United States v. Antinori, 6400.
Decision Date | 01 June 1932 |
Docket Number | No. 6400.,6400. |
Citation | 59 F.2d 171 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. ANTINORI. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
W. P. Hughes, U. S. Atty., of Jacksonville, Fla.
Wm. M. Gober, of Tampa, Fla., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, FOSTER, and SIBLEY, Circuit Judges.
On June 10, 1929, appellee, Paul Antinori, pleaded guilty to several counts of an indictment charging violations of the Narcotic Act (26 USCA §§ 211, 691 et seq.). A sentence of four years' imprisonment in the Atlanta penitentiary was imposed on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The judgment further provided that the execution of sentence be suspended for four years and Antinori be placed on probation on terms stated.
At a subsequent term, on June 9, 1931, on motion of the United States Attorney, suggesting that Antinori was guilty of transporting and possessing intoxicating liquor, in violation of the National Prohibition Act (title 2, § 3 27 USCA § 12), his probation was revoked, but the court, as appears from the order, found that he had not been guilty of any violation of the Narcotic Act, and that the offense of transporting and possessing intoxicating liquor did not warrant the imposition of a four years' sentence. The judgment was modified, and he was sentenced to be imprisoned in the county jail for a period of twelve months.
It is not disputed that the court had jurisdiction to suspend the sentence, but it is contended by the government that the court was without jurisdiction and authority to reduce the sentence from four years to twelve months after the expiration of the trial term, notwithstanding the provisions of the probation laws.
The Probation Law, Act March 4, 1925, as amended, so far as necessary to quote, provides:
Conceding that, under the well-established rule, the District Courts of the United States cannot amend or set aside a final judgment after the term at which it is entered, unless a proceeding for that purpose was begun during the term, U. S. v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 35 S. Ct. 16, 59 L. Ed. 129, it could not be questioned that Congress could change the rule by statute.
The Probation Act is remedial. Its history and intent are discussed in U. S. v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347, 48 S. Ct. 146, 72 L. Ed. 309, to which we may refer without repeating what was there said. As is well expressed in the act itself, the law is designed to vest the trial judges with discretion to extend mercy to the defendant when the ends of justice and the best interests of the defendant and the general public would be subserved thereby. The act gives the trial court au...
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Roberts v. United States 15 8212 18, 1943
...had construed the Act as authorizing in that circumstance a judgment which reduced the term of the original sentence. United States v. Antinori, 5 Cir., 59 F.2d 171; Scalia v. United States, 1 Cir., 62 F.2d 220. ...
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United States v. Smith
...a liberal construction and one which will effect the purposes of Congress.6 Scalia v. United States, 1 Cir., 62 F.2d 220; United States v. Antinori, 5 Cir., 59 F.2d 171; Reeves v. United States, 8 Cir., 35 F.2d 323; Nix v. James, 9 Cir., 7 F.2d 590. It was the intention of Congress to effec......
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Roberts v. United States
...or the suspension of sentence and to then impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed. This court in United States v. Antinori, 5 Cir., 59 F.2d 171, construed the probation statute to provide for retention of the trial court's jurisdiction beyond the judgment term, and uphe......