United States v. Allsenberrie

Decision Date17 April 1970
Docket NumberNo. 16890.,16890.
Citation424 F.2d 1209
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James ALLSENBERRIE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert S. Bailey, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., William T. Huyck, Chicago, Ill., John Peter Lulinski, Michael B. Nash, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for appellee.

Before KILEY, CUMMINGS and KERNER, Circuit Judges.

KERNER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant James Allsenberrie was found guilty by a jury under a two-count indictment charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 659. Count I of the indictment charged the defendant with stealing 17 cartons of merchandise from the Terminal Transport Company on or about November 7, 1966, while the goods were traveling in Interstate Commerce. Count II charged the defendant with possession of 12 of the stolen cartons on November 10, 1966. Defendant Allsenberrie was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on each count; the sentences originally set to run consecutively for a total of twenty years. On motion for a reduction of the sentence, the sentence was reduced to provide that the sentence on each count would run concurrently. From the jury finding of guilty and the sentence of 10 years, defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant Allsenberrie was employed as a dockman for Terminal Transport Company and reported a shortage of 17 cartons of garments. Three days later on November 10, 1966, an F.B.I. agent appeared before a judge of the district court and executed an affidavit for a search warrant alleging that the stolen property was located at an establishment known as Bob's Bargain Nook and owned by Robert T. Chveja.1 That affidavit provided in relevant part as follows:

And that the facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows: that on 11/9/66, a confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised your affiant that James Allsenberrie, who is employed as a dockman by the Terminal Transport Company, Inc., on 11/7/66 stole 17 cartons of garments from the Terminal Transport Company, Inc., and took them to the Bargain Nook at 6020 S. Archer, part of which were stored in the one and one-half story frame building, part in the garage and part in a trailer without wheels on the same property west of the buildings; further, that on 11/10/66, Ray Hunter, Northern Regional Manager, Terminal Transport Company, Inc., Forestview, Illinois, advised that their records reflect a shortage of 17 cartons of garments being shipped under Terminal Transport Company, Inc., Pro Number 5775025, from Wernar Brothers, Dothan, Alabama, to Wernar Brothers, Geneva, Illinois, and that these garments are valued in excess of $100. He further advised that Terminal Transport Company, Inc., dockman James Allsenberrie in performing his duties was responsible for the handling dling of this shipment. Later, on this same date, Hunter advised that an employee of the dock, who had furnished him reliable information in the past and whose identity he declined to furnish, told him, Hunter, that Allsenberrie had taken the aforementioned 17 cartons of garments on 11/7/66 and had taken them to the Bargain Nook located at 6020 South Archer, Chicago, Illinois. This employee also told him that the goods had not been disposed of as yet and that they were still located at the above-mentioned address.
Your affiant physically observed this location on 11/10/66 and did note that the buildings matched the description as furnished by the above sources and that there is a forty foot aluminum trailer without wheels parked west of the buildings.

A warrant was issued on the affidavit and executed by agents of the F.B.I. on the same day resulting in the seizure by agents of the 12 cartons of garments — the knowing possession of which defendant Allsenberrie was charged in Count II of the indictment.

Defendant filed, prior to trial, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained via the November 10 search. The trial judge refused to hold a hearing on the motion to suppress finding that the defendant Allsenberrie was without standing to raise the constitutional issue presented under the Fourth Amendment.

The finding of the trial judge that defendant lacked standing to challenge the reasonableness of the search is the first allegation of error raised on appeal. Defendant Allsenberrie contends that since Count II of the indictment charges him with possession of the stolen goods on November 10, the day of the search, such finding of constructive possession should be sufficient to give the defendant the requisite standing.

