United States v. Alone

Decision Date12 July 2011
Docket NumberCR. 11-50031-JLV
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LEONARD CHASE ALONE, JR., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Leonard Chase Alone, Jr., filed a motion to suppress statements obtained by law enforcement. (Docket 17). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the court's case management order (Docket 14), Magistrate Judge Veronica L. Duffy held a hearing on this matter and issued a report and recommendation. (Docket 32). The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion to suppress defendant's statement given on March 2, 2011, to FBI Agents Rice and Blackburn. Id. Defendant timely filed objections to the report and recommendation. (Dockets 36). The court reviews de novo those portions of the report and recommendation which are the subject of objections. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357-58 (8th Cir. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court may then "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).For the reasons stated below, defendant's objections are overruled and the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is adopted in its entirety.

DISCUSSION

A. Magistrate Judge's Findings of Fact

Defendant does not object to the magistrate judge's findings of fact. (Docket 36, p. 1). The magistrate judge's findings of fact are adopted by the court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

B. Magistrate Judge's Conclusions of Law

Defendant objects to the magistrate judge's conclusions of law and recommendations relating to the statements obtained from the defendant for the following reasons:

1. His statement to the FBI was not voluntary;
2. Any waiver of his Miranda1 rights was not made in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent fashion; and
3. His Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated pursuant to United States v. Red Bird, 287 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002).

(Docket 36). Each of these objections will be addressed separately.

1. STATEMENT TO THE FBI WAS NOT VOLUNTARY

Because the defendant did not object to the magistrate judge's findings of fact, those facts will not be restated and are incorporated by reference. The arguments made by defendant in support of his objections to the magistratejudge's conclusions of law and recommendations are the same arguments made to the magistrate judge before issuance of her report and recommendation. See Dockets 18 and 31.

Because Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., was of "limited intellect" and in tribal court custody for a number of tribal violations, including a charge of sexual abuse which was being investigated by the FBI agents, he argues under the totality of the circumstances the statements given to the FBI agents on March 2, 2011, were involuntary. (Docket 36, p. 2). This argument is premised on his belief the FBI agents gave him "confusing information" regarding the consequences which would occur following any statement he provided. Id.

"In considering whether a confession was voluntary, the determinative question is whether the confession was extracted by threats, violence, or promises (express or implied), such that the defendant's will was overborne and his . . . capacity for self-determination was critically impaired." United States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 1998). The court must look to the totality of the circumstances, "including the conduct of the law enforcement officials and the defendant's capacity to resist any pressure." Id.

At the suppression hearing, Agent Rice testified Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., told the agents he had dropped out of the ninth grade because he had fallen two years behind in reading and math. (Docket 27, p. 31:5-11). At the suppression hearing, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., testified he did not tell the FBIagents he had been in the special education program in school. Id. at p. 71:1923.

Before beginning the interview process, Agent Rice informed Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., that while he was in tribal custody, the FBI agents were not going to arrest him or take him into their custody that day. Id. at p. 33:17-20. He told the agents he understood he was not getting out of jail. Id. at lines 22-23.

During his discussion of the Miranda rights waiver form, Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., indicated to Agent Rice he understood what was being read to him and initialed each item to indicate he understood each provision. Id. at p. 17:2-8. At the bottom of the written waiver of rights, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., signed the form, indicating he wanted to speak with the agents. Id. at lines 13-23.

The court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion there was no evidence introduced at the suppression hearing to suggest that Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., "suffered from any condition or infirmity that made him especially susceptible to pressure from law enforcement or that the agents were aware of any special weakness and acted to exploit that weakness." (Docket 32, p. 20). In reviewing the transcript of the suppression hearing, the court agrees that while Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., is uneducated, he is not unintelligent. Throughout his testimony at the suppression hearing he was "articulate and well-spoken." Id.

While his tribal lay advocate may have told him to talk with the FBI and then he would be released from custody, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., admitted neither FBI agent told him he would be released. In fact, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., testified that while the FBI might not be holding him, there was nothing the agents could do about the tribal charges on which he was being held. Id. at p. 76:12-15. Any perception he would be released was conceived by Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., himself or as the result of his discussion with his tribal lay advocate. The agents were very clear Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., was not going to get out of jail that day because he spoke with them. The FBI agents did not coerce him and they were not aware of any outside coercion, which they might have then exploited. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,165-67 (1986).

The court finds Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., did not have any susceptibilities which caused his free will to be overtaken. Even if he was susceptible, there is no evidence the FBI agents were aware of that condition or acted to exploit any weaknesses. See United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The court finds Mr. Chase Alone, Jr.'s statement to the FBI agents was voluntary and the defendant's objection to the report and recommendation on this basis is overruled.

2. WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS

Coupled with his first objection, Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., asserts his waiver of Miranda rights was not a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.(Docket 36, pp. 2-3). The government is required to show Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., was advised of his Miranda rights, understood those rights, and then chose to make an uncoerced statement. Berghuis v. Thompkins,_ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261-62 (2010). Whether Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., effectively waived his Miranda rights requires two inquiries:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). The court concluded there was a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, so the only remaining inquiry is whether Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., was aware of the "nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Jones, 23 F.3d at 1313.

Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., did not appear to have any cognitive difficulties or misunderstand his Miranda rights when the waiver of rights form was discussed with him. (Docket 27, p. 18:1-6). His responses to Agent Rice and his testimony at the suppression hearing disclose a young man who comprehended the simple, plain English explanation of his rights and the consequences if he chose to speak with the law enforcement officers. He did not have any difficulty reading the waiver form and did not need any helpunderstanding the words used in the form. Id. at p. 74:3-7. At the suppression hearing he did not testify he did not understand his Miranda rights or the consequences of a waiver of those rights.

The court finds Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., had sufficient intellect to understand his Miranda rights and then made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights before he began the interview process. Defendant's objection on this basis is overruled.

3. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Defendant asserts the magistrate judge failed to properly apply United States v. Red Bird, 287 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002) and should have found his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. (Docket 36, p. 3). In Red Bird, the defendant was arrested on tribal charges, arraigned before the tribal court and appointed an attorney to represent him. This attorney was licensed in both tribal and federal court. Red Bird, 287 F.3d 714. Because the federal agents who interviewed Mr. Red Bird were aware of the attorney-client relationship on the same charges the agents were investigating, the court concluded Mr. Red Bird was "entitled to the protections of the Sixth Amendment." Id.

Mr. Chase Alone, Jr., was charged in Oglala Sioux Tribal Court with an offense of sexual abuse, the same incident which the FBI agents were investigating. (Docket 27, p. 30:6-8). "The Sixth Amendment right to counselis offense specific." Red Bird, 287 F.3d at 714 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)). The "tribal rape charge [had] identical essential elements when compared with the later federal charges filed. . . . the federal and tribal complaints charge the same offense for Sixth Amendment purpos...

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