a court may not consider the ground in a section 2255 motion unless the defendant establishes (1) cause for not raising the ground on direct appeal, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error, that is, alternatively, that he is "actually innocent." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted). To show cause for procedural default, a defendant must show that "some objective factor external to the defense prevented [him] or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to [defendant's] own conduct." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235. A meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1344.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal and are properly raised by a § 2255 motion regardless of whether they could have been brought on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); see also United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d, 1, 8 (11th Cir. 2012). In order to prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was below an objective and reasonable professional norm and that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2013). Strickland's two part test also applies to guilty pleas. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct.1376, 1384 (2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). A defendant will be required to show that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on proceeding to trial. Id at 1384-85 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). A defendant's "after the fact testimony concerning his desire to plead, without more, is insufficient to establish" prejudice. Pericles v. United States, Case No. 12-14505, 2014 WL 2198514 (11th Cir. May 28, 2014) (quoting Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991)). In applying Strickland, the court may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim if a defendant fails to carry his burden on either of the two prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
In determining whether counsel's conduct was deficient, this court must, with much deference, consider "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Dingle v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007). Reviewing courts are to review counsel's performance in a highly deferential manner and "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2000) (); Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir. 1989) (). Counsel's performance must be evaluated with a high degree of deference and without the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To show co...
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