We agree that the defendant should have been held to have the proper standing to challenge the reasonableness of the search. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part that:

A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. * * *

The United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), interpreted the meaning of "aggrieved party" and thus established who had standing to question the validity of a government search. In Jones the defendant sought to suppress a quantity of narcotics seized under an allegedly invalid warrant. The district court and court of appeals held that since the defendant had neither established that he had more than a licensee's interest in the premises nor that he was in possession of the narcotics, he lacked standing to raise the motion. The Supreme Court rejected the first reason for a denial of standing stating, "Anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." (362 U.S. at 267, 80 S.Ct. at 734.) As to the second ground — lack of possession — which directly relates to the facts of the instant case, the Supreme Court found that since the basis of the charge against defendant was possession of narcotics, it would be a "squarely contradictory assertion of power by the Government" (362 U.S. at 264, 80 S.Ct. at 732) to indict defendant for possession of narcotics but oppose defendant's motion to suppress because he did not have the requisite possession for standing:

To hold that petitioner\'s failure to acknowledge interest in the narcotics or the premises prevented his attack upon the search, would be to permit the Government to have the advantage of contradictory positions as a basis for conviction. Petitioner\'s conviction flows from his possession of the narcotics at the time of the search. Yet the fruits of that search, upon which the conviction depends, were admitted into evidence on the ground that petitioner did not have possession of the narcotics at that time. The prosecution here thus subjected the defendant to the penalties meted out to one in lawless possession while refusing him the remedies designed for one in that situation. It is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Government. The possession on the basis of which petitioner is to be and was convicted suffices to give him standing under any fair and rational conception of the requirements of Rule 41(e).
(362 U.S. at 263-264, 80 S.Ct. at 732.)

Similarly, Count II of the indictment in the instant case charges defendant Allsenberrie with possession of twelve stolen cartons of goods on November 10, the date of the search. To charge defendant with possession of the stolen goods and then find that he lacks the requisite possession in order to challenge the validity of the search we believe to be the exact inconsistent position to which the Court in Jones was directing itself.

The government distinguishes the Jones decision by limiting its application only to cases where the sole basis of the offense, as in the cases of narcotics, is possession. See United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964). In Konigsberg the court held that since possession was only one element of the crime involved and proof of possession alone was not enough to convict, the Jones rule did not apply.

We reject such a very limited application of Jones. The United States Supreme Court in characterizing its holding in Jones in a later case stated:

We held that when, as in Jones, possession of the seized evidence is itself an essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged, the Government is precluded from denying that the defendant has the requisite possessory interest to challenge the admission of the evidence.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390, 88 S.Ct. 967, 974, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).

Thus the requirement of the Jones case is not that proof of possession alone be sufficient to convict but only that possession be an essential element of the offense. We find that Count II of the indictment charging Allsenberrie with knowing and willing possession certainly charges possession as an essential element of the offense. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated in rejecting the identical government argument that Jones should be limited to its exact facts:

It is still "squarely contradictory" for the government to charge out of one side of its mouth that the defendant had possession, even though in addition to possession the government must ultimately prove other
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • State v. Matthews
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 31, 1974
    ...positions.' Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S., at 263, 80 S.Ct. (725), at 732 (4 L.Ed.2d 697). See United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209, 1212--1214 (CA7 1970); United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83--86 (CA2 1968); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 537 (CA1 1968); United State......
  • U.S. v. Mason
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • November 21, 1975
    ...States, 496 F.2d 351, 354 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Estrada, 441 F.2d 873, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1970); Oertle v. United States, 370 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. In this instance we have unsealed the FBI report in question, ......
  • U.S. v. Fogelman
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 11, 1978
    ...v. Dowdy, 455 F.2d 1253, 1255 (10th Cir., 1972); United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d 902, 904 (8th Cir., 1972); United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir., 1970). See also Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 169 (5th Cir., 1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L......
  • Duncan v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • February 4, 1976
    ...that Jones had 'been overruled 'sub silentio' by Simmons' and fould the 'argument (to be) untenable . . ..'); United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209, 1212-14 (7th Cir. 1970); Valasquez v. Rhay, 408 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir. 1969); Cook v. State, 134 Ga.App. 712, 714-15, 215 S.E.2d 728 (197......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT