United States v. Allen
Docket Number | 21-00057-04-CR-W-SRB |
Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. REX M. ALLEN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant Rex M Allen's Motion for Severance (Doc. #84). For the reasons set forth below, this motion is denied.[1]
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 16, 2021, the Grand Jury returned a twelve-count Indictment against defendants Samuel Vega, Joshua R. Sanchez John E. Chandler III, Rex M. Allen, Shani L Kolar, Shenell M. Thurman, Christopher L. Patrick, and James C. Willard. Defendant Allen is charged in Counts One and Ten. Count One charges all defendants with Conspiracy to Distribute 500 Grams or More of Methamphetamine. Count Ten charges defendant Allen with Distribution of Five Grams or More of Actual Methamphetamine.
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 8(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, establishes the requirements for joinder of defendants. Defendants are permitted to be joined where “they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). “‘There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.'” United States v. Anderson, 783 F.3d 727, 743 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993)). A joint trial is especially compelling when it is charged that defendants have engaged in a conspiracy. See United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 923 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1181 (2011); United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 866 (1997). “‘The preference for joint trials of defendants jointly indicted, particularly where conspiracy is charged, is not limited by any requirement that the quantum of evidence of each defendant's culpability be equal.'” United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 610 (8th Cir. 2009)).
The question of whether joinder is proper is to be determined from the face of the indictment, accepting as true the factual allegations in the indictment. See United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 644 (8th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). See also United States v. Willis, 940 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1991) (); United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 62 (8th Cir. 1989) ().
Accepting as true the factual allegations in the Indictment, it is clear that the charge in Count One (that all defendants conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine) satisfies the requirement that the defendants are alleged to have participated in the same act or in the same series of acts constituting an offense. There is no misjoinder of defendants in this case.
“‘When defendants are properly joined, there is a strong presumption for their joint trial, as it gives the jury the best perspective on all of the evidence and therefore increases the likelihood of a correct outcome.'” United States v. Casteel, 663 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 609 (8th Cir. 2009)). However, Rule 14, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits severance where joinder would result in unfair prejudice to a defendant. The decision to sever lies in the trial court's discretion. See United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1340 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
Defendant Allen argues that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial. Specifically, the defendant states:
(Motion for Severance at 2 and 4; Doc. #84.)
Defendant Allen first argues that there is an inherent risk of substantial prejudice from the spillover effect of conspiracy evidence and that it will be impossible for jurors to compartmentalize the evidence among the various defendants. However, the Court notes that conduct in furtherance of a charged conspiracy is admissible against all co-conspirators as evidence of the conspiracy. See United States v. Ramsey, 510 Fed.Appx. 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1084 (2013). Accord United States v. Hernandez, 90 F.Supp.3d 813, 823 (N.D. Iowa 2015) ()
To the extent that evidence would be admissible in a joint trial that would otherwise not be admissible if defendant Allen were tried alone, the law is clear that a defendant is not entitled to severance simply because the evidence against a co-defendant is more weighty than the evidence against him or because evidence admissible against a co-defendant may make his case more difficult to defend. In United States v. Willis, 940 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 971 (1993), the court found:
There can be little doubt that the joint trial made it more difficult for Willis [a minor participant charged in only two of thirty-two counts] to defend himself. The evidence clearly revealed that Duke was a major drug dealer with a “far-flung” operation. But difficulty alone is not a reason to reject joinder. A showing of clear prejudice must be made.
Id. at 1139. See also United States v. Pecina, 956 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1340 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
Prejudice may occur if the jury is unable to compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant. See Willis, 940 F.2d at 1138. However, this potential problem can normally be resolved through applicable jury instructions. See Pecina, 956 F.2d at 188 () ; United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1990) (); United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1989).
There is no reason to question that any possible prejudice to defendant Allen resulting from any evidence which is not evidence of the conspiracy and/or the other charge brought against Allen and which is presented against his co-defendants cannot be resolved through precautionary jury instructions.
Defendant Allen's next argument for prejudice, mutually antagonistic defenses at trial, must also fail. Mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses are those which force the jury to disbelieve the core of one defense in order to believe the core of the other. See Hood v. Helling 141 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1004 (1998); United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1989). Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993). The mere fact that one defendant tries to shift blame to another defendant does not mandate a separate trial. See United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 873 (1997); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1996) (); United States v. Shivers, 66 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1995) (“the jury was free to disbelieve . . . both of their shift-the-blame-to-the-other-defendant stories”). A defendant is entitled to a severance based on the antagonistic defense of a co-defendant only if there is a danger that the jury will infer that the conflict in defenses alone demonstrates that both defendants are guilty. See United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1037 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 922 (2011); United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 644 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S....
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