United States v. Anderson

Decision Date17 July 1942
Docket NumberNo. 15267.,15267.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California
PartiesUNITED STATES v. ANDERSON et al.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Wm. Fleet Palmer, U. S. Atty., and Maurice Norcop, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

J. George Ohanneson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

YANKWICH, District Judge.

By the indictment, filed on March 4, 1942, three persons, the defendants on trial, Gunard Hubert Anderson, Joseph Aimino, and one Alfred Sackett, were charged with conspiracy to take and carry away and abet and aid in taking and carrying away for their own use, with the intent to steal and purloin the same, property which was being made, manufactured and constructed under contract for the War Department of the United States, — to-wit, scrap aluminum and other usable salvage being made, manufactured and constructed in airplanes by the North American Aviation, Inc., under contract for the War Department of the United States.

Four overt acts were set forth in the indictment:

1. That on or about March 1, 1941, defendant Joseph Aimino received from defendant Gunard Hubert Anderson at Los Angeles, California, the sum of $15.

2. That on or about July 19, 1941, defendants Alfred Sackett and Gunard Hubert Anderson sold to one Finkelstein Foundry Supply Company approximately 1,508 pounds of aluminum at Los Angeles, California.

3. That on or about September 6, 1941, defendants Alfred Sackett and Gunard Hubert Anderson sold to Finkelstein Foundry Supply Company, approximately 1,294 pounds of aluminum at Los Angeles, California.

4. That on or about January 6, 1942, at Los Angeles, California, defendant Gunard Hubert Anderson had in his possession approximately 896 pounds of aluminum rivets.1

Ordinarily, in a conspiracy matter, any important question of law relates to the conspiracy itself. This, because the conspiracy is stated plainly in the indictment, the meaning of the law charged to be violated is clear, or the enactment has been on the statute books so long that no question as to its meaning is raised. In a conspiracy case, the conspiracy is the offense. And before a defendant can be convicted, it must be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was a party to the conspiracy and that the unlawful agreement charged continued up to the time when an overt act was committed.

The other element of the offense is the specific intent to promote the common design. This may be inferred from the evidence, and from the acts and declarations of the members of the conspiracy, made while the conspiracy is in progress. The overt act, which must be proved, is any act committed by any one or more of the conspirators which has a tendency to forward its purpose.2

Here, however, while these principles still govern the determination of the guilt or innocence of these two defendants, the stress of the whole case is laid upon the object of the conspiracy, namely, the violation of Section 82 of Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated. The section was first enacted in 1909. It was amended in 1918 and in 1938.

It has been before the courts in very few cases. But such courts as have had cases under it, including our own Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that the object of the section is to introduce the crime of larceny into the Federal Criminal Code.

In Frach v. Mass, 9 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 820, 821, we find these words: "Larceny of property of the United States is made a crime by 18 U.S.C.A. § 82."

This means of course, that in interpreting the statute, we may apply the principles governing the common law crime of larceny, as interpreted by the courts of various states.

The most important question in the case is the meaning of the words "property which has been or is being made, manufactured, or constructed under contract for the War or Navy Departments of the United States."

Originally, the section merely applied to property of the United States or any branch or department of the United States. Then was added, as Government activities expanded, property of corporations in which the United States of America was a stockholder. And, finally, the phrase just given.

During the course of the other trial before a jury, in passing on the admissibility of evidence, I made an elaborate statement of my interpretation of this section. Counsel for the Government have incorporated it in their argument.3 There is, therefore, no need for re-elaboration here. A summary will suffice.

I am of the view that the word "property" in this phrase is used in its broadest sense. Had the Congress intended to confine the offense to property "owned" by the United States, there would have been no need to specify property of a corporation in which the United States is a stockholder. Ordinarily, there is no special state law, which makes it a state offense to steal property of a corporation because a particular stockholder owns stock. The larcenous act lies in stealing the property of a corporation, regardless of the interest of a particular stockholder. It is larceny, so long as ownership is in some one else than the thief. But, evidently, in order to avoid the claim that only property which is in the absolute ownership of the United States could be the subject of this crime, the Congress included property belonging to a corporation in which the United States is a stockholder. They did not say a sole stockholder or even a majority stockholder. But they did not stop there. They added: "or any property which has been or is being made, manufactured, or constructed", etc.

We, thus, have two kinds of property which come within the purview of the statute, so far as this case is concerned.

First, property which has already been made, manufactured or constructed under contract for the War or Navy Departments of the United States. That would mean a completed thing, — an airplane, a ship, a gun.

The alternative phrasing "which * * * is being made, manufactured, or constructed", etc., would be meaningless, if we interpreted the enactment as referring only to a completed thing.

They intended by these words to cover something else. The beginning of the section, in its original form, had already included all property belonging to the United States. The obvious interpretation of the section, therefore, is that when they said, in the alternative, "or is being made, manufactured, or constructed under contract for the War or Navy Departments of the United States", they intended to include something less than a completed article, — something incomplete, which was, for the moment, under the control of the person making it, manufacturing it or constructing it for the United States, and in which either the War or Navy Department had an interest, arising through contract.

The words "made, manufactured, or constructed" cover almost everything which the skill of man can make out of raw materials. They have been given the broadest meaning by courts4. The word "property" also requires a broad construction.

Generally, "property" expresses the sum of all the rights and powers incident to ownership. It includes any interest in anything which may be the subject of ownership and the right to dispose of such interest.5

The words "property * * * being made, manufactured, or constructed", would lack meaning, if I held that the only property which is the subject of this section is "property" which has passed into the ownership of the United States, because that is covered by the original section.

If we say that these words mean that there must have been a manufactured part, such as a wing or part of the fuselage or an engine or any other completed equipment, actually manufactured on the place, we limit the scope of the section, unjustifiably.

I think that what the Congress sought, by the section, was to protect the rights of the Government in property which had either been completed or was being held for delivery for the United States, or property as well as materials which were in the process of being made, manufactured or constructed into parts for completed objects under contract with the Navy or War Department of the United States. Of necessity, therefore, pieces of dural, so important in the construction of airplanes, and which as the testimony shows indisputably, could be turned into parts by the machine shops in the plant of North American Aviation, Inc., are clearly within the statute. We have the testimony of the foreman of the machine shop of the Aviation Company that several different parts, such as a nose wheel timing valve, which is Exhibit 32, a swivel pin, which is Exhibit 33, Exhibit 34, the designation for which escapes me, could be made out of the pieces of dural taken by the defendant, and be incorporated into an airplane. The same is also true of Exhibit 31, a system exhaust valve. Exhibit 35 is a retainer for air emergency air brake valves, and Exhibit 36 resembles an ordinary large valve about an inch and a half wide. All are usable parts.

I am of the opinion that when a manufacturer is in the process of constructing, making or manufacturing a thing, not only the finished object, but also the raw material which is held available for its construction, is within the designation of "property * * * being made, manufactured, or constructed." This conclusion leaves very little to be added by way of comment on the facts. The evidence shows clearly that large pieces of dural, which came under the designation of salvage, and which were designated as acceptable material in the contract between Anderson and the Aviation Company, were taken from the plant, as a result of a conspiracy between him and the defendants Aimino and Sackett.

In view of Sackett's plea of nolo contendere, his connection with the case has not been gone into fully. It was also unimportant, except to indicate that he agreed to a false bookkeeping system to cover up the large amount of dural which was coming through.

Even if we...

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7 cases
  • Morissette v. United States 8212 10, 1951
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1952
    ...with intent to steal or purloin * * * any property of the United States * * * shall be punished as follows * * *.' In United States v. Anderson, D.C., 45 F.Supp. 943, a prosecution for conspiracy to violate that section, District Judge Yankwich said: 'It has been before the courts in very f......
  • Benson v. Kwikset Corp., G030956.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • February 10, 2005
    ...manufactured, or constructed' cover almost everything which [human] skill ... can make out of raw materials." (United States v. Anderson (S.D.Cal.1942) 45 F.Supp. 943, 949.) "[T]here are many [judicial] holdings and statements to the effect that, to constitute manufacturing, ... the operati......
  • Benson v. Kwikset Corp., G030956.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 2004
    ...manufactured, or constructed' cover almost everything which [human] skill ... can make out of raw materials." (United States v. Anderson (S.D.Cal.1942) 45 F.Supp. 943, 949.) "[T]here are many [judicial] holdings and statements to the effect that, to constitute manufacturing, ... the operati......
  • Benson v. Kwikset Corp., G030956.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 2007
    ...manufactured, or constructed' cover almost everything which [human] skill ... can make out of raw materials." (United States v. Anderson (S.D.Cal.1942) 45 F.Supp. 943, 949.) "[T]here are many [judicial] holdings and statements to the effect that, to constitute manufacturing, ... the operati......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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