United States v. Amaya

Decision Date01 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. CR 11–4065–MWB.,CR 11–4065–MWB.
Citation853 F.Supp.2d 818
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Angel AMAYA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert A. Knief, U.S. Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.

R. Scott Rhinehart, Rhinehart Law, PC, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.

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                ¦TABLE OF CONTENTS  ¦
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                ¦I.  ¦INTRODUCTION                                                   ¦820    ¦
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                ¦    ¦A.  ¦Procedural Background                                      ¦820   ¦
                +----+----+-----------------------------------------------------------+------¦
                ¦    ¦B.  ¦Factual Background                                         ¦821   ¦
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                ¦II.  ¦ANALYSIS                                                      ¦824    ¦
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                ¦    ¦A.  ¦Fourth Amendment Violation                                 ¦825   ¦
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                ¦    ¦    ¦1.  ¦Binding appellate precedent                           ¦826   ¦
                +----+----+----+------------------------------------------------------+------¦
                ¦    ¦    ¦2.  ¦Reliance on binding appellate precedent               ¦829   ¦
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                ¦    ¦B.  ¦Discovery Violation                                        ¦831   ¦
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                ¦      ¦                                                              ¦      ¦
                +------+--------------------------------------------------------------+------¦
                ¦III.  ¦CONCLUSION                                                    ¦833   ¦
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I. INTRODUCTION

This case boasts an unusual and endlessly surprising history—one that includes two mistrials and intervening United States Supreme Court authority on the use of GPS devices. Before me now is defendant Angel Amaya's Motion To Suppress GPS System (docket no. 299), in which he moves to suppress evidence derived from the installation and use of GPS devices, without a warrant, on all vehicles in which he had an expectation of privacy.

A. Procedural Background

On July 28, 2011, a Superceding Indictment was returned against defendant Angel Amaya and five co-defendants, charging them with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of pure methamphetamine or 500 grams of methamphetamine, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. In addition, the Superceding Indictment charges defendant Amaya and three co-defendants with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), and 1956(h).1 On October 12, 2011, the first day of the trial of defendant Angel Amaya and his co-defendant Javier Amaya,2 I granted a mistrial after the prosecution's first witness, Special Agent David Jensen, referred to material barred by a sealed motion in limine ruling. That mistrial was the result of a docketing snafu—the prosecutor did not receive the sealed motion in limine ruling prior to the trial and, thus, did not inform his witnesses of this court's restrictions on evidence in this case.3

On December 19, 2011, the first day of our second attempt to try this case, defense counsel informed me that the prosecution's discovery file did not include any information regarding the use of GPS devices to collect evidence in this case. Defense counsel reported that they had only become aware of the use of a GPS device on defendant Angel Amaya's vehicle through the testimony of the government's first witness, Special Agent Jensen. The defendants then orally moved for a mistrial, which the prosecution opposed. I granted the defendants' motion for mistrial. The defendants then orally moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. After receiving briefing from the parties, I denied the defendants' motion for mistrial with prejudice on January 26, 2012, after finding that there was no evidence that the prosecution “intended to ‘goad’ the defendant[s] into moving for a mistrial.” See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).

On January 23, 2012, the United States Supreme Court delivered its opinion in United States v. Jones, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), in which it held that “the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ Id. at 949 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, on January 31, 2012, I invited defendant Angel Amaya and his co-defendant Javier Amaya to file motions to suppress GPS-derived evidence based on Jones.4 On February 9, 2012, defendant Angel Amaya filed his Motion To Suppress GPS System (docket no. 299), in which he moves to suppress all information and evidence seized as a result of law enforcement's installation and use, without a warrant, of GPS tracking devices on vehicles in which he had an expectation of privacy. The Government filed its Resistance (docket no. 300) on February 15, 2012. Amaya 5 submitted his reply (docket no. 303) on February 22, 2012. I held an evidentiary hearing (docket no. 313, Minute Entry) on Amaya's suppression motion on March 5, 2012, in which Special Agent Jensen, the case agent, testified, and Amaya offered into evidence several DEA reports regarding surveillance in this case. At the hearing, I requested supplemental briefing on whether the good faith exception applies in this case and whether sanctions should be imposed for the prosecution's failure to provide notice in discovery that law enforcement had used GPS surveillance. The prosecution filed its supplemental brief (docket no. 320) on March 14, 2012, and Amaya submitted his supplemental response (docket no. 332) on March 26, 2012.

B. Factual Background

Law enforcement agents used GPS devices on nine vehicles while investigating this multi-defendant case. Originally, Amaya moved to suppress evidence derived from GPS installation and use on the black GMC Yukon, the grey Dodge Ram truck, the black Nissan Maxima, and any other vehicles in which Amaya had an expectation of privacy. However, at the suppression hearing, the parties agreed that the vehicles at issue are Amaya's black GMC Yukon; a black Nissan Maxima registered to another individual but used by Amaya; and his sister's blue Nissan Murano, during the time that Amaya borrowed it and drove it to Texas. The parties agreed that Amaya had an expectation of privacy in these vehicles,6 and the prosecution indicated that evidence derived from the use of GPS on these vehicles may be used in the prosecution's case against Amaya.7

The agents did not have a warrant to use GPS devices to monitor Amaya. All devices ran on battery power and were affixed to the outside of the vehicles. The agents switched the devices on and off remotely and would switch the devices off when not in use to conserve battery life. When switched on, the GPS devices were set to ping at fifteen second intervals, and the location of the vehicle would be transmitted to a website where agents could then access the location information. Special Agent Jensen testified that agents used GPS devices in their investigation, as follows:

Q: What was the purposes of the trackers in this investigation?

A: To aid in surveillance. If the vehicle we were following went into a remote area or we felt our vehicles were being seen too many times by the occupants or if we lost the vehicle at a traffic light, I would send out a signal to the tracker to send me a report of its location. Once we caught up with the vehicle, we would turn the tracker off and let surveillance take its course.

Suppression Hearing Transcript (H.Tr.) at 14 (docket no. 330).

Agents first used GPS in this case on March 18, 2011, when they attached a GPS device to Amaya's black GMC Yukon, his primary vehicle, while it was sitting in the driveway of his residence, with the end of the vehicle hanging over the sidewalk. The driveway was short, such that a longer vehicle could not park on it without its end hanging over the sidewalk. There were no fences or gates around the driveway and no bushes to obscure the view of the driveway from the sidewalk or street. Before initially applying the device, agents learned that a state trooper had stopped Amaya, while driving a pickup on I–29, after the trooper received a call that Amaya's vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and that the occupants were smoking marijuana. During the stop, Amaya reported that he was traveling to a Wells Fargo Bank in Omaha to transfer...

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