United States v. Anghaie
| Decision Date | 29 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:12-cv-102-RS-GRJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SAMIM ANGHAIE and SOUSAN ANGHAIE, individually and d/b/a NEW ERA TECHNOLOGY, INC., and NEW ERA TECHNOLOGY, Defendants. |
The United States initiated this action by filing a Complaint pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (FCA). Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the FCA in connection with Small Business Administration (SBA) program contracts administered by the Department of the Air Force (AF) and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, (NASA), both federal agencies.1 The circumstances underlying the Complaint lead to the individual Defendants' prosecution and conviction of criminal conspiracy and wire fraud charges following a jury trial. See United States v. Anghaie, Case No. 1:09-cr-37-MP-GRJ. The individual Defendants are now proceeding pro se in this case, and the Clerk entered a default as to the corporateDefendant, New Era Technology, Inc. (NETECH), due to that Defendant's failure to obtain Counsel. Docs. 55, 56.
Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on all claims, and Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Counts 2 and 3 on statute of limitations grounds, and partial summary judgment as to damages on the remaining 20 counts of the Complaint. Docs. 20, 42. Each party has responded in opposition to the other party's motion. Docs. 33, 46.2 Consideration of the motions was deferred pending settlement negotiations, but such negotiations have concluded in an impasse and this case is now set for trial on December 8, 2014. Doc. 64.
For the following reasons, it is clear that Defendants' summary judgment motion asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to Counts 2 and 3 and contending that the United States incurred no damages is due to be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Doc. 42, be denied. The United States' summary judgment motion, Doc. 20, raises separate and complex factual issues stemming from the lengthy criminal trial, and therefore Plaintiff's summary judgment motion will be addressed in a separate Report and Recommendation.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the entry of summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In applying this standard, the Court must examine the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and other evidence in the record "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Samples on Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F. 2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). As the Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact. If the movant is successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party who must then come forward with "sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove." Rollins v. Techsouth, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). The non-moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other admissible evidence to demonstrate that a material fact issue remains to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2005). At the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249. Some degree of factual dispute is expected, but to successfully counter a motion for summary judgment the factual dispute must "affect the outcome of the suit" and must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248.
The following facts are undisputed by the parties. NETECH was a Florida forprofit corporation formed in 1989 by Sousan Anghaie and Samim Anghaie. Between 1999 and 2009, Samim Anghaie was employed full time as a professor at the University of Florida and served as the Director of the Innovation Nuclear Space Power and Propulsion Institute (INSPI) at UF, a UF-sponsored research center. The Complaint in this case concerns four funded contracts within the SBA's Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR), as administered by NASA and the Air Force, that were awarded to NETECH for the development of an innovative nuclear fuel for aerospace applications: NNC07CA14C ("N14C"), NNM04AB19C ("N19C"), NNC06CA72C ("N72C"), and FA9550- 06-C-0099 ("AF99").
Relative to these four and other contracts, the individual Defendants were charged in a superseding indictment on December 20, 2010, with sixty-two counts of violations of federal law including conspiracy, wire fraud, false statements to a federal agency, and money laundering. See Superceding Indictment, Case No. 1:09-cr-37-SPM-GRJ, Doc. 69.
Defendants were granted a Judgment of Acquittal on ten substantive counts of wire fraud and five substantive counts of money laundering (Counts 23-31, 42, 52-56) on the grounds that such counts were barred by the general federal five-year statute of limitations for criminal offenses. See Case No. 1:09-cr-37-SPM-GRJ, Doc. 114. The jury acquitted Defendant Samim Anghaie of eight substantive counts of wire fraud (Counts 10, 11, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 45). Id. Doc. 123. The jury acquitted Defendant Sousan Anghaie of nine substantive counts of wire fraud and one count of knowingly and willfullymaking and using false documents (Counts 10, 11, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 44, 45, and 61). Id. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the counts involving allegations of money laundering or, as to Sousan Anghaie, on the count of making false statements (Counts 48-51, 57-60, 62). Id.
The Court entered a civil forfeiture judgment against Defendants in the amount of $390,252.91. Id. Doc. 151. The Court declined, however, to award restitution to the United States, finding that no actual loss to the United States, as the victim, had been established for purposes of restitution. Id. Doc. 238.
The instant Complaint alleges 22 counts of FCA violations. Count 1 of the Complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to submit false claims in connection with the contracts, in violation of 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(3). Counts 2-22 collectively allege that Defendants made false certifications and representations when initially submitting the contract proposals, when filing technical reports, and when submitting invoices for payment, on 22 separate dates under four contracts. Some of the claims are identical to the counts of conviction in the underlying criminal case, some of the claims are identical to counts in the indictment for which Defendants were acquitted, and some of the claims were not prosecuted in the criminal case. See Doc. 1; Case No. 1:09-cr-37-MP-GRJ, Doc. 69 (superceding indictment).
A successful FCA claim requires proof of the following: (1) a false or fraudulent claim; (2) which was presented, or caused to be presented, by the defendant to theUnited States for payment or approval; (3) with the knowledge that the claim was false. United States v. R & F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005). 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1) provides that a civil action under the False Claims Act may not be brought more than six years after the date on which the violation of the Act is alleged. The limitations period for FCA claims is computed from "the date on which the violation of [the FCA] is committed," and the "violation" is the submission—not the payment—of a false claim. Smith v. United States, 287 F.2d 299, 303-04 (5th Cir.1961) ( ). See also Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 2449 (2005) (). The FCA's six-year limitation period may be tolled for three years from the date when "facts material to the right [of] action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances." 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2).
With respect to the instant summary judgment motion, Counts 2-4 of the Complaint concern alleged false claims relating to contract N19C. Counts 2 and 3, which are the subject of Defendants' asserted statute of limitations defense, allege transactions on January 19, 2006, and April 7, 2006. Doc 1. These transactions were not the subject of the criminal prosecution. See Case No. 1:09-cr-37-MP-GRJ, Doc. 69 (superceding indictment). Defendants contend that they are entitled to summaryjudgment on Counts 2 and 3 because the six-year FCA statute of limitations expired prior to the May 11, 2012, filing of the Complaint. See Doc. 42; 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). Defendants further contend that 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) provides a "safety net" in the event the material facts underlying a complaint were not timely discovered. Defendants contend that NASA Special Agent Mazzella and the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida filed affidavits in a series of civil forfeiture cases on February 19, 2009, more than three years prior to the date the United States filed the instant action,...
To continue reading
Request your trial