United States v. Ansani

Decision Date05 January 1955
Docket NumberNo. 54 Cr. 556.,54 Cr. 556.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. ANSANI, Harvey Milner, John Edward Moore, alias Claude Maddox, alias John Manning, Joseph J. Aiuppa, and Ray Johnson, co-partners doing business as Taylor & Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Robert Tieken, U. S. Dist. Atty., by Raymond C. Muller, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for the U. S.

George F. Callaghan, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Moore and Aiuppa.

Samuel S. Brown, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Ansani, Milner and Johnson.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

This is a four-count indictment, charging each of the five defendants with violations of the penal provisions of Chapter 24 of Title 15, enacted in 1951, found in 15 United States Code Annotated, at § 1171 and following. Section 2 of the Chapter provides that it shall be unlawful "knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in a State * * *."

I eliminate some.

"* * * from any place outside of such State." The Section does not apply to the transportation of gambling devices to a State, or a subdivision of a State, which has enacted a law providing for the exemption of the State or subdivision from the provisions of the Section. Section 3 of the Chapter provides that each manufacturer of or dealer in gambling devices shall register his name and address with the Attorney General upon first engaging in business, and thereafter upon the first day of July of each year. Section 3 also provides that each manufacturer of or dealer in gambling devices shall file monthly records of all sales and deliveries of gambling devices, together with an inventory with the Attorney General. Section 4 of the Chapter provides that all gambling devices, when shipped or transported, shall be plainly labeled or marked so that the name and address of the shipper and consignee and the contents of the package may be readily ascertained on an inspection of the outside of the package.

Count one of the indictment charges that on February 26, 1954, the five defendants knowingly shipped and caused to be transported in interstate commerce four mechanical devices known as "trade boosters," which are alleged to be essential parts of slot machines. It is alleged that the defendants shipped these "trade boosters" from Chicago, Illinois, to Williamsport, Pennsylvania, and that neither the City of Williamsport nor the State of Pennsylvania had enacted any law providing for the exemption of said City or said State from the provisions of Section 2. Count two of the indictment charges that the five defendants knowingly failed to file with the Attorney General any inventory and record of sales and deliveries of gambling devices for the month of February, 1954, including a record of the sale and delivery of the four "trade boosters" alleged in count one of the indictment. Count three charges that the defendants knowingly failed to register with the Attorney General as dealers in gambling devices. Count four charges that the defendants knowingly shipped four "trade boosters" on February 26, 1954, as alleged in count one, without plainly marking the containers to indicate that they contained gambling devices. The defendants have moved to dismiss each of the four counts of the indictment.

Counts one and four shall be considered together, for they both relate to the actual transportation of the alleged gambling devices. They charge that the defendants shipped gambling devices in interstate commerce, and that the devices so shipped were not placed in plainly marked packages. Only two of the many points raised by the defendants with respect to these counts in my opinion deserve comment. First, with respect to count one, the defendants point out that the indictment charges them with transportation of a device known as a "trade booster," which is "a subassembly and essential part intended to be used in connection with so-called slot machines." The defendants contend that the statute does not define "gambling device" to include a subassembly and essential part of a slot machine. The relevant parts of Section 1 of the Statute read as follows:

"As used in this chapter —
"(a) The term `gambling device' means —
"(1) any so-called `slot machine' or any other machine or mechanical device an essential part of which is a drum or reel with insignia thereon * * *.
* * * * * *
"(3) any subassembly or essential part intended to be used in connection with any such machine or mechanical device."

According to the defendants, "any such machine or mechanical device", as used in subsection 1(a) (3), refers to the phrase "any other machine or mechanical device" in subsection 1(a) (1), so that the subsection 1(a) (3) cannot refer to subassemblies or essential parts of "any so-called `slot machine.'" In my opinion it need only be said in answer that under the accepted canon of construction the phrase "any other machine", in subsection 1(a) (1), modifies the phrase "any so-called `slot machine'", and includes only machines of the same general class as slot machines. It is therefore clear that subsection 1(a) (3) is limited to subassemblies of slot machines and other machines which have the general characteristics of slot machines, and that the indictment, which charges the transportation of subassemblies of slot machines, states an offense against the United States, as defined in the Statutes.

Second, with respect to count four, the defendants argue, on the basis of United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 74 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed. 179, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1953, that Section 4 of Chapter 24 relates to both interstate and intrastate transactions, and is therefore unconstitutional. However, in United States v. Five Gambling Devices, the Supreme Court construed the statute to relate only to interstate transactions, and this indictment clearly charges an interstate shipment. The same answer might be made to similar challenges to counts two and three of the indictment — these counts relate to a shipment of gambling devices from Illinois to Pennsylvania, and arguments based on the case of United States v. Five Gambling Devices, which was limited to intrastate shipments, are wholly without merit, in this case.

I have carefully considered other objections to counts one and four of the indictment, as raised by...

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3 cases
  • United States v. Ansani
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • February 1, 1957
    ...to imprisonment for one year and one day and fined $1,000.00. The decision of the District Court is reported in United States v. Ansani, D.C.N.D.Ill., 138 F.Supp. 454. Numerous points are raised by defendants, the most substantial of which is whether the devices in question, i.e., certain "......
  • State v. Rullestad
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1966
    ...monthly inventories and records of sales with the attorney general, each of which was an unlawful sale or delivery, United States v. Ansani, 138 F.Supp. 451 (N.D., Ill.1955) ; required a truck driver with an overweight load to drive onto scales as ordered, Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137......
  • State v. One Slot Machine, 13253
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 18, 1957
    ...U.S. 842, 74 S.Ct. 16, 98 L.Ed. 362; United States v. 19 Automatic Pay-Off Pin-Ball Machines, D.C. 113 F.Supp. 230; United States v. Ansani, D.C., 138 F.Supp. 451, 454. In each of these cases the machines in question had been altered in such manner that the coin operation or the automatic p......

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